Afghanistan, Troop Withdrawals, and Strategy

June 22, 2011

By: Kerry Patton

On October 11, 2001, then Undersecretary of Defense Douglas Feith wrote a “secret” three-page memo for the Secretary of Defense that outlined what Feith thought the US military’s “Afghanistan Strategy” should consist of.

 

Declassified in May 2005, Feith’s memo identified Al Qaeda and the Taliban as key actors in Afghanistan that needed to either physically be eliminated, or their rule and power terminated. But while Feith’s “strategy" outlined what the military’s objectives in Afghanistan ought to be, he also specified what the US Armed Forces should not be engaged in.

 

Combating Al Qaeda, according to Feith, was the key focal point of our strategic objectives in Afghanistan. The United States, he strategized, needed to eliminate Al Qaeda’s leadership and its forces by utilizing Afghan combatants from “whatever” Afghan factions that were willing to assist us, coupled to the implementation of incentive programs and assisting the cooperating Afghans with equipment and financing.

 

Since those lofty aspirations were identified, the US has spent billions of dollars providing hefty incentives to the Afghan people for their help in our Global War on Terror (GWOT). We have equipped numerous elements of Afghan’s security forces, like the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National and Border Police, to name a few.

 

But after all that, of the four “goals” Feith listed as necessary to combat Al Qaeda, we have achieved only two.

 

Today, Bin Laden has been eliminated, but Al Qaeda’s leadership remains intact. And while the leaders of the terrorist group come and go, their positions remain. We worked extremely close (and sometimes very well) with numerous tribal groups in the early years of the GWOT in Afghanistan, but once the official Afghan security organizations blossomed, some could argue we turned our cheeks to those tribal elements that were still willing to assist us to secure their tribal boundaries. Two of the four points related to Al Qaeda that Feith identified swiftly faded into the dusty mountainsides of the country, never to fully be achieved.

 

But Al Qaeda was not the only focal point in Feith’s Afghanistan Strategy. The Taliban also had to be reckoned with, he understood. The two central goals that were set forth to deal with the Taliban were, first, “terminate rule of current Taliban leadership to make an example out of them (as a state sponsor),” and to “undercut Al Qaeda.” Second was the creation of “a stable, post-Taliban Afghanistan,” which Feith said in his memo “is desirable but not necessarily within the power of the US.”

 

Taliban rule in Afghanistan clearly has been marginalized through a centralized government, but this fragile government likely will shatter immediately upon full withdrawal of US forces. The Taliban still enjoys majority support throughout many of the nation’s isolated villages. Stability remains elusive given that the country has had an extremely difficult time maintaining any historically prolonged stability. Luckily, though, we realized this going into the war and ensured that this was not “necessarily within the power of the US,” as Feith so deftly pointed out.

 

Still, of all the elements of Feith’s strategy for defeating Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan, we have achieved only two of the six objectives that he identified in the years since the US carried its GWOT to Afghanistan. While some may argue, perhaps, that a few other of Feith’s objectives have at least been quasi-achieved, such debate is highly subjective.

 

Interestingly, on the last page of Feith’s 2001 memo to the SecDef, he made one extremely interesting point; and that was “nation Building is not our key strategic goal.” And “not” was underlined, thus the emphasis was the US should not be in the business of nation building in Afghanistan.

 

But for those who served in Afghanistan, they know that what was emphasized as not being our strategic goal in fact became just that. We have Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT’s) all over the country. They build clinics, schools, roads and other forms of infrastructure across the nation. Disturbingly, though, some sources have stated that Afghanistan has become a “quantitative” war, meaning that in order to be promoted, you better be able to either show how many people you killed, or how much money you spent, which Feith’s memo appears to clearly indicate isn’t the situation he intended.

 

So, what has happened in Afghanistan during the decade since Feith penned his Afghanistan Strategy? Well, leaders have come and gone who’ve taken on new responsibilities and authority who've focused on ideas and objectives that frequently have been shaped, if not required, by Washington’s politically expedient winds. Throughout the war, surges occurred, draw downs resulted, surges reassumed, and now, it appears, we will see yet another draw down by summer 2011.

 

It’s hard to fight an unconventional, asymmetric war like this one.

 

Yet, those who fought - and who continue to fight - demonstrate to the world just how powerful the individual US soldier, sailor, airman and Marines truly are. They make up the best fighting force the world has ever seen, bar none! Our brave men and women serving abroad have, and continue, to do what very few Americans could ever comprehend performing based solely on faith, honor and espirit de corp. And they do it without ever openly complaining to the public. They did – and continue to do - what they were tasked to do by not just their superiors, but their country. And they’ve done, and do it, with valor. They are what make America universally enviable.

 

In the process, however, we have lost many - too many – of our soldiers and airmen on the battlefields of Afghanistan. Those patriotic heroes and their families will forever remain in the daily prayers of many of us who are safe and sound back home, far removed from the horror of this war. After nearly ten years of brutal modern warfare and only two of the six key goals that Feith outlined having been achieved in Afghanistan, the question that policymakers must now ask is this: how much longer will we need to risk more lives fighting this war to accomplish the remaining four goals as were identified by Feith? There is no better time than now to begin the withdrawal of our troops from the blood soaked soil of Afghanistan.

 

The war, it can be argued, for practical purposes was won in 2002 when we ousted the Taliban from dominion over the Afghan people and extinguished Al Qaeda’s sanctuaries across their land. And now, with the life of Osama Bin Laden – effectively the near messianic leader of these two clearly aligned groups - Al Qaeda no longer is a threat in Afghanistan when compared to other locations around the world like Yemen, Somalia … even the United States where jihadist lone wolves are being converted, radicalized and recruited.

 

But instead, we are doing exactly what Feith said we should not do in Afghanistan. And that is “nation building.” It’s time we stop these activities and bring the majority of our weary troops home to their families and loved ones. Let them regroup, reorganize, and refit so they are better prepare for operations elsewhere … like, maybe, on the US/Mexican border.

 

Kerry Patton served in both the US Defense and Justice departments and was a contractor for the departments of Homeland Security and State. He worked in South America, Africa, the Middle East, Asia and Europe focusing on intelligence and security matters. He personally interviewed current and former terrorists, including members of the Taliban, and is author of, “Sociocultural Intelligence: The New Discipline of Intelligence Studies.” President of the SOCINT Institute, Patton also is co-founder of the National Security Leadership Foundation, a non-profit organization pending 501c (3) status. He can be reached at: kerry(at)socintinstitute.com