Some Afghans being allowed into the United States cannot cut their Taliban ties.

Abdul Ahamad sat outside the offices of the Bagram Afghanistan counterintelligence support team. He sat perfectly still trying hard to control his breathing. He was about to undergo the most important interview of his life.

He wore a suit his uncle had traveled to Pakistan to purchase just for the occasion. He had never worn a suit before and the stiff collar combined with the stifling summer Afghanistan, late morning heat, generated a continuous flow of tiny streams of perspiration that rolled slowly down his back tickling him as they went, as if to say, “You’re kidding yourself. You know, you don’t belong here.”

In his lap he held a neat file folder containing a dossier that had been compiled specifically for him and tendered forth a multitude of arguments designed to portray Abdul as the perfect candidate for a visa to the United States under the Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) program. If his answers during this interview are sufficient, he will have cleared the last great hurdle to gaining admission to the United States.

His background had been checked by the government of Afghanistan and they had, in their infinite wisdom proclaimed him free of condemnation. He had further been checked by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the results predictably, had been inconclusive, indicating that this individual had no known criminal record nor active or closed investigations.

He had in his possession sterling written recommendations from his O-6 (colonel) commander and several of the men he had worked with in his capacity as CAT I, (category one, local national, non-security cleared) linguist.

Comments such as, “This man has served with honor,” and “he has risked,” and “Abdul has contributed…” were liberally scattered throughout the many pages of documents. What was excluded however was the fact that as many as seven times in the past six months Abdul had made direct contact with some of the most notorious and powerful members of the Haqqani network and had spoken specifically to the son of it’s founder, Sirajuddin Haqqani.

Abdul’s reasons for seeking a visa to the United States were many. Anyone enduring the harsh life of such a poor country would yearn for the freedom and comfort offered by America. If he were granted such a visa however, he would not—could not—leave behind the radical influences with which he had grown to manhood. Those who had mentored and urged him to pursue this access to America would certainly continue to be a controlling force in his actions.

Persistent attempts

A red team analysis brief provided to then-Lt. Gen. Stanley McChrystal in mid-2009 indicated an excess of 100 reported attempts at infiltration by anti-coalition forces each month throughout early 2009. Mullah Mohammed Omar, the “Supreme Taliban commander,” and Sirajuddin Haqqani, the leader of the fiercely anti-US Haqqani network had both directed operatives to increase efforts to infiltrate ANSF, (Afghan National Security Forces), Afghan Police, Afghan security training centers, and of utmost importance, the ever-growing force of CAT I linguists who work most directly with and have the highest level of access to the command structures within coalition forces. The ultimate goal of such directives should be obvious.

In mid-2008, the United States government approved Section 1244 of Public Law 110-181 establishing a completely distinct SIV program authorizing 5,000 numbers per fiscal year for certain nationals of Iraq and Afghanistan who have been employed by, or on behalf of the United States Government to receive immigrant visas to the America. The Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009 (Law 111-8 of March 10, 2009) extended the period of eligibility for Afghan Special Immigrants for resettlement assistance, entitlement programs, and other benefits to up to eight months from their date of admission. 

This move to provide immigrant status and government assistance to individuals met with little resistance due primarily to America’s dismal record of extending protected status to US allied Vietnamese soldiers and linguists after our defeat in that country. Our government could not afford to make that same mistake again. The rush to implement this new visa program has however, laid the groundwork for a much more costly and disastrous mistake.

In the words of Stephen A. Edson, the deputy assistant secretary of State before the House Foreign Affairs Committee and subcommittees on the Middle East and South Asia and International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight, on March 11, 2008, efforts to issue SIV visas to translators and interpreters must be accelerated:

“We quickly built a robust system to meet the additional workload through the coordinated efforts of our domestic and overseas operations. In the final days of the fiscal year we knew we would be very close to the goal, but issuing all 500 was not a certainty. Using the best estimates we could devise we scheduled sufficient appointments   to ensure that all would be used. Domestic operations in the Bureau of Consular Affairs were continued throughout the final weekend of the fiscal year, as our Middle East posts operate on the US weekend, to monitor number usage and guarantee that any demand for available numbers was instantly met. We were surprised to learn on the first normal workday of the FY 2008 that, despite our best estimates, we had actually issued slightly more than 500 visas.”

This rush to implement the SIV program has proven to be just as disastrous and potentially devastating as all other efforts to rush an end to our involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq. Allowing Afghans unbridled access to the United States in part because they have been vetted by their country and shown to have no criminal record is ludicrous in light of the fact that record keeping in Afghanistan is virtually non-existent. An FBI check is also virtually useless since the FBI has had minimal oversight in Afghanistan and little access to these applicants.

Assistant Secretary Edson himself acknowledged such. “Risks for the applicants and our staff who process these cases are real,” he said. “Constant attention to changing political and security realities is needed.” Such vigilance is lacking however in our ‘sprint’ to implementation.

Suspect connections

The vast majority of these applicants for the SIV program are of little risk to our security and will in fact in all likelihood be good US citizens. Some of them however have the type of connections, tribal affiliations, and philosophical leanings that combine to make them perfect for anti-US terrorist-type tasking once they are firmly established in the states.

The most effective means of identifying the dangers within the crowd of applicants is the required counterintelligence (CI) interview that takes place once the issuance of the visa is virtually a foregone conclusion. During this interview, an effective interviewer can uncover relationships and former affiliations that may radically influence an applicant.

The problem however is that once the applicant reaches this part of the process, they and their sponsor, normally a commander who has become enamored with ‘their’ linguist are convinced of acceptance and highly resistant to any undue reporting from the interviewer.

One CI interviewer reported, “Commanders who sign the letters of recommendation, are often ignorant of the details of the program. They can and do however, use their rank and influence to speed the process for an interpreter they've had only a passing, working relationship with, and about whose personal live they know nothing.  Failure to give the thumbs up to their linguist can be met with hostility from their sponsor, most often a high ranking commander.”

This insistence on approval of their candidate stems additionally, from the fact that negative, anti-coalition associations their linguist may be shown to have had, indicates a lack of vigilance on their part. This can be embarrassing to the commander.

Another problem resulting from a rush to implementation is that little or no guidance for the CI interviewer has been forthcoming from Department of State or Department of Homeland Security.  A lack of operating procedures and criteria guidance complicates this particular step in the process.  An interviewer that doesn't know what information is required is at a disadvantage before the interview even takes place. Most of these applicants have been plucked from the cradle of terrorism and detecting negative behavior, associates, and ideology even by experienced CI agents is extremely difficult at best.

One CI agent encapsulated the problem with the following:

“Conspiracies aside, those who have faithfully worked with CF [Coalition Forces] and who have no terrorist affiliations can still be a threat and pose a risk to National Security. I interviewed an interpreter who I will refer to as Karl. Karl had worked with CF for more than three years and came to the interview armed with a folder full of recommendations and certificates of appreciation from the numerous units with whom he had served.  All other investigations had found no derogatory information in his file. He was one of the few Afghans that had completed high school and had received good grades in all his subjects. He professed a duty to be a good example and an upstanding member of his family and community. His older brothers had sacrificed their education to work, in order that Karl could have a better chance than they did. He did not drink, use tobacco, or drugs. His background record did contain derogatory information. Why no one else had found it is a mystery to me. When it came to lifestyle regarding women, his responses came after pregnant pauses. While he professed to be a virgin and had never paid for the services of a prostitute, his voice became much quieter when denying those activities, his body screamed 'yes'. This particular detail may appear irrelevant in the scope of his suitability for a visa but has far reaching implications. The greatest being his ability to leave the protection of a military installation, venture into hostile areas, and partake in an act deemed highly immoral within the Muslim community. How is it that he could be out in a town with terrorists that are looking for any means to harm CF and not get captured or killed? Knowing that it could bring shame to himself and his family, Karl is ripe forexploitation by entities unfriendly to the US.  His vulnerability to blackmail places him, the unit he works with, the installation he works at, and, if granted a visa, the US in general at risk. Involvement with prostitution by itself is not reason enough to deny a petition for SIV. Karl's relationship with it becomes a point of weakness and vulnerability that precluded him from receiving an approval.         

“That might well be the end of that but often commanders who refer interpreters have grown so attached to them that they seek the needed approval elsewhere. An attitude of 'interview this interpreter until he gets it right' regardless of the implications is a problem endemic to this program. Colonels and Generals who are used to hearing 'yes' bristle when told 'no'. This is especially true if that no comes from a low ranking enlisted soldier or a contractor.”

Abdul will probably get his visa and will more than likely be living in the United States. The CI interviewer who screens him will use all his experience and intellect to ascertain whether Abdul is a potential threat but all things considered his chances of success are slim. The pressure placed on the CI community to approve these applicants will assure that. Our rush to conclude this operation and leave having made no grave mistakes will continue to provide all the necessary ingredients for another 9/11.