Meanwhile, insurgents in Mosul have been trying to drag the Kurdish minority into their fight in an effort to ignite a sectarian war. Violence against Kurds has escalated in recent days, with offices and officials of Kurdish political parties attacked. Insurgents fired on a truck carrying Kurdish peshmerga fighters, and at least one Kurd reportedly was beheaded in Mosul. Two Iraqi soldiers also were beheaded in Mosul, claims an Al Qaeda-linked group led by Osama Bin Laden loyalist, Abu Musab Al Zarqawi, who escaped US forces in Fallujah.

Further fanning the flames of Islamist anger toward US forces in Iraq, extremist publications and websites in recent days have begun to claim that US military forces used banned chemical weapons in Fallujah. An alleged Iraqi physician has even been quoted saying he examined corpses in Fallujah and confirmed that the individuals died of chemical weapons.

In addition, authorities are concerned that the unrelenting wave of assaults by insurgents in the Sunni-dominated parts of the country indicate the attack on Fallujah has inflamed Sunni resentment against the American presence rather than pacified it.

Consequently, senior defense officials and outside experts believe the Pentagon has overstated the effect the offensive on Fallujah has had on the insurgency. US forces already have had to be diverted from Fallujah to fight insurgents in Mosul and elsewhere.

Responding to Gen. Sattler’s claim that “we feel right now that we have … broken the back of the insurgency and we have taken away this safe haven,” Anthony Cordesman, a senior analyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studies said, “I see absolutely no chance that's true.”

“The level of hostility that the fighting in Fallujah has created among Arab Sunnis, many other Iraqis and Arabs outside Iraq, raises serious questions about its impact on future insurgent activity,” Cordesman says, adding, “it may well make it much easier [for them] to get recruits and to justify violence. It also has almost certainly increased the slow but steady polarization of Iraqi Sunnis into a group that feels disgraced and deprived of power and wealth by the invasion and the occupation that has followed.”

Indeed, Gen. Sattler’s own intelligence assessment pointed out that the terror-backed insurgents – many of whom fled prior to the Fallujah offensive - had demonstrated “outstanding resilience” and would use the siege on Fallujah as a recruiting tool.

During a visit to Iraq last week, Gen. John Abizaid, commander of US forces in the Middle East, agreed with Sattler’s position that the US military had broken the back of the insurgency. Abizaid told reporters the Fallujah offensive was a major blow to the insurgents and that the only way US-led forces could be defeated is if they lose their will.

But Abizaid told the Pentagon’s internal news service “we are … under no illusions. We know that the enemy will continue to fight.”

If the military is unable to significantly put down Al Qaeda-backed uprisings throughout Iraq and more Guard and Reserve forces have to be deployed, there’s little doubt it will further strain military manpower and resources domestically, which would be vital in responding to a major terror attack on America, especially one involving multiple attacks using WMDs.

Iraq’s interim Prime Minister, Ayad Allawi, said last week that insurgents and terrorists will inflict as much damage they can in a continuing effort to frighten and intimidate Iraqi citizens and security forces as they try to stop the country's upcoming elections.

Some military officials have long argued that the US cannot win the war in Iraq without committing tens of thousands more troops. But the military cannot substantially increase boots on the ground in Iraq without creating military vulnerabilities in other parts of the world or making tours longer or closer together in Iraq.

To bolster combat forces in Iraq in the run-up to the elections there in January, the Pentagon will likely expand its forces in Iraq by thousands of troops through delaying the departure of more experienced units as fresh troops rotate in, military officials say.

Army Chief of Staff Gen. Peter Schoomaker told the House Armed Services Committee last week that “I'm committed to providing the troops that are requested, but I can't promise more than I've got.”

Marine Corps Commandant, Gen. Michael Hagee, added: “The demand on the force has increased exponentially,” explaining Marines now spend almost twice as much time deployed as they did two years ago.

In October, the military ordered 6,500 troops to delay their departure from Iraq.

This past week, the Army and Air Force announced an increase in the number of reservists on active duty in support of partial mobilization. The total National Guard and Reserve personnel who have been mobilized is 182,478, including both units and individual augmentees.

In testimony before the House Armed Services Committee Nov. 17, the four military services’ chiefs admitted that the Bush administration did not adequately prepare for the military’s role in post-war Iraq. The four chiefs unanimously testified that while they had adequately planned for combat operations, they failed to put enough effort into securing the nation and fighting a burgeoning terrorist insurgency in Iraq.

Compounding this problem, the US Army is facing resistance from more than 2,500 veterans – and likely many more – whom it has ordered back to duty. This as GAO’s new report revealed Army and Air National Guard efforts to reshape their forces to meet post-9/11 warfighting requirements “have degraded the readiness of nondeployed units, particularly in the Army National Guard.”

GAO told lawmakers in a report released last week that “to deploy ready units for overseas missions, the Army National Guard has had to transfer equipment and personnel from nondeploying units. Between September 11, 2001, and July 2004, the Army National Guard had performed over 74,000 personnel transfers. Similarly, as of May 2004, the Army National Guard had transferred over 35,000 equipment items to prepare deploying units, leaving nondeployed Army National Guard units short one-third of the critical equipment they need for war.”

Because the Pentagon is having to rely largely on Guard and Reservists to stabilize Iraq and fight terrorism abroad, equipment shortages in the field have followed suit, resulting in nondeployed units stateside being stripped of equipment to keep deployed units abroad equipped.

It is no secret that troops are routinely put in harm's way without adequate equipment – a situation made glaringly clear on Oct. 13 when an 18-member platoon from the 343rd Quartermaster Company refused to deliver a shipment of fuel from the Tallil Air Base near Nasiriya to Taji, another base north of Baghdad - region that is among the most hostile in Iraq - because they lacked the armored vehicles and other critical equipment to safely make the trip through hostile territory.