It is 12:50 A.M. and you have been moving all night aided by the brothers in your cell and several strangers. Now, just 120 yards away is the border fence. In the distance glows the coastal city where you will soon explode yourself as a busy nightclub empties its crowd onto the street.
By: BC Kessner
You are in good terrain, clearly in a gap between the border's sensors, and the final approach offers cover and concealment. Your handler receives a text message confirming that the roving patrol is occupied with the diversion, as planned. You have six minutes to navigate the layers of concertina wire, the ditch, the roads and the fence before the reaction force arrives — that is, if you are detected at all. In six minutes, you will know if your destiny is to die as a shahid, a martyr, forever glorified for completing your mission.
As your helpers, with their cutters, makeshift ladders and carpet strips boost you into the no-man's land between the obstacles, unseen defenders also get the nod. Miles behind you, special operations forces surround your cell's escape car and driver. Earlier, an unmanned aerial vehicle had tracked another vehicle from that spot to a house near your village. Mobile phone intercepts and surveillance confirm the presence of your network's senior operative. Now, joint teams of army, police and security service personnel execute a surgical arrest operation, capturing six of your friends and vital intelligence. Less than a mile in front of you, special police converge on a man, a woman and the taxi waiting to take you within walking distance of your target.
Around you, chaos erupts from out of the shadows. Pain explodes in your thighs as they're pierced by a bullet; shot, you tumble 9 feet from the fence's barbed outcropping. A portable high-powered jammer keeps your handler's cell phone signal from detonating your vest amid the soldiers who appear out of nowhere. Then he and your helpers are taken down and before you can initiate the charge yourself, the weight of the world smothers you.
In less than six minutes, you have found a fate far worse than the death you had imagined. The Border has won.
Here in Israel, one doesn't have to imagine terrorists like the would-be suicide bomber above; they are part of a real, new world nightmare that never goes away. Fortunately for those who live here, the defenders, with all their gadgets and skill and bravery, have greater numbers and just as much persistence as the terrorists.
In a series of interviews held during February, Israel Defense Force (IDF) personnel, senior government officials and defense industry executives explained how the country has moved to regain control of its terrestrial "borders" from the bombers who exploited their weaknesses and made a living out of dying spectacularly on the other side.
Rachel Ashkenazi, Israel's Ministry of Defense (MoD) spokesperson, made an interesting comment when asked about figures on the length of Israel's borders: "Let's reach that point first," she said. "No borders [equals] no length" — since there are no fixed borders, their length cannot be measured. That is clearly something to set straight before launching into a discussion of Israeli border issues. Henceforth, "border" in the Israeli sense should be thought of here as a line of separation or demarcation, and not an undisputed political or legal boundary.
Still, those interviewed offered excellent descriptions of what is happening on the ground today along the lines where people are divided, the "borders." At the center of their story is the new Security Fence separating Israel from the Palestinian territories in the West Bank and the troops that guard it.
Terrorism, epitomized by the lone and deadly suicide bomber, is the target here. Crime, smuggling and illegal immigration are lesser concerns for now, but those activities tell of the unbreakable connection between the people and economies now split to protect the many, on one side, from a few amongst many on the other. Understanding the dynamics, the life and forces that flow through the area are just as important in Israel's approach to border security as the static boundary that divides them.
Seam Zone anatomy
"The bomber is the weapon that does the most killing, and the fence has proven very effective against this threat," Col. Aharon Haliva, the commander of the IDF's Ephraim Brigade, said during an exclusive, all-afternoon tour of his area of responsibility (AOR). "Where it is operational, the fence is working just fine, and for us it has changed everything."
Haliva's three battalions protect a large area north of Tel Aviv on both sides of the fence where Palestinian territory comes the closest to Israel's coastal population and industrial areas. The area used to have some of the worst terror statistics in Israel, but since stretches of the fence became operational there in July 2003, the number of bombings dropped instantly and continues to decrease each year, he said.
Three Israeli firms are qualified to provide border fences to MoD specifications. Until about 10 years ago, Israel's Magal, based in Yahud, was the sole provider and installed more than 90 percent of the electronic fences on Israel's periphery, Izhar Dekel, the company's president and CEO, explained in an interview.
"Magal currently supplies [its] BVS-5000 fence under one of MoD's two major seam zone construction contracts," Dekel said. On the other, Israel's Elbit, headquartered in Haifa, teams with Detekion, a US company based in Vestal, NY. According to Ashkenazi, both projects are slated for completion by the end of the year. RAFAEL, another Haifa-based company, is another option, having won a tender as lead integrator for a fence and sensor project called Solid Mirror between Israel and Lebanon in 1999.
Ashkenazi said that only about 4 to 5 percent of the separation barrier is the concrete wall often shown on the news. These concrete sections, about 5 miles of which lie in Haliva's AOR, were built to protect vehicles on the new Trans-Israel highway and people in other urban areas from sniper fire. They present problems for the IDF because it is more difficult to run vibration and movement detection sensors on the concrete than the fence, Haliva said. "They are ugly and expensive, but they do reduce the chance of small arms fire on the highway, which would cause a major, major problem," he added.
Along most of the seam zone is a band of obstacles designed to identify the boundary for innocent civilians while deterring and detecting those looking for a way to penetrate it. At the center is a 10-foot-high electronic fence composed of a lower link section and taut upper wires with barbed wire outcropping. It is not electrified but wired with electronic sensors that detect vibration and movement on the fence. Access roads lie on both sides of the fence for IDF vehicles, and soldiers look for footprints in smoothed strips of sand alongside the roads. Typically on the West Bank side of the fence is a large ditch, followed by a triangular-shaped stack of six well-anchored concertina wire coils, more than 6 feet high and deep. Outside the wire runs a steel rail to defend against vehicles ramming the obstacles. Beyond the road on the Israeli side is another stack of razor wire or a barbed-wire fence, depending on the terrain.
Israel is paying about $3.7 million per mile of the fence once all of the engineering, construction and operational costs are figured in. The plan calls for 472 miles of fence, for a total cost of about $1.75 billion.
In theory, this will buy a chance for the thin-stretched IDF to control large areas of the West Bank that previously offered wide-open access to Israel's strategic core. For now, however, gaps remain due to ongoing construction and pending judicial and political decisions on the exact path of the fence.
Sensors and integration
In one room of a battalion command center, Haliva pointed out the live feeds coming in via fiber-optic cables or microwave transmissions from seven long-range day and night observation systems tactically positioned in this part of his AOR. These advanced cameras are the reason for the 150-foot towers placed on hilltops every few miles along the separation zone, he explained.
"We can scan almost every inch of the fence and the places where the fence should be," the female watch captain told me. "The girls [soldiers] here know every rock, every tree and pole and path along their part of the fence. If anything enters [their field of view] or if anything changes, they know instantly," she added.
Three of the cameras are variants of the Plug-in Optronic Payload (POP) built by Israel Aircraft Industries'(IAI) TAMAM division. POP is a gyro-stabilized system designed for helicopters that includes a focal plane array thermal imager, color camera and laser pointer. It is working extremely well at ranges of "a few miles" and the strongest winds do not affect the images, the captain said.
The other cameras belonged to the Long-Range Reconnaissance and Observation System (LORROS) family built by Elbit's El-Op subsidiary and supplied by Ortek, Elbit's consolidated homeland defense unit. These cameras and forward-looking infrared systems are not stabilized but have greater ranges than the POP.
The captain specifically mentioned another "excellent system" called SPIDER, built by Israel's CONTROP, based in Hod Hasharon. It combines passive electro-optic imaging radar with a camera and laser range finder to detect motion automatically, while the unit itself is scanning. Since optical radar faces additional operational challenges in the rocky and steep terrain typical of this battalion's area, it is being used by the IDF in other places, she said.
Terrorists planning to cross the fence would change their itinerary if they could see the images playing continuously in the command center. The operators, all women, sit at consoles with several monitors showing tactical maps, a broad panoramic view of their sector and both color and thermal images from the cameras. Teams of five or six specially trained young enlisted women learn only one camera and one sector of the fence, by heart. Their entire two-year enlistment is spent taking turns operating their console continuously.
Several times during the half-hour I was inside the control center an alert sounded from the command area in an adjacent room. In each case, either a vibration sensor along the fence detected movement or a soldier on patrol noticed something suspicious near the barrier.
Instantly, an area was highlighted on the screens and an operator moved her camera to that position. She was able to zoom in so close it looked on the screen like she was at the scene pointing a video camera her own feet. Within seconds, assessments were made — a group of kids playing and throwing rocks, an animal. These times, no suspected terrorist activity was identified. Senior watch standers returned to their stations, notes were made on the computerized log and the soldier resumed scanning her sector.
Had there been a problem, the closest reaction force would have been dispatched immediately. This happened once just prior to my visit, causing the suspension of my planned itinerary. In this case, an Israeli reported a hole in a legacy fence (not the separation barrier) around his village. Col. Haliva arrived just as the reaction force responded in full battle rattle, accompanied by IDF Bedouin trackers. They determined there had been no recent movement through the dilapidated fence and that the breach had not been freshly cut.
When the separation fence closes the gaps and all the sensors come online, these time-draining and problematic legacy fences can go away, Haliva said. So can many of his outposts that were positioned years ago to quell activity in high-friction areas between Israeli and Palestinian communities. The new system should allow him to make better use of his soldiers, lead to faster reaction forces and enable the brigade to spend more time on arrest operations aimed at apprehending terrorists before they try to cross the border, he added.
"Using technological advantage to reduce manpower is one of MoD's primary goals with the fence project," Mena Bacharach, RAFAEL's head of homeland security business development, told me. RAFAEL is hoping to get orders for its sensors and integration packages as MoD awards additional tenders for the seam zone and other border programs, he said.
As Israel continues to outfit the seam zone with additional high-end cameras, technologies such as IAI ELTA's family of ground movement detection and surveillance radars and other video motion detection systems being fielded by the IDF could soon be found in greater numbers along some borders. The IDF also has experience with tactical aerostats, and MoD has said it is procuring more of these systems designed to provide additional cost-effective and mobile visual coverage from the air.
On Feb. 18, IDF officials said that unmanned ground vehicles (UGV) would be used to help patrol routes along the seam zone by June. The combat engineering development branch is working with UGV-makers IAI Lahav divsion and Elbit to ready the first vehicles for live field evaluations. Initially, the UGVs will use cameras and other sensors to identify and ward off infiltration attempts, but one officer said that a future variation of these UGVs would be equipped with remote weapons stations.
The first stages of Elbit's TORC2H system are present in the command center, one watch officer said. TORC2H is the backbone of the $200 million Digital Army Program, augmented by a material amount of US foreign military funding. MoD awarded it to Elbit in 2004 to coordinate forces at different levels and deliver computerized systems down to the single soldier over the next 10 years. According to the officer, TORC2H is not configured at the highly sophisticated level depicted at defense exhibitions, at least not in his C2 center. "Maybe like what you see there in another five years," he added. The IDF spokesperson's office said the IDF has received all elements of TORC2H on schedule and that fielding was proceeding according to plan.
Still, the fence and its sensors are already doing their jobs, and the brigade continues to operate effectively with its current C2 capabilities, Haliva said. "My biggest problems are the passages," he added, referring to the gaps, as well as the checkpoints.
Crossings
"These checkpoints are not the job for soldiers." Retired Gen. Bezalel Traiber's words echoed exactly what Haliva said about one of his biggest challenges. Traiber, the MoD's chief for crossing point management, explained Israel's strategy for transforming the passages between Israel and the Palestinian territories from a military operation to a civilian one. Israel's approach centers on new technology and privatization.
Freeing up soldiers is only part of the reason for the privatization. "Civilians need to take care of civilians; it is something we absolutely have to do," Traiber said.
By all accounts, the crossings are dismal for everyone. Palestinians suffer through long lines and degrading searches, and suspicion is rekindled against them every time there is an attempted terrorist attack. Eighteen-year-old Israeli soldiers rotate through for a couple of months and, whether they dreamed of being a fighter or just want to survive their mandatory enlistments, they soon find themselves afraid of getting blown up at a terminal.
Civilians at the checkpoints reduce friction, Traiber said. They are mature and carefully selected personnel focusing exclusively on one job long term. According to Traiber, civilians have the best chance to understand economic and sometimes personal connections running through the crossings and work with them, not against them.
Once a checkpoint is privatized, only MoD supervisors and company personnel specially trained in search and security procedures work inside the compound. If a bomber or explosive material is detected, Traiber said the company contains the area until the IDF arrives to take charge of the situation. Communications between the checkpoint personnel and the IDF are "perfect" and the whole handover can be done in about 10-15 minutes, he added.
Technology plays the other major role. "The first thing you have to understand is that we are preparing a system to check everything 100 percent, something that is not done anywhere else in the world," Traiber said. Currently, there are about 20 operational crossings, which are sometimes closed and often crowded, inefficient and volatile. The plan corresponding with the Security Fence calls for 34 but, according to Traiber, that is looking like too many and the number will end up being closer to 28.
New technologies, such as biometrics and detection equipment, are aimed at decreasing manpower requirements and increasing flow capacities up to four times more than current figures, Traiber said. Privatization of nearly all of the pedestrian and vehicle crossings will get soldiers almost completely out of the checkpoint business for good, he added.
Israel has already invested tens of millions of dollars on technologies and designs for new terminals that are rapidly becoming operational in the West Bank and Gaza, according to Ashkenazi. In December, a memorandum of understanding signed by the ministry's director general and the US ambassador to Israel covered the procurement, delivery and installation of scanning devices and equipment to expedite activities at the crossings. By mid-January, the private company Mikud Security Co., Haifa, was operating some of that equipment at the Shaar Ephraim facility in Haliva's AOR.
Technologies, such as magnometric gates and a wideband millimeter-wave holographic imaging scanner produced by SafeView, Santa Clara, Calif., are in use at some crossings and can detect weapons made of metal "or any other material hidden on the body in a matter of seconds," Traiber noted. In March, biometric smart cards and readers produced by EDS, Plano, Texas, were introduced at Shaar Ephraim, though at the end of the screening process. After about a year, once everyone has confidence in the system, the plan is to move the biometric screening to the front.
Three types of fixed and mobile scanners are being used at the four goods crossings working now at some capacity. They vary by energy source and configuration to ensure complete penetration in the search for contraband among the different types of goods and containers. Additionally, dogs screen every vehicle and container awaiting entry into Israel.
Analysis
Despite the undefined nature of Israel's borders, the defense establishment has managed to create an effective framework for protecting the country's boundaries against threats old and new. Though unique, Israel's experience offers several lessons for any nation facing threats along its borders.
Israel has established excellent command, control and communications at the national, regional and tactical levels, and transformation underway with the Digital Army Program should enhance and integrate these systems further into a single, effective architecture. Close interagency cooperation between IDF, police and interior security services has proven essential, particularly at the tactical level. In Ephraim Brigade's AOR, for example, Haliva uses two companies of border police just like his other soldiers to help defend the lines and conduct antiterror arrest operations in the West Bank.
Close cooperation between Israel's robust defense industry and the IDF has led to the development of state-of-the-art intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance systems vital for stopping terrorism at the border. The Security Fence and towers, air platforms, mobile command and control and signals intelligence platforms are good examples of industry and military collaboration. Equipping those systems with the latest sensors has enabled the IDF to use the technological advantage to reduce manpower requirements.
However, Israel must avoid possible manpower reduction traps. Haliva pointed out that his brigade has had to operate with fewer soldiers in each of the last five years, and that this is happening in other units, as well. The country is becoming more reluctant to use the reserves because of cost and potential internal political ramifications. Technology helps, but effective border protection here in Israel involves more than just putting a bunch of assets along a line and pointing them outwards; patrolling, intelligence gathering, reaction force and arrest operations are by their nature manpower intensive.
Troops also need more than sensors and communications to intercept terrorists trying to cross the fence. A critical part of border security is the mobility of the reaction forces. According to several IDF officers, there is a shortage of custom-made vehicles they need to do their job in the West Bank. "We need more vehicles, especially ones that can move quickly on the back roads in this terrain … vehicles that can take bullets as well as rocks," one said.
Whether it is reserve manpower, hardened vehicles, a shortage of tactical unmanned aerial vehicles or a situation where only the brigade commander has the latest ruggedized computer terminal that can download tactical information from the command center, shortfalls in the field can indicate the limitations of costs and budgets. Deciding what systems to procure requires careful upper-level prioritization about what is needed and how badly.
Terrorism changes priorities. During the Intifada of the past five years, suicide bombers raised the stakes of border security. Israel's new Security Fence incorporates years of lessons learned with the latest technologies and a hefty price tag, but by all accounts, it has enabled Israel to dramatically stem the flow of terrorism from the West Bank.
Israel is facing another difficult border problem. Its border with Egypt along the Sinai runs about 125 miles and is essentially wide open. So far, Israel has been able to live with the flow coming across this remote border. A new fence project there would cost hundreds of millions of dollars. Human trafficking and drugs are beginning to get more attention, and there are indications that terrorists are beginning to use this passage. One IDF officer said "things" from the Sinai are already showing up in the West Bank.
Whether it takes six minutes to cross a fence or six days to infiltrate through the desert, once terrorists start showing up at your back door, it's past time to start thinking about priorities and a new world border.
BC Kessner is a freelance journalist based in Tel Aviv, Israel. He has written for Defense Daily and Defense Technology International.
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