Congress wonders if FPS might set standards

Federal guidelines promulgated for protecting federal buildings provide a "consistent approach" to facility security, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) security chief testified Tuesday to a congressional panel that expressed interest in more centralization of security policies.

While federal security agents could not have prevented a disgruntled software engineer from crashing a plane into a federal building in Austin, Texas, last month, guidelines distributed by the Interagency Security Committee (ISC) minimized the loss of life and provide satisfactory countermeasures to most security threats, said Steven Miller, IRS deputy commissioner for services and enforcement.

Since the Feb. 18 plane attack, IRS has followed ISC guidelines to enhance security at the federal Austin Echelon Building and across the country, Miller commented.

"The increased vigilance at the Austin Office includes continuing to check the identification of persons entering offices, conducting random searches, and overall guard presence and visibility. There is now 24/7 guard service in all eleven IRS Austin offices.

There is also additional security at IRS facilities across the country including additional guard service," Miller stated.

The assistant secretary of homeland security for infrastructure protection chairs the ISC, which was established after the 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Building in Oklahoma City, Okla. The ISC, drawing members from 45 federal agencies, develops standards, policies, and best practices for enhancing security at non-military federal facilities, noted Sue Armstrong, acting deputy assistant secretary of Infrastructure Protection at the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).

But ultimately professionals who possess no expertise in security practices exercise the ISC standards when setting security for federal buildings, protested Del. Eleanor Holmes Norton (D-DC), who sits on the House Federal Workforce, Postal Service and the District of Columbia Subcommittee.

Facility security committees, organized from the tenant agencies in federal facilities, make the determinations as to how to enact ISC security guidelines instead of agencies of trained security professionals like the DHS Federal Protective Service (FPS). This arrangement can lead to bad security policies such as a common requirement that contract security guards remain at their posts even when a threat situation is unfolding somewhere else in a building, Norton said.

"This has been the case ever since guards have been used. This could have been corrected many years ago," Norton objected.

FPS Director Gary Schenkel acknowledged that FPS has identified such long-standing security gaps, but the agency could only make recommendations to facility security committees as it is unable to set policy at individual buildings.

Norton called for a joint committee hearing with the House Homeland Security Committee to examine issues related to decentralized security oversight, suggesting that FPS should set uniform requirements across all federal facilities.

Mark Goldstein, director of Physical Infrastructure Issues at the Government Accountability Office (GAO), agreed with Norton's characterization that facility security committees create weaknesses in facility security through "a balkanized, fragmented approach to security" as opposed to FPS implementing a portfolio-wide approach based on risk management principles.

Norton also questioned Schenkel on improvements FPS had made since GAO investigators were able to smuggle bomb parts into 10 federal facilities and reassemble them, as detailed in the report Homeland Security: Preliminary Results Show Federal Protective Service's Ability to Protect Federal Facilities Is Hampered By Weaknesses in Its Contract Security Guard Program.

Schenkel replied that FPS had taken "dramatic steps" since the results of the undercover GAO testing were revealed in June 2009.

FPS has increased the frequency of post inspections performed by contract security officers; improving upon additional training in magnetometer and X-ray screening, particularly for improvised explosive devices; and ensuring qualifications of contract security officers, Schenkel said.

The agency also has developed a Covert Testing Working Group, which instituted improvements in the oversight of the contract security officers, Schenkel said.

GAO's Goldstein revealed that his agency was working on several reports related to federal facility security efforts, including an evaluation of the move of FPS into the National Protection and Programs Directorate at DHS at the beginning of fiscal 2010 and an examination of efforts to protect federal property across a spectrum of activities.