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Saturday, February 15, 2025

Central Asian Militants in Post-Assad Syria: Evolving Roles and Challenges

Central Asian Salafi militants' euphoria over the 'holy jihad' victory and Assad's fall is fading, replaced by fears of becoming bargaining chips for Syria's new authorities seeking international recognition. 

Erdogan’s Syria Gambit: Reviving Ottoman Ambitions in the Levant

On December 13, Ibrahim Kalin, head of Turkiye’s National Intelligence Organization (MIT), performed the first Juma Namaz (Friday prayer) in Damascus’s historic 8th-century Umayyad Mosque since the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime. A jubilant crowd of worshippers gathered in the heart of the Syrian capital to mark this significant event, welcoming Kalin—the first foreign official to openly demonstrate support for the armed opposition groups leading the 13-year resistance —with resounding chants of “Takbir” and “Allahu Akbar.” 

According to Milat TV, the car’s driver was none other than Ahmed al-Sharaa, better known by his nom de guerre Abu Mohammad al-Jolani, the victorious leader of the influential Sunni Islamist rebel group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), who personally accompanied Kalin, evoking a resemblance to an Ottoman Grand Vizier. Among the assembled Ansar (local) worshippers, Tajik and Uzbek Muhajireen (foreign jihadists) were seen chanting “Takbir.” Kalin’s visit fulfilled Erdogan’s long-standing pledge, first declared at the onset of the Syrian civil war in 2014, to remove Assad and perform the Salat ash-Shukr (Prayer of Gratitude to Allah) at Umayyad Mosque.  

This scene underscored Turkey’s ascent as a dominant geopolitical force in the Levant, outmaneuvering its regional rivals, Russia and Iran, through the 2017 Astana Process. Ankara’s strategy hinges not only on supporting influential rebel factions like the Syrian National Army (SNA) and HTS but also on leveraging the backing of Sunni Muslims, who constitute 75% of Syria’s population and hold a favorable historical memory of seven centuries of Ottoman rule. 

Central Asian Militants in Syria: Revolution or Divine Jihad Victory?

The eleven-day joint HTS-SNA offensive, codenamed Deterrence of Aggression, which ended the Assad regime’s 54-year rule in Syria, also involved foreign Salafi-Jihadi factions, including the Uzbek Katibat Tawhid wal Jihad (KTJ), Katibat Imam al-Bukhari (KIB), Islamic Jihad Union (IJU), Uyghur Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP), Katibat al-Ghuraba al-Turkistan (KGT), North Caucasian Jaysh al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar (JMA), and Ajnad al-Kavkaz (AK)—collectively referred to in Syria as the “Muhajireen”. 

Under HTS’s strategic framework, these foreign militants– originating from Central Asia, Russia’s North Caucasus, and China’s Xinjiang– were tasked with supporting operations in Idlib, Aleppo, and Homs, primarily acting as a cover for HTS’s elite Inghimasi assault units. However, the regime’s critical defensive post at Regiment 46 collapsed unexpectedly as the offensive approached Aleppo’s outskirts.  

Ayyub Hawk, leader of the Uzbek jihadi private military contractor Muhojir Tactical (MT), described in a TV interview how his militants, alongside HTS’s elite Abi Ubaidah bin al-Jarrah Brigade, spearheaded the capture of strategic positions in Qabtan al-Jabal city, securing the route to Aleppo. They swiftly overran a fortified outpost held by 30 Assad regime soldiers, including Russian contractors overseeing aviation and drone coordination. Exploiting surprise, they launched a rear assault, catching the enemy off guard, as they had anticipated an HTS attack from Fouad and the M4-M5 highway axis. Hawk noted that he had to neutralize a Russian contractor who refused to surrender. Adhering to HTS tactics, the Inghimasi fighters pressed forward immediately after capturing each position, leaving no time for the enemy to regroup. This strategy, focused on targeting weaker points and bypassing heavily fortified areas, minimized losses within KTJ ranks to approximately one percent. 

Following the fall of Damascus, Uzbek, Uyghur, and Tajik jihadists enthusiastically disseminated videos and photographs of their Salat ash-Shukr at the Umayyad Mosque, portraying it as evidence of their ‘holy jihad victory in Sham (Syria), a land revered in Hadiths as the beloved by the Prophet Muhammad.’ 

Thus, Abdul Aziz Domla, the emir of the Uzbek KTJ– one of the largest and most formidable Central Asian militant factions in Idlib– proclaimed that the “descendants of al-Bukhari (Central Asians), by aiding HTS, had fulfilled their historical debt to the Umayyad Caliphate for expanding Islam into Mawarannahr (Transoxiana) in the mid-7th century.” Abu Yusuf Muhojir, the KIB leader, interpreted this unexpected triumph as a manifestation of the “divine power of the Almighty, who chastised the enemies of Islam and exalted His servants above them.”  

Ahluddin Navqotiy, a leading ideologist of Central Asian Salafi Jihadism and the Imam of KTJ, declared after performing Salat ash-Shukr that “today, Allah has bestowed His Nusrat (victory) upon the entire Muslim Ummah, affirming the legitimacy of our jihad to defend Islam in Bilad al-Sham (Greater Syria).” He further emphasized that this struggle “must now be directed toward the liberation of the Al-Aqsa Mosque and the sacred land of Bait ul-Maqdis (Jerusalem),” explicitly voicing anti-Israeli sentiments and indicating the intended direction of their future jihad.  

The Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP), originating from China’s Xinjiang province and a long-standing ally of HTS as well as a staunch adherent of al-Qaeda, celebrated the Syrian Jihad’s victory by sharing a photo of Uyghur militants performing the Salat ash-Shukr. Buoyed by the success of the Syrian jihad, the TIP vowed to soon return to China and initiate armed resistance against the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). 

Post-Soviet Militants as HTS’s Tactical Shield Against ISIS and Al-Qaeda

The success of the Syrian Revolution today would not have been unlikely without HTS maintaining control over Idlib– its key military and economic stronghold– with the support of post-Soviet and Uyghur Salafi-Jihadi groups. Together, they resisted repeated offensives Bashar al-Assad’s infantry, pro-Iranian and Hezbollah Shiite militias, and sustained Russian airstrikes over the past six years. 

Abu Jolani, after disavowing ISIS and al-Qaeda and outmaneuvering their high-profile leaders, systematically strengthened his Al-Nusra Front (ANF) beginning in 2013. The group later rebranded as Jabhat Fateh al-Sham in July 2016 and subsequently reorganized into Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in January 2017. Around this core, he integrated smaller Central Asian and Caucasian militant factions, whose activities in Syria attracted minimal attention from the US-led anti-ISIS global coalition. 

Foreign jihadi factions such as KTJ, KIB, IJU, TIP, KGT, JMA, and AK deliberately refrained from seeking global leadership within the transnational jihadi network. This strategic restraint allowed their activities to complemented, HTS’s narrowly focused Sunni nationalist resistance, which prioritized gaining control within Syria rather than pursuing broader global ambitions. Russian-speaking radical Islamists began their hijrat (religious migration) to Idlib in 2011, following the outbreak of Syria’s civil war, responding fervently to the call of Yusuf al-Qaradawi, one of the world’s most influential Sunni clerics. In 2013, al-Qaradawi issued a fatwa urging Sunni Muslims worldwide to wage holy jihad against the Bashar al-Assad regime, Lebanon’s Hezbollah, and Iran-backed Shia forces. His authority among Central Asian radical Salafis was so profound that his fatwa eclipsed efforts by pro-government muftis and imams to dissuade their followers from joining the Syrian jihad. 

Abu Jolani effectively leveraged the combat capabilities of Central Asian and Caucasian jihadi factions to consolidate his authoritarian hold over Idlib province, using their presence as a smokescreen to obscure his actions from al-Qaeda. Amid his conflict with ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, Jolani pledged bay’ah (allegiance) to al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri in 2013. Following its parent organization, the Uzbek KTJ likewise pledged bay’ah to al-Qaeda’s Ayman al-Zawahiri.  

The most ideologically committed Central Asian affiliate of al-Qaeda was the Uyghur TIP, whose Syrian branch remains deeply embedded within HTS. TIP leader Abdul-Haq al-Turkistani served as a member of al-Qaeda’s elite shura in Afghanistan, while his deputy in Syria, Abu Omar al-Turkistani, held a senior position within Abu Jolani’s Jabhat Fatah al-Sham in 2016. 

When Jolani disavowed al-Qaeda and renounced global jihad in July 2016, shifting HTS’s focus exclusively to localized combat, he pragmatically preserved the allegiance of Central Asian and Caucasian militant factions. This calculated move allowed him to project to the outside world that his endeavor had garnered the backing of non-takfiri Islamists, capable of effectively opposing both ISIS and al-Qaeda in Syria. During the 2019 armed confrontation between HTS and al-Qaeda’s newly established Syrian affiliate, Huras al-Din (HD), Abu Jolani ruthlessly exploited the military capabilities of KTJ, TIP, and Jaysh al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar, coercing them into siding with HTS. But when former KTJ leader Abu Saloh defected to al-Qaeda’s Jabhat Ansar al-Din with 50 Uzbek fighters, Jolani retaliated by arresting him and accusing him of misappropriating $60,000 earmarked for weapons procurement. Eight months later, Abu Saloh was released from prison but remains in Idlib, now stripped of the influence and prominence he once held within Central Asian jihadist circles.  

Despite Jolani’s public break with al-Qaeda, his rejection of transnational jihad, and his rapid ascent to Syria’s political forefront, his two Central Asian jihadi allies– Uzbek KTJ and the Uyghur TIP– have not disavowed their bay’ah to al-Qaeda. Moreover, al-Qaeda’s late leader Ayman al-Zawahiri praised TIP emir Abdul-Haq al-Turkistani as his loyal brother-in-arms. 

Over the past decade, the relationship between HTS and Central Asian as well as North Caucasian Salafi-Jihadi factions has remained turbulent. Nevertheless, al-Jolani has successfully suppressed foreign Takfiri militant groups that opposed his long-term strategy to consolidate political control in Syria and marginalized those who championed a global jihadi agenda beyond Sham.  

Idlib’s Foreign Fighters: Victors Without a Future?

Now that Jolani has risen to the height of political authority in Syria, the fate of the foreign militant groups that fought alongside HTS for a decade– playing a significant role in the against government forces and the dismantling of Assad’s regime– remains uncertain. Jolani has announced plans to dissolve HTS, requiring all Syrian combat factions to surrender their weapons and integrate into the Ministry of Defense. However, he has remained conspicuously silent regarding the future of the foreign fighters. 

Recognizing the strategic necessity of cutting ties with ISIS and al-Qaeda to secure his survival and consolidate influence within Syria’s local Sunni Jamaat, Jolani now appears inclined to distance himself from his Central Asian and Caucasian jihadi allies. Their continued presence in Syria seems increasingly uncertain, and the prospects of them engaging in external jihadi operations under his leadership appear even more unlikely. 

Foreign fighters are unlikely to secure a role within the Syrian government’s armed forces, especially as local religious minorities—including Druze, Christians, and Alawites—have become increasingly vocal in demanding the expulsion of foreign militant groups from the country. The controversy intensified following a recent incident Suqaylabiya, a predominantly Christian town in Hama, where masked Uzbek militants set fire to a Christmas tree. This act ignited protests in Damascus demanding the expulsion of foreign fighters from Syria and provoked widespread condemnation from the international community. Central Asian radical Salafis regard New Year celebrations as Shirk (idolatry). In 2021, Uzbek KTJ jihadists stormed the Idlib Museum, vandalizing sculptures, statues, paintings, and mosaics from the pre-Christian era—priceless artifacts of human civilization—driven by their belief that photography and sculpture are forbidden in Islam. 

Therefore, al-Jolani, who seeks to legitimize his political ambitions through democratic elections within the next four years, is likely to bow to public pressure and take decisive steps to expel foreign fighters from Syria. Just as he previously decisively severed ties with Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and Ayman al-Zawahiri, he now appears prepared to abandon his “post-Soviet jihadi allies” in pursuit of political pragmatism. 

In this shifting landscape, the initial euphoria once felt by Central Asian and Caucasian Salafi jihadists has given way to deep anxiety about their uncertain future. Among Uzbek and Uyghur Islamists, signs of growing disillusionment are evident regarding Jolani’s departure from strict religiosity. Their dissatisfaction stems not only from his symbolic transformation—exchanging traditional jihadist attire for a suit and tie—but also from his abandonment of the goal to establish an Islamic Emirate. The divergence in their rhetoric is striking: while Central Asian and Caucasian jihadists hailed the fall of Assad’s regime as a “victory of holy jihad” and a “divine manifestation of Allah’s long-awaited Nusrat (victory),” Jolani, in his address at the Umayyad Mosque, referred to it as “the Great Syrian Revolution.” 

A petition recently surfaced on the KTJ-affiliated Tavhid Xabarlari (Tawhid News) Telegram channel, advocating for Syrian citizenship to be granted to Uzbek Muhajireen, who played a role in liberating the country from infidels. Furthermore, KTJ propagandist Abu Walid have circulated claims that HTS leader al-Jolani allegedly pledged Syrian citizenship to foreign jihadists who supported HTS. 

Ayyub Hawk expressed hope that Muhojir Tactical fighters might be appointed as military instructors within the Ministry of Defense. The recent appointment of six foreign fighters—Chinese Uyghurs, a Jordanian, and a Turk—to MoD’s senior positions as colonels or brigadier-generals has sparked concerns among religious minorities. 

The formal integration of Central Asian jihadists into Syria’s defense apparatus is likely to trigger strong opposition from China, Russia, and Central Asian governments, further hindering efforts to lift international sanctions. However, this matter will likely become a central topic in forthcoming negotiations between Central Asian authorities and Syria’s new leadership. It is important to note that these jihadi groups are officially designated as terrorist organizations by the governments of Central Asia and Russia.  

In conclusion, Central Asian Salafi-Jihadi groups pose a significant threat to US national security. The US government has designated several such groups—including the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), KIB, JMA, and KTJ—as terrorist organizations, along with TIP leader Abdul Haq al-Turkistani, due to their al-Qaeda ties. Over the past decade, Uzbek and Tajik immigrants in the US linked to the IMU and KTJ have been convicted for plotting terrorist attacks, including an attempted assassination of President Barack Obama. 

To address this threat, the US should exert diplomatic pressure on Syria’s de facto leader, Ahmed al-Sharaa, to sever ties with foreign terrorist groups and expel them from the country. Such decisive measures would not only diminish the influence of these extremist factions but also enhance Washington’s strategic alliances with Central Asian governments. 

Uran Botobekov, Ph.D.
Uran Botobekov, Ph.D.
Dr. Uran Botobekov is a leading expert on the Central Asian Salafi-Jihadi Movement, a research fellow, and a member of the Advisory Board of EU Modern Diplomacy. During his career, Dr. Botobekov combined public and diplomatic service for the Kyrgyz government with scientific research. At various times he worked in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as the head of the State Policy Department of Governmental Agency for Public Service Affairs of Kyrgyz Government and the Press Secretary of the Kyrgyz President. He also served as the Counselor-Ambassador of the Kyrgyz Republic to Turkey and Ukraine. Dr. Botobekov regularly publishes books, articles, and Op-eds. He is the author of two books, several articles, and book chapters regarding Sunni Jihadism, terrorist financing, and radical Islamism. His research and analytical articles on militant Salafism in the post-Soviet Central Asian space were published in Russia, Turkey, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Japan, USA, India, China, Vietnam, Germany, and Kyrgyzstan. His 2019 book, “Think Like Jihadist: Anatomy of Central Asian Salafi-Jihadi Groups,” analyzes the stages of formation and development of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and other militant groups in post-Soviet Central Asia, as well as their joining global ISIS and al Qaida. At the same time, Dr. Botobekov contributed to media and research platforms such as CSIS, Modern Diplomacy, The Diplomat, The Jamestown Foundation, The American Foreign Policy Council’s Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst and Carnegie Moscow Center on counterterrorism and homeland security issues. He regularly advised governments of Central Asian countries on matters relating to radical Salafism and Islamist extremism.

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