COLUMN: Daesh-Khorasan Poses a Low Threat to the United States

Key Judgments: 

• We assess that is unlikely that Daesh-Khorasan will be able to attack the US homeland and its interests as well as its allies in the foreseeable future. 

• We assess that a Daesh-Khorasan attack against the US homeland and its interests as well as its allies would likely be a low-damage event.  

Daesh-Khorasan Unlikely to Attack Against the US. Daesh-Khorasan has had longstanding designs of striking the US homeland that could not be supported by parallel capability given the Coalition operations that devastated the group in terms of sanctuary and human resource. After the troops’ withdrawal in 2021, however, Daesh-Khorasan did benefit from the release of up to 2,000 prisoners, safe havens for reconstituting, matériel abandoned by the US forces, and a better operational environment sans Coalition counter-terrorism pressure. Nonetheless, the Taliban government’s military crackdown in at least 16 Afghan provinces decimated Daesh-Khorasan’s already lacking external operations’ strength. 

• The number of anti-US plots emanating from Afghanistan-Pakistan by the supporters of al-Qaeda, Taliban, and Lashkar-e-Taiba have been nearly thrice as many as those related to Daesh-Khorasan.ⁱ 

• The dedicated external operations infrastructure inside Afghanistan that the organization requires to plan and orchestrate attacks against the US is absent. Instead, Daesh-Khorasan appears to be more focused on delegitimizing and destabilizing its rival Taliban’s government, evident from the escalation in the former’s attacks since the latter’s takeover.ⁱⁱ 

• Daesh-Khorasan has so far struggled in recruiting a significant number of foreign fighters from the US. This means the chances of training Americans in Afghanistan before sending them back to conduct attacks in the US are minimal.ⁱⁱⁱ 

• Confined to Afghanistan and under intense military pressure from the Taliban, it is barely possible for Daesh-Khorasan to successfully plan and launch complex external operations against the US homeland. The Biden administration has endorsed the effectiveness of the Taliban’s campaign against the organization.^iv  

Daesh-Khorasan Attack Against the US Would be a Low-Damage Event. Assessments by US defense officials post-Taliban takeover that predicted the period required by Daesh-Khorasan to acquire the necessary capabilities to mount an attack on the US have all proven incorrect. While it is true that following the withdrawal the US has a much weaker ‘over-the-horizon’ counterterrorism strategy that provides Daesh-Khorasan a more permissive operational environment, practically the group has been seriously engaged in the domestic battle against the Taliban forces. Such a focus on the Afghan front scarcely affords Daesh-Khorasan the freedom to develop the capacity to orchestrate a high-damage attack on the US homeland. 

• In the absence of proper external operations infrastructure and sufficient numbers of trained American recruits, Daesh-Khorasan is expected to rely on inciting its supporters and sympathizers inside the US to carry out lone-actor attacks, at the maximum.^v  

• Evidently, Daesh-Khorasan’s ultimate goal is to strike the US, but since it is highly unlikely in the foreseeable future, it may opt to attack the geographically closer US embassies located in South and Central Asia. Further, although striking an allied European country is more probable than the US,^vi such an event is more likely to cause minor damage.  

• Despite the downgraded counter-terrorism intelligence and operations’ pressure post-withdrawal, the Turkish, German, Austrian, and Dutch police in 2023 successfully carried out arrests of Daesh-Khorasan-linked operatives who were planning to strike European targets.^vii These timely arrests indicate that it is difficult for Daesh-Khorasan to execute high-damage and complex attacks even in European countries. 

The overall assessment is that Daesh-Khorasan presents minimal risk to the US homeland and its interests as well as its allies at this time. Though it is unable to launch or facilitate a deadly attack in the near future, it remains a threat likely to grow in the midterm future.  

Sources 

i Mines, Andrew. “The Evolving Terrorism Threat to the U.S. from the Afghanistan-Pakistan Region.” George Washington University Program on Extremism, 2023. https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs5746/files/2023-08/evolving-threats-from-afpak-final.pdf.  

ii Thomas, Clayton. “Taliban Government in Afghanistan: Background and Issues for Congress.” Congressional Research Service, 2021. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R46955.   

 iii Abdul Sayed and Hamming, Tore Refslund. “The Growing Threat of the Islamic State in Afghanistan and South Asia.” United States Institute of Peace, 2023. https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2023-06/sr-520-growing-threat-islamic-state-afghanistan-south-asia.pdf. 

 iv Mir, Asfandyar. “Commentary: No Good Choices: The Counterterrorism Dilemmas in Afghanistan and Pakistan.” CTC Sentinel 16(10), 2023. https://ctc.westpoint.edu/commentary-no-good-choices-the-counterterrorism-dilemmas-in-afghanistan-and-pakistan/.  

 v Imran, Muhammad. “The Growing Threat of ISIS-K and Implications for Global Security.” Eurasia Review, July 24, 2023. https://www.eurasiareview.com/24072023-the-growing-threat-of-isis-k-and-implications-for-global-security-oped/.  

 vi Jadoon, Amira, Andrew Mines and Abdul Sayed. “The Enduring Duel: Islamic State-Khorasan’s Survival Under Afghanistan’s New Rulers.” CTC Sentinel 16(8), 2023. https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-enduring-duel-islamic-state-khorasans-survival-under-afghanistans-new-rulers/. 

 vii Counter Extremism Project. “Multiple Arrests in Europe Highlight Complex Threat of Islamist Terrorism.” Counter Extremism Project, December 24, 2023. https://www.counterextremism.com/press/multiple-arrests-europe-highlight-complex-threat-islamist-terrorism.