States frequently designate non-state actors who engage in violence for political, religious, or ideological purposes targeting non-combatants as terrorist organizations to counter their activities. However, there is ongoing debate about the effectiveness of these designations in combating terrorism, with critics questioning whether they disrupt terrorist operations or merely serve symbolic purposes. The recent designation of six Mexican cartels and two international gangs has sparked renewed discussions about the efficacy of such measures and their potential outcomes. This article critically examines the rationale behind state terrorist designations and evaluates their effectiveness on cartel designations, focusing on Salafi-jihadist groups and Iran-backed militia organizations.
A terrorist designation is an official declaration by a government or international body that identifies a group, organization, or individual as being involved in terrorism or supporting terrorist activities. These designations enable states to implement significant legal measures, including asset freezes, travel restrictions, and increased scrutiny, aiming to disrupt the group’s operations and prevent further acts of terrorism. Additionally, such designations heighten the penalties for supporting or engaging with listed groups, thereby strengthening efforts to combat terrorism and mitigate its global impact. For the United States, these designations also authorize military operations against designated groups beyond its borders.
States utilize various motives when designating groups as terrorist organizations. Authoritarian regimes, in particular, often exploit terrorism designations as tools to suppress political opposition, labeling religious movements, political parties, or prominent figures as terrorists. For example, following the 2013 coup, the Egyptian government designated the Muslim Brotherhood, a transnational political movement advocating for the so-called purification of Islam from Western influences through political power, as a terrorist organization. Similarly, Russia designated opposition leader Alexei Navalny as a terrorist and imprisoned him. In Turkiye, the ruling AKP government officially designated the Gulen movement—a moderate Islamic group that resisted subjugation to the government—after the 2016 controversial coup attempt. Furthermore, the AKP’s corrupt relationships with the Pakistani government contributed to the Gulen movement’s designation as a terrorist organization in Pakistan. The movement’s Sufi and moderate Islamic teachings were perceived as threats to Iran’s Shiite ideology and the Wahhabi views held by the Gulf States, which led to its designation as a terrorist group in those regions as well.
Terrorist designations are often accompanied by intensified media campaigns that depict members of opposition groups or political movements as terrorists. A similar trend is observed in some African countries, such as Ethiopia, where the government has officially designated opposition ethnic groups as terrorist organizations. This pattern of exploitative designations, typically driven by political rivalries, extends to other regions, including parts of Asia. In some instances, terrorist designations by states serve as acts of political retaliation. A prominent example is the U.S. designation of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a terrorist organization, which led to the Iranian government’s reciprocal move of designating the U.S. military as a terrorist group.
The U.S. government initiated terrorist designations in 1996 with the passage of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), which granted the Secretary of State the authority to designate foreign groups as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs). This legislation made it illegal for U.S. citizens and organizations to provide support or resources to these groups. In 1999, Executive Order 13224 expanded the scope of these designations by enabling the classification of individuals and entities as Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGTs), allowing for measures such as asset freezes and sanctions. The U.S. government designates not only groups but also states that sponsor terrorism—currently identifying four such states—as well as individuals, with the Department of State and the Department of the Treasury responsible for enforcing these classifications.
As of March 8, 2025, the U.S. government has designated 97 organizations as terrorist groups since 1997, while removing 20 of these organizations from the list. Such delistings typically occur when groups have either become inactive or transitioned into the political sphere. The delisted organizations reflect a diverse range of ideologies, including separatist movements like the Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) in Europe, religious groups such as Aum Shinrikyo, Jewish organizations like Kahana Chai, revolutionary factions including the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement, and the Revolutionary Organization 17 November (17N), as well as paramilitary forces like the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia.
The U.S. government currently maintains a list of 77 organizations designated as FTOs. These organizations are categorized based on various ideologies and operational strategies, often with significant overlap. However, the largest category comprises religious-jihadist organizations, reflecting the global dominance of groups like ISIS and Al-Qaeda. Of the 77 designated organizations, 51 are primarily jihadist, including groups affiliated with ISIS—such as ISIS-West Africa, ISIS-Greater Sahara, ISIS-Libya, and Abu Sayyaf—as well as Al-Qaeda affiliates, including Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, Al Shabaab, Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Data from the Global Terrorism Trends and Analysis Center (GTTAC) reveals that terrorist activities committed by FTO-designated jihadist groups account for more than 50% of global terrorist incidents. Notably, ISIS was responsible for 560 attacks in Syria and Iraq, its affiliate in the Democratic Republic of Congo conducted 319 attacks, and its affiliate in Mozambique carried out 145 in 2024. Similarly, Al-Qaeda-linked groups such as Al Shabaab and TTP were responsible for 261 and 455 attacks, respectively in the same year. Hamas is also classified within the broader category of jihadist terrorist groups.
According to Figure 1 above, the second-largest category comprises left-wing and anarchist organizations. Prominent groups within this category include Shining Path, the Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C), the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), the National Liberation Army (ELN), Revolutionary Struggle (RS), and the Communist Party of the Philippines/New People’s Army (CPP/NPA). Data from the GTTAC indicates that, apart from the NPA and ELN—both of which were responsible for several hundred attacks between 2018 and 2024—other left-wing and anarchist groups have been involved in relatively fewer incidents, with only a few dozen attacks attributed to them.
The categorization of Iran-backed groups on the FTO list is complex, as the Tehran regime extends support and logistical resources to a diverse array of groups, irrespective of sectarian affiliation. This support is primarily directed toward organizations that target the United States and Israel or serve Iran’s strategic interests through proxy engagements, particularly among Shia factions. Notable examples of Iran-backed Shia groups included in the FTO list are Hezbollah, Ansarallah, Kata’ib Hizballah, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). It is important to highlight that the IRGC represents the only state actor currently listed on the FTO roster. These groups have become increasingly prominent, especially in the aftermath of the October 7 Hamas terror attacks. For instance, data from the GTTAC indicates that Hezbollah was responsible for 1,450 attacks in 2024 alone, underscoring their active role in regional terrorism.
The groups designated as FTOs that fall under the separatist category include the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA), and the New Irish Republican Army. Furthermore, recently designated Mexican cartels and international gangs based in Venezuela and El Salvador are categorized under narcoterrorism and gang terrorism. Despite criticisms from scholars and practitioners regarding definitional and operational challenges, the narcoterrorist groups include the Cartel de Sinaloa, Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG), Cartel del Noreste, La Nueva Familia Michoacana, Cartel de Golfo (Gulf Cartel), and Carteles Unidos. Additionally, the gang terrorist groups include Tren de Aragua and Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13). These criminal organizations engage in a range of illicit activities, such as drug trafficking and organized violence, frequently employing terrorism tactics like intimidation, extortion, and violent warfare.
Terrorist designations provide states with essential tools to counter terrorist groups. For example, the United States has utilized the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) to carry out international operations against such groups, leading to the elimination of numerous jihadist leaders in Afghanistan, Syria, and Yemen. However, the actual impact of these tools on the strength, size, and operational capacity of these groups remains uncertain. In some instances, terrorist designations appear to have limited influence on the operational capabilities of these groups. For example, the designation of ISIS affiliates in Mozambique and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in 2021 did not diminish their activities; rather, these groups expanded their operations. As illustrated in Figure 2 below, while the number of ISIS-M attacks and fatalities fluctuated between 2018 and 2024, a significant increase occurred after the 2021 designation. Specifically, in 2022, the number of attacks surged from 42 in 2021 to 187, marking a fourfold rise.
The frequency of ISIS-DRC attacks exhibited an upward trajectory from 2018 to 2021, and this trend persisted following the group’s designation in 2021. Notably, the number of fatalities attributed to the organization continued to rise, thereby reflecting an expansion in its operational capacity, as illustrated in Figure 3 below.
The situation is analogous for the Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), which was designated as a terrorist organization in 2018. Analysis of GTTAC data from 2018 to 2024 in Figure 4 below reveals a marked increase in the group’s operational capacity. While multiple factors likely influence both the designation and operational strategies of JNIM, it is more precise to argue that the group has exploited prevailing economic and political grievances within Muslim communities in the Sahel region. Furthermore, JNIM has effectively capitalized on the instability in the post-junta period, particularly in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger following 2023, thereby expanding its influence. Notably, JNIM was responsible for a significant number of attacks in these countries in 2024.
The examination of other religious-jihadist FTO groups highlights that terrorist designations have limited impact on the operational capacities of these groups, as their activities are deeply rooted in religious and ideological motivations. These groups, often adhering to distorted interpretations of Islamic doctrine, demonstrate a strong commitment to their cause. Moreover, the failure of state actors in regions where ISIS and Al-Qaeda originated, due to both resource limitations and operational deficiencies, has hindered efforts to counter these groups effectively. The U.S. military has been actively involved in operations against designated groups, aiming to contain them within their countries of origin.
The impact of terrorist designations on Iran-backed militia groups appears to be relatively marginal. These groups continue to receive significant logistical, financial, and ideological support from the Tehran regime, which is central in directing their activities. Despite being designated as terrorist organizations, the operational capacity of these groups has not been substantially hindered. In fact, their involvement in regional conflicts has escalated, particularly in the Middle East. For instance, in 2022, attacks attributed to Iran-backed militias accounted for 6.2% of all terrorist incidents, and this figure rose slightly to 13.9% in 2023. However, following the October 7 attacks, the share of total incidents attributed to these militias saw a marked increase, surpassing 25% in 2024. This trend underscores the limited effectiveness of designations in curbing the operational reach of these groups, particularly when they are supported by a powerful state actor such as Iran.
Currently, there is an ongoing debate regarding the impact of designating cartels and gangs as terrorist organizations. Despite the potential diplomatic repercussions, including strained relations and diminished cooperation between the United States and Mexico, the actual effectiveness of such designations may be limited by the operational resilience of these criminal organizations. While sanctions and potential military interventions may be implemented, the broader impact could be constrained due to these groups’ extensive global networks, with established markets in regions such as Europe, Australia, Brazil, and Japan. In response to terrorist designations, these groups will likely adapt by shifting their operations to alternative markets. Although a temporary reduction in activities may occur in the immediate aftermath of such designations, these groups are expected to eventually regain momentum and refocus on the U.S. market, where the persistent demand for illicit drugs remains high.
In conclusion, while terrorist designations serve as a strategic tool for states, particularly for military and law enforcement agencies like those in the United States, their effectiveness remains a subject of ongoing debate. Authoritarian regimes, such as those in Turkiye, Russia, and Egypt, frequently exploit these designations to suppress political opposition, often labeling dissident groups as terrorist organizations. However, the broader impact of such designations is contentious. Terrorist organizations, driven by ideological and religious motivations, and often backed by state sponsors, remain resilient due to their ability to adapt to changing geopolitical landscapes and exploit emerging vacuums. Furthermore, the global operational capacity of these groups suggests that terrorist designations may have limited efficacy, not only in curbing the activities of established terrorist organizations but also in diminishing the operations of newly designated cartels and gangs.