While the 2024 Crocus City Hall attack marked a turning point in the fight against Central Asian ISKP, the group’s ability to adapt under counterterrorism pressure and evolve its tactics underscores that the threat is far from over. Countering this menace requires not only sustained vigilance but also meaningful intelligence cooperation between Central Asian governments and global partners—before ISKP regains the initiative.
Targeted Crackdowns Against Central Asian ISKP Cells
On July 19, Uzbekistan’s State Security Service announced the dismantling of an underground network and the arrest of 16 individuals linked to the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) in the city of Namangan. Investigators revealed that the cell was led by a 19-year-old woman who had created a pro-ISKP Telegram channel with more than 120 members, through which she disseminated audio-visual propaganda promoting the Islamic State’s ideology and calling for armed jihad.
After undergoing religious indoctrination at a clandestine hujra (informal religious school) in Istanbul in 2022, she reportedly embraced radical Salafi beliefs so deeply that she denounced her own father as a kafir (infidel) for rejecting the group’s creed. Strikingly, among those arrested was the founder of a private university in Namangan—highlighting the group’s penetration into educated and socially influential circles.
This incident represents yet another blow to ISKP’s Uzbek and Tajik network, following their audacious 2024 Crocus City Hall attack in Moscow—a brutal operation that captured global attention and showcased the group’s operational sophistication, strategic ambition, and expanding transnational reach. Since then, ISKP-linked individuals have come under intensified scrutiny from regional and international counterterrorism agencies, leading to increased arrests and disruption of the group’s networks across Central Asia.
Earlier, in June 2025, the Yakkasaray District Court in Uzbekistan sentenced 46-year-old Obid Saparov, a native of Kashkadarya Province, to 16 years in prison for his involvement in ISKP-linked terrorist activities, including his role in the 2022 rocket attack launched from Afghanistan on the Uzbek border city of Termez. His capture by Pakistani security forces in January 2025 and subsequent extradition to Tashkent were the result of intelligence sharing facilitated through multilateral cooperation among Uzbekistan, Pakistan, and the US.
ISKP suffered another significant blow on March 2, 2025, when Mohammad Sharifullah, also known as “Jafar”—a senior ISKP commander involved in the 2021 Kabul airport suicide bombing that killed 13 U.S. service members and approximately 160 civilians, and a key coordinator of the group’s Tajik and Uzbek operatives in the Af-Pak zone—was apprehended through multilateral intelligence cooperation involving Russia, Iran, Pakistan, Türkiye, and the US.
A UN Monitoring Team’s 35th report revealed that Pakistani security forces then disrupted an attempt by ISKP’s External Operations Unit to establish a presence along the Af–Pak border region, arresting three senior operatives—Adil Panjsheri, Abu Munzir (Tajik), and Kaka Younis (Uzbek)—all implicated in the recruitment and financing of suicide bombers linked to the deadly attacks in Kerman and Moscow. Through coordinated multilateral counterterrorism efforts involving regional actors and the US, Panjsheri, a key suspect in the January 2024 Kerman bombing, was extradited to Iran.
Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif later hailed the US for its intelligence-sharing efforts and for sustained bilateral and multilateral counterterrorism cooperation in the fight against ISKP. Western security and intelligence agencies have played a critical role in disrupting nearly all ISKP-linked plots at an early stage, preventing major attacks on Western soil and leading to the arrests of numerous Tajik, Uzbek and Kyrgyz ISKP operatives. Notably, despite strained relations with Moscow and Tehran, U.S. agencies have engaged in targeted intelligence-sharing with both Russia and Iran to help neutralize transnational ISKP threats.
From Kunar to the Kremlin: The Rise and Fall of Tajik ISKP Wing
In response to the Taliban regime’s ruthless crackdown on ISKP since its return to power in 2021, numerous ISKP operatives of Uzbek, Tajik, and Kyrgyz origin from post-Soviet states have been forced to abandon their strongholds in Afghanistan’s eastern Kunar and Nangarhar provinces, shifting toward the volatile Af-Pak borderlands. Some have reportedly moved even farther afield, seeking refuge in Pakistan’s Balochistan province.
As the group has progressively shifted its operational and logistical infrastructure beyond Afghanistan to evade Taliban pressure, ISKP’s leadership has increasingly sought to exploit Central Asian foreign fighters for external operations in countries with sizable Central Asian migrant communities—such as Russia, Turkey, Iran, Europe, and the United States. This pivot toward transnational attacks aligns with ISIS’s broader strategy to position itself as the undisputed leader of the global Sunni Salafi-Jihadi movement, eclipsing rivals such as al-Qaeda, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, and the Taliban.
Leveraging shared Russian proficiency, visa-free travel frameworks, ease of cross-border movement within the CIS, and common adherence to the Hanafi Sunni school of belief, Central Asian commanders have successfully recruited Tajik and Uzbek migrants residing in Russia and Turkey to join ISKP.
The surge in ISKP’s transnational operations between 2021 and 2025 highlights the pivotal role played by Central Asian foreign fighters—particularly Tajik fighters—in enhancing the group’s operational capabilities through successful terrorist attacks in Iran, Turkey, and Russia.
The high-profile, violent attacks carried out by ISKP’s Central Asian jihadists have triggered unprecedented, coordinated pressure from regional and Western counterterrorism and intelligence agencies. This coordinated campaign has disrupted numerous plots and dealt a substantial blow to ISKP’s operational infrastructure.
The activities of Al-Azaim Media, ISKP’s multilingual official propaganda outlet, suggest that following a series of operational setbacks that have significantly weakened its clandestine networks both regionally and in the West, the group is gradually adapting to sustained counterterrorism pressure by seeking to stay under the radar of security and intelligence agencies. Previously, pro-ISKP Telegram and Instagram channels broadcasting in Uzbek, Tajik, and Russian across the post-Soviet space openly disseminated propaganda produced by Islamic State-Central and its Khorasan Province, frequently rotating IP addresses and usernames to circumvent platform restrictions.
Today, however, these networks operate with far greater secrecy and discipline. ISKP propagandists have adopted increasingly sophisticated tactics, shifting toward small, localized, and tightly controlled discussion groups—often formed within local mosques among individuals who already know and trust one another—making detection and infiltration far more difficult for monitoring agencies. Thus, the kind of open interaction once common among Central Asian ISKP militants on Telegram, Twitter, and Facebook during the group’s early phase in 2015-18 is now virtually nonexistent.
While global counterterrorism efforts have significantly curtailed the open dissemination of jihadi propaganda on social media and disrupted direct online contact between sympathizers and ISKP recruiters, the group has adapted by shifting to more discreet, targeted communication within closed online forums—often embedded in local religious jamaats composed of individuals who already know and trust one another. This was exemplified by the recent dismantling of a cell in Namangan, Uzbekistan.
The United Nations has also highlighted ISKP’s evolving tactics and its concerted efforts to embed itself within the religious landscape of Central Asia. According to the UN Monitoring Team’s 36th report on ISIS and Al-Qaida, released on July 21, 2025, ISKP leader Sanaullah Ghafari continues to place particular emphasis on recruiting members from post-Soviet Central Asian states and on expanding the group’s operational reach into Afghanistan’s neighboring countries and beyond. The report further notes that although ISKP maintains a core leadership composed primarily of Afghan Pashtuns, its rank-and-file fighters are now predominantly of Central Asian origin, with the group’s estimated strength hovering around 2,000 militants.
Conclusion: Defeating ISKP Requires Joint Regional Action
In conclusion, in the aftermath of ISKP’s 2024 Moscow attack, the group’s Tajik and Uzbek members have come under intensified counterterrorism scrutiny both across Central Asia and in the West. This sustained pressure has significantly degraded their operational capabilities and disrupted recruitment pipelines. Yet despite these setbacks, ISKP’s Central Asian network remains resilient—quietly recalibrating, reconstituting local cells, and probing for new opportunities to strike.
Concurrently, ISKP continues to exploit the deviations from core global jihadi principles exhibited by rival Sunni militant movements—including the Taliban and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), along with their Central Asian affiliates such as Katibat Tawhid wal-Jihad (KTJ), Katibat Imam al-Bukhari (KIB), the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), and the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP). By denouncing these groups as Munāfiqūn (hypocrites), ISKP seeks to position itself as the sole legitimate vanguard of holy jihad, claiming exclusive commitment to defending and advancing the interests of Central Asian Muslims.
To effectively counter the evolving ISKP threat, Central Asian governments would benefit from enhancing intelligence cooperation with key international partners—including Russia, the United States, Turkey, Pakistan, and European nations—particularly those hosting significant Central Asian migrant communities vulnerable to radicalization and recruitment. Equally vital is sustained engagement with the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and the emerging government in Syria, both of which are conducting direct counter-ISIS operations on the ground. Such cooperation is indispensable, as many Central Asian jihadist factions remain entrenched in Afghan and Syrian theaters of operation. At the same time, regional governments would be well-served by refraining from politicizing the ISKP threat for immediate geopolitical gain, as evidenced by Moscow’s unsubstantiated attempt to link Ukraine to the Crocus City Hall attack—an approach that risks diverting attention from the core counterterrorism challenge.
As ISKP recalibrates under mounting pressure, its future may depend less on battlefield success and more on its ability to exploit fractures—ideological, geographic, and political. For Central Asia and its international partners, the challenge lies not only in disrupting cells, but in denying ISKP the narrative, sanctuary, and audience it needs to rise again.