Over the last six years, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria – Democratic Republic of the Congo (ISIS-DRC) has emerged as the deadliest violent extremism group operating in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), with over 8,000 fatalities recorded between 2018 and the end of July 2024. The armed group’s violent footprint marked by a sharp escalation in attacks—peaking at 319 incidents in 2021—is evidence of both operational resilience and strategic adaptation. While traditional armed groups in the eastern DRC region, such as March 23 Movement (M23) and the Cooperative for Development of the Congo (CODECO), have also perpetrated terrorism, it is the ISIS-DRC that has uniquely fused transnational jihadist objectives with the DRC’s internal conflicts. This dynamic interplay between global terrorism networks and local insurgencies underscores a critical challenge for homeland security professionals and counterterrorism analysts: understanding how localized grievances fuel transnational terrorism.
Data from the Global Terrorism Trends and Analysis Center (GTTAC) provides detailed insights into ISIS-DRC’s activities, while also aligning them with the global objectives of ISIS. This emphasizes its localized motives rooted in the DRC’s complex, conflict environment. Some eastern territories within the country have long been a stage for non-state armed actors whose activities have profoundly shaped the Great Lakes’ regional stability and humanitarian conditions.
Regional Context and Group Distinctions
From 2018 to August 2024, non-state armed groups such as the M23, CODECO, the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), and Wazalendo fighters have escalated their armed operations. Each group pursues distinct agendas—ranging from ethnic grievances to economic exploitation. However, ISIS-DRC stands apart as the only armed group with deep ties to a transnational terrorist network. Its ability to navigate shifting political, ethnic, and economic contexts while adapting its strategies underscores the challenges of asymmetric warfare in eastern DRC, where state and non-state actors form fluid alliances.
Founding and Transformation
Founded in 1995, ISIS-DRC began as the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), a Ugandan insurgent group born from the merger of the Uganda Tabliq movement and remnants of the National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (NALU). Initially motivated by Ugandan political grievances, the group transformed dramatically after aligning with ISIS in 2019. This allegiance shifted its goals from regional insurgency to global Salafi-Jihadist ambitions, including the establishment of an Islamic caliphate.
On March 10, 2021, the U.S. Department of State designated the ADF as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO), recognizing its integration into ISIS’s global network. This designation highlights the group’s ideological pivot and increasing operational brutality.
Escalation of Tactics
Since 2018, ISIS-DRC has employed increasingly sophisticated methods, transitioning from guerrilla tactics to using improvised explosive devices (IEDs), suicide bombings, mass executions, and kidnappings, among others types. The group’s leader, Seka Musa Baluku, renewed allegiance to ISIS in April 2024, reaffirming the Salafi-jihadist group’s commitment to the global jihadist strategy.
Examples of ISIS-DRC attacks underscore the group’s growing operational capabilities and brutal tactics. The Beni Massacre (January 2021), the Mpondwe School Attack (June 2023, in Uganda), and the executions in Beni, Lubero, and Mambasa territories (2nd and 3rd Quarters, 2024) illustrate its ability to strike civilians, security forces, and regional peacekeepers with devastating effect. Data from GTTAC highlights a consistent pattern of escalating violence, demonstrating ISIS-DRC’s adaptability and its alignment with the broader transnational objectives of ISIS while exploiting local conflict dynamics in the DRC.
Operations
ISIS-DRC financial and State-like activities and operations are through a robust network of illicit trade, including coffee, timber, and gold smuggling. These ventures sustain its operations and support state-like structures within its territories. Reports highlight the armed group having established structures in schools, prisons, and health centers, further entrenching its presence in the DRC.
The Salafi-Jihadist group leverages propaganda to amplify its influence, using ISIS’s weekly publication al-Naba to celebrate territorial gains and claim high-casualty terrorism attacks. Recent al-Naba issues emphasized its geographic expansion into Lubero territory in North Kivu Province and its allegiance to ISIS’s global jihadist objectives.
Analysis: Tactical Evolution of ISIS-DRC
Data from GTTAC provides a comprehensive picture of ISIS-DRC’s emerging threat and operational patterns. It highlights the group’s evolution into the most lethal violent extremism groups in the DRC. Between 2018 and July 31, 2024, ISIS-DRC has been responsible for 1,506 documented attacks, resulting in 8,130 fatalities, as shown in Figure 1. below. The GRID data reveals a sharp escalation in both incidents and lethality from 2020 onward, with fatalities peaking in 2022 (1,622 deaths) before slightly decreasing in 2023 (1,460 deaths) and 2024 (1,269 deaths). This fluctuation suggests an adaptive strategy, where the group has recalibrated its operational focus rather than diminished in threat level. ISIS-DRC’s ability to sustain a high casualty count despite varying levels of operational intensity is indicative of both its resilience and the limitations of counterterrorism efforts in eastern DRC.
A closer examination of ISIS-DRC’s tactics underscores its strategic approach to asymmetric warfare. The group has executed large-scale massacres, for instance, the Beni Massacre (January 2021), and transnational attacks like the Mpondwe School Attack (June 2023, Uganda). This demonstrates its capability to project violence beyond Congolese borders. Targeted executions in Beni, Lubero, and Mambasa territories (2nd and 3rd Quarters, 2024) reflect a shift toward calculated intimidation tactics aimed at consolidating control in these areas. The persistence of high fatality rates, coupled with the rising number of kidnappings (2,148 GRID-documented cases since 2018), suggests that ISIS-DRC is employing both coercion and guerilla warfare tactics to weaken state authority and maintain its relevance among the DRC’s fragmented armed landscape.
The data also highlights an evolving pattern in ISIS-DRC’s claims of responsibility. Whereas the group initially refrained from overtly claiming attacks (no claims in 2018), it has increasingly sought to assert its role within ISIS’s global jihadist network, as seen in Figure 2, below, claiming responsibility for the incidents in the first seven months of 2024 alone.
This trajectory signals a growing integration into the transnational Salafi-jihadist movement, reinforcing the importance of monitoring ISIS-DRC’s ideological alignment and propaganda strategies.
Examining the claimed responsibility data versus the total number of incidents offers several insightful trends. Even though in 2018, ISIS-DRC did not claim a single attack, in 2024, over one-third (34%) of ISIS-DRC attacks were publicly claimed. We see that the sharpest increase occurred between 2021 and 2024, aligning with the group’s growing efforts to link its operations with ISIS’s global narrative. See Figure 3, above, showing the gradual increase in claiming responsibility for attacks, which suggests a deliberate strategic decision by ISIS-DRC to increase its visibility within the global jihadist ecosystem.
Furthermore, while the number of ISIS-DRC perpetrators reportedly killed in armed confrontations (319 between 2019 and 2024) suggests that security forces have achieved some tactical successes, these figures pale in comparison to the group’s sustained operational resilience. This underscores a critical challenge for regional and international counterterrorism efforts—neutralizing leadership figures or eliminating individual non-state, armed actors has not meaningfully disrupted ISIS-DRC’s broader terrorism infrastructure in this region of Africa.
From a national security perspective, these findings present a troubling forecast for stability in the Great Lakes region. The DRC’s complex web of armed groups, including M23, CODECO, FDLR, and the Wazalendo fighters, provides an ideal environment for ISIS-DRC to thrive while leveraging transnational ISIS resources. Illicit economic networks—such as smuggling in minerals, timber, and other products—offer vital funding streams that sustain ISIS-DRC’s operations. This fusion of terrorism with organized crime further complicates counterterrorism efforts, as financial disruptions require a multi-pronged approach involving not only military pressure but also economic and innovative interventions.
Ultimately, ISIS-DRC’s trajectory from 2018 to mid-2024 underscores the limitations of conventional counterinsurgency measures in asymmetric warfare environments. Despite continued military operations, the group has demonstrated remarkable adaptability, adjusting its tactics, propaganda, and financing strategies to maintain operational momentum. This suggests an urgent need for a recalibrated approach that integrates intelligence-driven counterterrorism efforts with broader stabilization initiatives, including governance reforms and economic interventions aimed at disrupting ISIS-DRC’s recruitment pipeline. Given the group’s increasing lethality and transnational aspirations, its activities should be viewed not only as a localized insurgency but also as a significant emerging threat to regional and global security.
Moving Forward
Addressing ISIS-DRC’s growing threat will require a multifaceted counterterrorism strategy that incorporates both non-kinetic interventions. Lessons from countering other ISIS affiliates underscore the necessity of regional cooperation, intelligence-sharing, and strategic messaging to counter radicalization and recruitment. The significance of this emerging threat cannot be overstated—left unchecked, ISIS-DRC risks further destabilizing an already fragile region. An integrated approach, blending security operations with governance reforms and economic development, is essential to disrupting ISIS-DRC’s influence and ensuring long-term stability.