PERSPECTIVE: Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions Escalate Tensions with Missile Strikes and Global Noncompliance

In the turbulent Middle East, piercing Iran’s veil of secrecy is difficult and dangerous in a country considered one of the world’s most oppressive theocracies overseeing all aspects of people’s lives. As tensions between Israel and Iran continue to escalate, the consequences of war are often an afterthought by government leaders determined to win at any cost. The quandary of a nuclear Iran remains open and has provoked rigorous analysis and suspicion on both sides. Much of this discussion has prompted worst-case scenario research such as Nuclear War between Israel and Iran: lethality beyond the pale, which used extensive modeling and simulation to estimate fatalities during a nuclear exchange between Iran and Israel as being horrific. The study estimates that “double strikes on three of Israel’s major cities, including Tel Aviv, by Iran yielded over 400,000 fatalities, and multiple return strikes by Israel on ten of Iran’s major cities, including Tehran, yielding over 24 million deaths. ⁱⁱ Intelligence operatives have pursued additional discovery of secret knowledge. While not well known by the public, a successful mission conducted in 2018 by Israel’s Mossad, the national intelligence agency tasked to perform such actions using clandestine methods, gathered the largest seizure of Iranian nuclear plans to date. This enormous trove of information has contributed to the puzzle and was shared with other intelligence organizations, journalists, scholars, and research institutions. “The target has become known as the Iranian Atomic or Nuclear Archive. The data contained in the archive exceeds what was previously known as the Amad Plan, a code name for Iran’s crash nuclear program from the 1990s-2000.”ⁱⁱⁱ Within the framework of these documents, Iran’s intention to establish a nuclear weapons complex and build five atomic weapons was revealed. Iran’s progress in achieving those goals remains unknown.  

Still, recent International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reports have confirmed Iran’s non-compliance with the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA) Agreement and the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT), documenting Iran’s noncompliance with these agreements and treaties and production of highly enriched nuclear materials beyond what is required for peaceful use. Taken together, these factors indicate that Iran may already possess the ability, means, and ambition to become a nuclear state and produce nuclear weapons. 

Iranian Rocket Force 

Israel and the world have remained on edge as Iran has successfully launched two recent and significant missile strikes into the heart of major Israeli cities, and Iran has threatened more if necessary. These missile attacks have renewed concern and reignited discussion about Iran’s ability to design and use a nuclear ballistic missile. Iran’s exact capabilities and progress toward acquiring such weapons remain uncertain. What has been demonstrated is that over half the equation has been met for such an attack.  

Chart 1 illustrates selected missiles at Iran’s disposal. 

Chart 1: Iran Missile Capabilities, Iran Military Power, DIA, 2019, page 47^iv

Iran’s substantial rocket forces and their ability to strike Israel from Iranian soil and deliver conventional munitions on target have been successful. The first attack, on April 13, 2024, was reported as “…more than 300 projectiles – including around 170 drones and over 120 ballistic missiles –fired toward Israel in an immense aerial attack overnight, noting the reprisals marked the first time the Islamic Republic has launched a direct assault on Israel.” ^v The second attack on October 1, 2024, was described as, “Iran unleashed a major airstrike targeting sites across Israel, while Israel’s air defenses shot down most of the 180 incoming missiles.” ^vi Fortunately, missile interception was coordinated between the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and the US military, using US Navy destroyers to shoot down the missiles successfully. Reporting by multiple streaming sources discussed how Iran’s use of ballistic missiles, many weighing over a thousand pounds and carrying conventional warheads, forced Israel into a defensive posture. Iran claimed both missile attacks were legally justifiable and were in response to several recent killings. “The IDF recently bombed and killed Hezbollah’s leader, Hassan Nasrallah, and the Hamas leader, Ismail Haniyeh, who was in Teran at the time of his death.”^vii Iran also holds the IDF responsible for the death of an Iranian military officer killed in Syria earlier in 2024. The first attack, while shocking, was mistakenly relegated as inconsequential due to Israel’s successful multilayered air defense system. As these events continue to escalate, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, in his September 27th speech at the United Nations General Assembly,^viii promised a response in retaliation to Iran’s aggression. That response recently took place on October 26th, striking military targets deep inside Iran. Despite the tragedy of Hamas’ attack against Israel on October 7, 2023, public sentiment against Israel has become increasingly hostile by the public and social media, in part due to disinformation. While Iranian militias and proxy strikes have historically been used and proven deadly when attacking Israel, Iran is no longer constrained by the need for concealment. This direct military action by Iran toward Israel has the potential to escalate into a devastating regional conflict. How far Iran may be willing to go is under serious analysis by most of the world’s government intelligence agencies.  

Striking Distance 

Chart 2 demonstrates the striking distance between Iran and Israel. 

Chart 2: Iranian Ballistic Missile Ranges, Iran Military Power, DIA, 2019, page 64^ix

The break in public consciousness after the first attack was a gift to Iran. The gap provided additional time and space to study their adversaries’ defenses, refine tactics, and continue nuclear weapons development. Openly attacking Israel during April and October of this year changes Iran’s pattern of response and should be considered a sentinel event within the region. Retributions have historically been relegated to Iran’s radical proxies, including Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis. However, the attacks on April 13 and October 1, 2024, were launched from Iranian soil. Before and during the strikes, thousands of Israeli citizens were forced to seek safety in bomb shelters reminiscent of the German Blitz against London during WWII. Such actions denote that Iran has become emboldened by global disapproval of Israel’s prosecution of the war in Gaza, Syria, and Lebanon. These launches represent symbolic gains to many Iranians and people living within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. GCC was established in the early 1980s to promote regional cooperation and interaction among its member states. Presently, Iran is enjoying support from GCC country citizens and the region in general, which could embolden further attacks, potentially including the use of weapons of mass destruction to address long-standing grievances with Israel.  Iran seeks to challenge and target the very existence of Israel as a nation and a Jewish state while aiming to change the power structure of the Middle East. The Iranian government has long believed the attainment of nuclear weapons would grant it external prestige and improve its security posture, which in turn could act as a deterrent to other nations considering military actions against their regime. Should Iran equip its rocket force with a nuclear warhead and engage in an exchange with Israel, the consequences would be catastrophic for both sides, the U.S. and the world.  

Iran’s Noncompliance with Nuclear Safeguards 

Photograph 1: Mahmoud Ahmadinejad Natanz UEF^x

Iran’s use of active and passive denial and deception techniques regarding its nuclear ambitions makes it challenging to obtain current information on its nuclear research, manufacturing, and weapons development. Iran’s program can best be described as adaptive, non-linear, and episodic. At one time, Iran was compliant with international standards but has departed from such cooperation. The story unfolds with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), founded in 1957, and a framework of safeguard systems created to ensure the peaceful use of nuclear equipment and materials supplied to nation-states during the Atoms for Peace initiative. The IAEA’s role expanded with establishing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to verify signatories’ use of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. “With the conclusion of the NPT in 1968, non-nuclear-weapon states joining the treaty committed, under Article III, not to acquire nuclear weapons and to accept IAEA safeguards on all their nuclear material to verify this commitment.”^xi Iran has been a signatory to the NPT since 1970. In addition, Iran agreed to IAEA verification and monitoring established by the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action Agreement (JCPOA), commonly referred to as ‘The Iran Nuclear Deal’ in 2015. Iran’s noncompliance with these agreements and safeguards has allowed its nuclear materials program to remain unmonitored. Iran’s progress in developing nuclear materials has accelerated since the Trump administration withdrew from the JCPOA in 2018. A year later, Iran was no longer compliant with JCPOA restrictions. “When negotiations commenced on the JCPOA, it would have taken Iran about two to three months to produce enough fissile material for one bomb (twenty-five kilograms of uranium enriched to above 90 percent), a time frame referred to as breakout.”^xii The IAEA report by the Director General to the Board of Governors and the United Nations Security Council regarding NPT safeguards and JCPOA verification monitoring and documenting Iran’s lack of cooperation regarding enrichment activities, uranium stockpile balances, undeclared production locations and equipment inventories. This includes enrichment of up to 60% U-235, enough for a low-grade nuclear weapon and the ability to enrich materials even higher using new centrifuges. IAEA reports Iran’s cessation of related commitments to the JCPOA as follows:^xiii  

• Removed all surveillance and monitoring equipment (cameras) related to the production and inventory of centrifuges, rotors, bellows, and heavy water for over three years. 

• Blocked inspectors and ceased access to any nuclear-related facilities or locations in Iran. 

The Iran nuclear deal, as envisioned by the JCPOA, has ended with no possibility of restarting the monitoring and verification to ensure the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program. In-depth research conducted by the Atlantic Council, Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative traced Iran’s technical progress and warned, “As of early 2024, Iran’s breakout for one nuclear weapon is estimated at one to two weeks, and breakout for five nuclear weapons is estimated at three to four weeks.”^xiv  As the war continues to escalate between Israel and Hamas in Gaza. Hezbollah in Lebanon and Iran and its proxies’ diplomatic negotiations appear less possible, and the tipping point toward the use of nuclear weapons more believable.  

Final Thoughts 

In his closing report on the NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Director General of IAEA stated, “Public statements made in Iran regarding its technical capabilities to produce nuclear weapons only increased his concerns about the correctness and completeness of Iran’s safeguards and security.” ^xv The Director was referring to local media interviews within Iran where senior Iranian Officials, Mr. Ali Akbar Salehi, Iran’s former nuclear chief and Mr. Kamal Kharrazi, head of Iran’s Strategic Council on Foreign Relations were both quoted in a joint interview saying “We have [crossed] all the thresholds of nuclear science and technology, and have increased the level of uranium enrichment from 20 percent to 60 percent in just a few days, and it can easily be enriched to 90 percent, implying that Iran is very close to making nuclear weapons.”^xvi   

In looking retrospectively at the ‘Atoms for Peace’ project to recent IAEA reporting, open-source information strongly suggests Iran most likely has developed the ‘break out’ capability necessary to assemble a weapon at a time of its choosing. Should they be able to create a warhead, they have the rocket force required to launch it. The cost of using such a weapon is horrific and would come at a significant cost. As the region and the world continue to remain on edge, how many of their people are the Mullahs in Tehran willing to sacrifice to use nuclear weapons? 

The author is responsible for the content of this article. The views and ideas expressed are his own and do not reflect the official policy or position of the National Intelligence University, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the U.S. Intelligence Community, the Department of Defense, the Joint Staff, the U.S. Government, or any associated government agency, or the Northrop Grumman Corporation or any commercial or private sector corporation. 

Sources

ⁱ Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), “Iran Military Power, Ensuring Regime Survival and Securing Regional Dominance.” Pg.30. August 2019; https://www.dia.mil/Military-Power-Publications/  (Accessed 21 April 2024). 

ⁱⁱ Dallas, C.E., Bell, W.C., Stewart, D.J. et al.  “Nuclear War between Israel and Iran: Lethality Beyond the Pale,” pg. 13; Conflict and Health 2013, 7:10, http://www.conflictandhealth.com/content/7/1/10 (Accessed 30 September 2024) 

ⁱⁱⁱ Albright, David, Burkhard, Sarah, “Iran’s Perilous Pursuit of Nuclear Weapons,” May 2021, Institute for Science, and International Security Press, 440 1st Street NW Suite 800, Washington, DC, USA. https://www.isis-online.org  (Accessed 30 September 2024) 

^iv DIA, pg. 47. 

^v Diamond, Jeremy, et al., “Iran Launches Unprecedented Retaliatory Strikes on Israel in Major Escalation of Widening Conflict,” CNN online, 14 April 2024, https://www.cnn.com/2024/04/13/middleeast/iran-drones-attack-israel-intl-latam/index.html   (Accessed 14 April 2024). 

^vi Al-Shalchi, Hadeel, Myre, Greg, “Iran Carries Out a Massive Missile Attack on Israel, Expanding the Middle East Conflict,” Middle East Crises Explained, NPR online update, 01 October 2024, https://www.npr.org/2024/10/01/g-s1-25707/iran-israel-hezbollah-lebanon-attack  (Accessed 01 October 2024). 

^vii Ibid 

^viii Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu remarks at the 79th session of the UN General Assembly, September 29, 2024, New York City, New York. https://www.un.org/unispal/document/israel-pm-remarks-un-ga-79-27sep24/  (Accessed 27 October 2024) 

^ix DIA, pg. 64 

^x DIA, pg. 20 

^xi Carlson, John, “Future Directions in IAEA Safeguards,” November 2018, Harvard Kennedy School, The Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, online, https://www.belfercenter.org (Accessed 10 October 2024). 

^xii Atlantic Council, Scowcroft Middle East, Security Initiative, “THE FUTURE OF US STRATEGY TOWARD IRAN A BIPARTISAN ROADMAP FOR THE NEXT ADMINISTRATION,” pg. 63; 03 October 2024, online; https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/event/the-future-of-us-strategy-toward-iran-a-bipartisan-roadmap-for-the-next-administration/ (Accessed 11 October 2024) 

^xiii IAEA, Board of Governors, “Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015),” pg. 9, 26 February 2024, online. https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/documents/gov2024-7.pdf  (Accessed 30 September 2024).  

^xiv Atlantic Council; pg.63. 

^xv IAEA, Board of Governors, “NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran,” pg. 9, 26 February 2024, online. https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/documents/gov2024-8.pdf (Accessed 30 September 2024).  

^xvi  Iran International Newsroom, “Iran Signals It Is Closer to Building Nuclear Weapons,” 12 February 2024; https://www.iranintl.com/en/202402123916 (Accessed 10 October 2024).  

Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu remarks at the 79th session of the UN General Assembly, September 29, 2024, New York City, New York. https://www.un.org/unispal/document/israel-pm-remarks-un-ga-79-27sep24/  (Accessed 27 October 2024)