September is National Preparedness Month: when we check our emergency kits, review evacuation routes, and prepare for natural disasters. But this year, as I sat in conference rooms at the Eradicate Hate Global Summit in Pittsburgh, I couldn’t stop thinking about a different kind of storm brewing in our communities. One that doesn’t announce itself with weather alerts or sirens.
It targets our children in their digital third spaces: Discord servers where they chat with friends; Instagram feeds where they scroll for hours; Reddit forums where they seek community; gaming platforms where they unwind; and the sprawling ecosystem of social media where teenagers spend most of their waking hours.
In 2024, teenagers accounted for up to two-thirds of ISIS-linked arrests in Europe, with children as young as 11 involved in recent terrorist plots. But Islamic extremists aren’t the only ones hunting in these digital spaces. White supremacist groups, neo-Nazi organizations, and other far-right movements have turned every corner of the internet where young people gather into potential recruitment centers.
What unites these predators across the ideological spectrum isn’t their beliefs; it’s their understanding that vulnerable children make easy targets. And while they’ve perfected their hunting techniques, we’ve dismantled our defenses.
The State Department issued a call for proposals in July 2025 to fund programs preventing terrorists from recruiting young people online. One month later, they canceled the entire initiative due to funding cuts. The very expertise needed to design and manage such responses had been dismantled when my office – the Office of Countering Violent Extremism – was shuttered along with similar prevention teams across the federal government.
We’re watching the storm approach, and we’re sending the meteorologists home.
The New Hunting Grounds
Every platform where teenagers gather has become a recruitment center for extremist movements. Neo-Nazi groups use gaming chats to spread white supremacist messaging. Islamic extremists exploit social media algorithms to target vulnerable youth. Far-right militias recruit through conspiracy theory forums. Anti-government extremists find followers in survivalist communities.
The tactics mirror those used by online predators: build trust, isolate targets, gradually introduce radical ideas, and exploit vulnerabilities. A teenager struggling with social isolation logs into Discord seeking connection and community. Instead, they find recruiters who validate their frustrations while slowly introducing conspiracy theories, hate-filled content, and calls for violence.
The progression is methodical. First comes the meme that seems edgy but harmless. Then the private message offering “real truth” about current events. Next, the invitation to a smaller, more exclusive group where radical content flows freely. Finally, the encouragement to take action, whether spreading propaganda, targeting individuals, or planning violence.
These aren’t random encounters. Extremist recruiters study adolescent psychology, identifying kids who show signs of depression, social anxiety, or family conflict. They understand that teenagers are naturally questioning authority and seeking identity—normal developmental phases that can be exploited.
History’s Warning Signs
This exploitation of youth isn’t new, only the technology has changed.
The Hitler Youth movement systematically recruited children through youth organizations. The Red Army Faction in 1970s Germany drew from disaffected university students. The Irish Republican Army found fertile recruiting ground among marginalized teenagers in Belfast.
What these historical cases teach us is that extremist movements succeed when they fill voids left by failing institutions. When young people can’t find meaning, purpose, or belonging through legitimate channels, they become vulnerable to those offering simple explanations for complex problems.
Today’s digital environment amplifies these vulnerabilities exponentially. Where previous extremists recruited face-to-face in specific locations, online recruiters can reach millions simultaneously, test messaging in real-time, and operate across borders with minimal detection risk.
The Programs We Dismantled
The prevention infrastructure dismantled over the past year wasn’t theoretical; it was saving lives.
At the State Department, our team worked with tech companies to identify recruitment tactics and develop content policies that protected legitimate speech while removing extremist material. We helped content moderators recognize subtle grooming techniques that avoid automated detection.
The Center for Prevention Programs and Partnerships at DHS built relationships with schools and community organizations to identify early warning signs. Their approach was therapeutic, not punitive—providing intervention resources that addressed underlying issues rather than criminalization.
At the FBI, specialized teams tracked recruitment networks and distinguished between teenage edginess and genuine threats. The Department of Health and Human Services funded research into psychological vulnerabilities that informed prevention strategies.
All shared common principles: early intervention beats prosecution; community solutions work better than federal enforcement; understanding radicalization psychology is essential for prevention.
The Disinformation Amplifier
What makes today’s threat environment particularly dangerous is how disinformation amplifies extremist recruitment while major platforms fail to enforce their own policies.
As I write this, Houthi-linked arms dealers openly sell weapons on verified X accounts, advertising Kalashnikovs and equipment marked “Property of U.S. Govt.” The Tech Transparency Project identified 130 Yemen-based accounts advertising weapons, some with verification checkmarks. X even ran advertisements beneath these posts, generating revenue from terrorist-linked content.
A teenager exposed to election fraud conspiracies becomes more susceptible to political violence messaging. Young people fed disinformation about minority communities become easier targets for white supremacist recruitment. Disinformation serves as a gateway drug to radicalization.
The Cost of Inaction
At the Pittsburgh summit, I heard from parents whose children had been radicalized online, officers investigating cases without prevention resources, and community leaders watching young people disappear into digital hate.
One mother found extremist content on her 14-year-old son’s computer. When she sought help, local resources that might have provided intervention had lost federal funding. A police officer described investigating a high school attack plot that might have been prevented if early warning systems remained operational.
These costs are measured in broken families, traumatized communities, and young lives destroyed by preventable radicalization.
What Preparedness Really Means
We don’t wait for hurricanes before planning: We build early warning systems and maintain emergency capabilities. The same logic should apply to extremist recruitment.
We need systems detecting concerning behavioral changes before they become threats. We need intervention addressing psychological vulnerabilities before recruiters exploit them. We need community responses providing support when families encounter these issues.
The good news: we know what works. Community-based prevention programs have demonstrated success in interrupting radicalization. EXIT programs in Germany and Sweden help individuals leave extremist groups through mentorship and psychological support. The Against Violent Extremism network connects former extremists with at-risk youth. Montreal’s Centre for the Prevention of Radicalization Leading to Violence has successfully intervened in over 1,000 cases through family counseling and community partnerships.
The Path Forward
Rebuilding prevention infrastructure requires immediate action and long-term commitment.
Congress must restore funding for prevention programs at State, DHS, FBI, and HHS. These aren’t luxury programs—they’re essential public safety capabilities protecting vulnerable citizens.
We must rebuild scattered expertise by bringing prevention professionals back from think tanks, universities, and private companies through sustained investment commitments.
We need stronger partnerships between agencies, tech companies, schools, and communities. Prevention works best at multiple levels simultaneously.
Parents and educators need training to recognize early warning signs. This means providing basic digital literacy and threat awareness to identify concerning behavioral changes.
Finally, we need active counter-messaging strategies competing with extremist propaganda for young people’s attention, empowering communities to tell better stories about identity, purpose, and belonging.
Field Notes
Prevention vs. Reaction: Preventing one radicalized individual costs approximately $30,000. Investigating, prosecuting, and incarcerating them after violence costs over $3 million—not counting human costs to victims and communities.
Community Resilience: The most effective programs work through trusted institutions—schools, religious organizations, sports teams, youth groups. Federal resources can support but can’t replace local relationships and trust.
Reader Challenge
Check Your Circle: Talk with young people about their online experiences—not to interrogate, but to understand their digital worlds.
Support Local Programs: Find prevention resources in your community. School counselors and youth organizations often spot concerning trends before law enforcement.
Practice Digital Hygiene: Model good information consumption. Fact-check claims before sharing them. Ask questions about sources when your teen shows you “shocking” content. Demonstrate critical thinking by saying “That sounds concerning: let’s look up where this information comes from” rather than immediately reacting emotionally. Young people learn more from observation than instruction.
As I flew home from Pittsburgh, I thought about my children and their digital world. The threats they face aren’t visible from satellites or predictable through models. They emerge from the intersection of human psychology and technology in ways we’re only beginning to understand.
But September’s preparedness lessons still apply: early warning, community response, and sustained vigilance. The storms targeting our children won’t announce themselves with sirens, but they can be detected, understood, and prevented—if we’re willing to invest in the tools and expertise necessary to protect what matters most.
Make sure you’ve read Part 1 of “The Prevention Files, We’re Dismantling the Systems That Prevent the Next 9/11.”