Two years ago, on March 4, 2022, the world watched in disbelief as Russian military forces launched a brazen assault on the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP), the largest nuclear facility in Europe. This audacious act marked a chilling moment in history, as the armed seizure of an operating civil nuclear power plant—and the fierce combat that ensued in its vicinity for months—set a dangerous precedent in the annals of warfare. The profound irresponsibility displayed by Russian forces before and after their capture of ZNPP raised urgent questions about the safety of nuclear energy in conflict zones. With military activity encircling the plant, ZNPP faced critical challenges, including intermittent losses of off-site power, a vital component for its safe operation. As tensions escalate, the specter of a nuclear disaster looms large.i
Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant
The ZNPP, located in southeastern Ukraine near the Dnieper River, is not only the largest nuclear power facility in Europe but also ranks among the top ten largest in the world. Commissioned in 1984, the plant consists of six reactors with a total net electrical power output of approximately 6,000 megawatts. This power plant’s production capacity has allowed the facility to play a significant role in meeting Ukraine’s energy needs, accounting for a substantial portion of the nation’s electricity supply. The ZNPP has been strategically significant for Ukraine, contributing to the stability of its energy grid and supporting economic growth. However, since the onset of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the plant has become the focal point for international concern about the safe operation of the facility and the potential for the unchecked spread of radioactive material due to intentional or unintentional damage caused by the conflict.ii
The Russian invasion has raised serious concerns about the safety and security of nuclear operations at ZNPP, particularly as the site has experienced direct attack and military occupation. International organizations and governments have expressed alarm over the potential risks posed by the conflict unfolding near the nuclear facility, fearing the possibility of an accident or radiation leak. As a result, the ZNPP has become a central topic for discussions about nuclear safety measures, emphasizing the need for stringent regulatory oversight and more robust legal and physical protective measures to prevent catastrophic outcomes during the instability and conflict in Ukraine.iii
Nuclear safety and security are vital for preventing catastrophic incidents that could adversely affect human health and the environment. Nuclear safety focuses on safeguarding nuclear facilities against accidents and natural disasters. Additionally, nuclear security is concerned with preventing unauthorized access and malicious activities, such as sabotage and terrorism. The operational integrity of the ZNPP is essential not only for Ukraine but also for the broader European region, particularly given the potential for cross-border effects from fallout in the event of a nuclear incident.iv
Overview of the Current Situation
The current situation at the ZNPP is challenging and dynamic due to the ongoing conflict near the site and the occupation of the facility by Russian forces. Since March 2022, Russian military forces have not only occupied the site but have also deployed military personnel and various types of weaponry within its grounds. The Russian military occupation has caused considerable concern about the safety and security of the plant, especially considering that military activities near nuclear installations are strictly prohibited under international law. Such actions endanger the integrity of the facility, which could have catastrophic consequences for both the local population and the broader region. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has voiced serious concerns regarding the risks linked to the military presence. Key issues include the heightened potential for nuclear accidents due to the compromised operational environment and the inability of Ukrainian plant operators to fulfill their critical safety obligations due to Russian interference. This situation not only undermines the safety protocols but also creates an atmosphere of uncertainty that could lead to severe consequences if not addressed.v
In response to these alarming circumstances and at the Ukrainian government’s request, the IAEA has established a continuous presence at the ZNPP since September 1, 2022. The agency’s personnel provide oversight, technical assistance, and monitoring and reporting on the situation to ensure that safety standards are upheld despite the challenging conditions. Additionally, IAEA staff play a significant role in supporting the maintenance of essential safety functions and operational integrity of the nuclear power plant, working diligently to mitigate risks associated with the current military occupation.vi
IAEA staff at the ZNPP provide regular updates and reports based on their observations, which are vital to maintaining accurate situational awareness and the material condition of ZNPP. The IAEA Director General has issued over 150 press releases and multiple reports to the Board of Governors, ensuring that the international community remains informed.vii On April 7th, 2024, several drone strikes were conducted on the plant, resulting in some structural damage. One of these strikes impacted the containment dome of the reactor building, raising immediate safety concerns. The IAEA team present at the site conducted a thorough assessment. They confirmed that despite the attack, the plant’s safety systems remained intact and fully operational, ensuring there was no immediate risk of a nuclear incident due to the strike.
The IAEA Director General stated that the attack was “a major escalation of the nuclear safety and security dangers.”viii Furthermore, according to the onsite IAEA team, the ZNPP has been cut off from the grid eight times since August 2022 due to the conflict. Although the plant’s reactors have been shut down since September 2022, plant maintenance and electrical power for cooling must be maintained to offset decay heat from the reactor fuel.ix The situation remains precarious as conflict near the facility is still ongoing, which increases the risk of an intentional or unintentional strike that could potentially release radioactive material into the nearby waterways, the Black Sea, or the atmosphere, both impacting surrounding European territories. Due to ZNPP’s location, essentially in the middle of Europe, a nuclear incident at this site could potentially be more significant than the 1986 incident at Chernobyl.x
IAEA’s Five Principles for the Protection of ZNPP
The IAEA developed five key principles to ensure the safety and security of the ZNPP amid the ongoing armed conflict in Ukraine. Recognizing the unique challenges posed by its proximity to military operations, these principles focus on mitigating the risk of a nuclear accident and preserving the facility’s structural integrity. The first principle emphasizes establishing a protective zone around the plant to minimize the risk of military activities in its vicinity. The second principle advocates maintaining a secure supply of essential services, such as electricity and water, to ensure the plant’s operational safety. The third principle involves continuous oversight and monitoring to detect potential threats promptly. The fourth principle highlights the importance of transparent communication between the IAEA and all relevant stakeholders to inform the public about plant developments.xi Lastly, the fifth principle focuses on the necessity of international cooperation to uphold safety standards and reinforce a collective commitment to protecting nuclear facilities during conflict. Unfortunately, these principles, which were established in May 2023, were violated in April 2024 when a drone strike occurred against the facility. The violation of these principles prompted a response from Rafael Mariano Grossi, IAEA Director General, “No one can conceivably benefit or get any military or political advantage from attacks against nuclear facilities. Attacking a nuclear power plant is an absolute ‘no-go.’ I firmly appeal to military decision makers to abstain from any action violating the basic principles that protect nuclear facilities.”xii Together, if adhered to, these principles provide a framework for managing the risks associated with the plant’s operation during this turbulent period, ultimately facilitating the protection of the facility and the surrounding populace.
Seven Pillars of Nuclear Safety and Security
The Seven Pillars were first outlined in 2022 at a Board of Governors meeting using IAEA standards modified to fit the unique circumstances surrounding ZNPP.xiii
Pillar 1 – Physical Integrity: The first pillar emphasizes the need to maintain the physical integrity of facilities, including reactors and associated systems. This is crucial to prevent structural damage that could lead to safety hazards.
Pillar 2 – Safety and Security Systems: The second pillar mandates that all safety and security systems and equipment be fully functional. This ensures safeguards are in place to respond to emergencies or threats.
Pillar 3 – Operating Staff: The third pillar emphasizes the operating staff’s capability to perform their safety and security duties minus any undue pressure. This is vital for maintaining a competent workforce capable of making informed crisis decisions.xiv
Pillar 4 – Off-Site Power Supply: The fourth pillar highlights the significance of having a secure off-site power supply separate from the grid for all nuclear sites. A reliable power source is essential for the operation of safety systems and for preventing potential accidents involving unchecked nuclear reactions.
Pillar 5 – Logistical Supply Chain: The fifth pillar stresses the need for secure supply chains and transport to and from the sites. This ensures that necessary materials and personnel can be mobilized quickly in response to incidents.
Pillar 6 – Radiation Monitoring and Emergency Preparedness: The sixth pillar specifies on-site and off-site radiation monitoring systems and pre-planned emergency response measures. These are crucial for detecting radiological incidents and ensuring a swift response.
Pillar 7 – Communication: The seventh pillar calls for effective communication with the regulator and relevant parties. Effective communication is essential for coordinating responses and ensuring all stakeholders are informed about the facility’s safety status.xv
The Seven Pillars are particularly relevant for the ZNPP, which has been exposed to military threats and operational challenges since the onset of the conflict. The IAEA has consistently highlighted that adherence to these pillars is essential for preventing a nuclear accident and ensuring the facility’s safety. “In resolution IAEA General Conference GC (66)/RES/6 (2022), all Member States have been called to maintain nuclear safety and security regarding peaceful nuclear facilities and materials in all circumstances and without prejudice to the views of Member States and noted the importance of following the IAEA Director ‘General’s seven indispensable pillars of nuclear safety and security.’” xvi Russian and Ukrainian adherence to these principles and pillars is of the utmost importance, as they increase layers of protection against incidents, bolster system resilience for the ZNPP, and safeguard plant personnel and the surrounding civilian population.
Risks Associated with the Current Control of the ZNPP
The presence of Russian military forces at the ZNPP poses significant risks to nuclear safety and security. Military operations near nuclear facilities increase the likelihood of accidents, including shelling or other forms of armed conflict that could compromise reactor integrity. Furthermore, the military occupation disrupts the standard operational procedures of the plant, hindering the ability of Ukrainian personnel to perform their safety and security duties effectively. Military equipment, such as rocket launchers installed by Russian forces within the plant, has further exacerbated these concerns. This tactic appears to be aimed at using the critical infrastructure as a shield against retaliation, which raises the stakes for potential accidents or miscalculations. The IAEA and various governments have called for inspections and a cessation of military activities around the site, highlighting the urgent need for international oversight to prevent a nuclear disaster.xvii
In addition to military risks, the environmental and humanitarian implications of a nuclear incident at the ZNPP are profound. A release of radioactive materials could contaminate air, water, and soil, leading to long-term health effects for populations in the region. One study on the potential spread of radioactive material in the event of a nuclear accident at ZNPP concluded that depending on weather patterns, the material could spread into the western edge of the Black Sea, the Dnieper River, to include “the eastern and northeastern regions of Ukraine, especially Kharkiv and the western borders of Russia.”xviii The study employed a sophisticated simulation software called Hysplit 4, which was developed by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration that integrated various meteorological data, including wind speed, direction, temperature, and humidity. These factors are critical as they influence the dispersal patterns of airborne radioactive materials. The simulation used material dispersion algorithms to predict the spread of Iodine-131 (131I) and Cesium-137 (137C), two radioactive isotopes.xix
Iodine-131 is a notable threat due to its propensity to accumulate in the thyroid gland, leading to potential hormonal imbalances and increased cancer risk. Similarly, Cesium-137 can contaminate both the environment and living organisms, compounding the health risks associated with exposure. Individuals living within 10 kilometers of the ZNPP are particularly vulnerable in the event of a release of these radioactive materials due to heightened exposure levels. The study suggests that individuals who are exposed to high doses of these two isotopes will be at an increased risk of developing cancer and infertility.xx Of course, this depends on how much radioactive material is released, how long the populace is exposed until they are alerted and evacuated, and the meteorological conditions. Six reactors worth of nuclear material are under threat. If its integrity is compromised, it could mean dire consequences for Ukraine, Russia, and nations bordering the Black Sea. The humanitarian crisis resulting from such an event would strain resources and complicate nuclear emergency response efforts. The international community must recognize the urgency of addressing these risks to protect human lives and the environment.
Recommendations for Action
The immediate withdrawal of Russian military forces from the ZNPP is essential to restoring safety and security at the facility. The risks associated with the Russian or any other military presence increase the risk of potential inadvertent damage to reactors, which are not designed to withstand military attacks, and damage to safety systems crucial for preventing overheating of the reactor cores. However, the current shutdown of all reactors has reduced this risk, as the nuclear chain reaction has stopped, significantly lowering heat output. There is still the potential for spreading radioactive material if the reactors are damaged amid the ongoing conflict. Additionally, the reactor fuel must be cooled as it perpetually gives off heat from radioactive decay. Establishing a neutral zone around ZNPP would demonstrate a commitment to upholding international law and protecting critical infrastructure.
The international community must exert pressure on Russia to comply with this demand and ensure that the ZNPP is returned to Ukrainian control. Admittedly, the Russians are not likely to agree to complete Ukrainian control. An alternative might be that the IAEA could supplement its ground team with additional personnel and ensure impartiality by maintaining the ZNPP and ensuring it only provides power to civilian infrastructure or an agreement along those lines. In return, the Russians would withdraw from the site, and ZNPP would be placed on a “no-strike list” until the conflict is resolved. The following section will provide more context into how the IAEA can assist in this effort and how negotiations might be begun. The way forward is to demilitarize the ZNPP and remove it from the conflict altogether because the stakes of a misstep are too high.xxi
IAEA Playing a Key Role in the Demilitarization of ZNPP
If serious negotiations are initiated with the Russian government regarding the conditions necessary for withdrawing Russian military forces from the ZNPP, the IAEA could be pivotal in persuading Russian leadership to seek a compromise. The precarious situation surrounding the ZNPP is highly concerning, as any significant damage to one of its six reactors could trigger a health and environmental crisis that would impact not only Ukraine but also parts of Russia. Radioactive material, once released, does not discriminate between national borders; it affects air quality, water sources, and public health for everyone, regardless of nationality, and the effects can last thousands of years. Ideally, Ukrainian and Russian leaders share a concern for the safety and well-being of their citizens. Understanding the catastrophic implications of another nuclear disaster in Ukraine, it is in their mutual interest to prevent any incidents that could lead to widespread radiation exposure. To address this, a feasible solution could involve the IAEA assuming complete control of the ZNPP.
This arrangement would allow the IAEA to either maintain the plant in an inactive status or operate it exclusively to supply electricity to civilian infrastructure, contingent upon the Russian government’s approval. By doing so, any apprehensions the Russian side may have regarding Ukraine’s control of the facility could be alleviated. With its extensive experience, the IAEA is well-equipped to manage the ZNPP effectively. Serving as a neutral and unbiased third party, the agency could oversee operations and strictly follow safety protocols. The IAEA has been monitoring and assessing the facility for over two years, giving it valuable knowledge of its operations and safety requirements. Consequently, a key requirement for furthering this arrangement would be the complete withdrawal of all Russian military personnel, equipment, and munitions from the ZNPP site.
Furthermore, Ukrainian and Russian leaders would need to reach a consensus on establishing a neutral zone in and around the facility. This zone would serve as a buffer, explicitly prohibiting military forces from either side from transiting through or conducting any military activities within its boundaries. Such measures would be essential for maintaining safety and security at the plant, ultimately safeguarding the health and well-being of citizens of both nations. The IAEA will require additional support for its missions across Ukraine as it continues to aid additional nuclear power plant (NPP) sites. In January 2023, the IAEA commenced missions to three additional Ukrainian NPP facilities besides ZNPP to assess safety and security conditions. The agency’s work in Ukraine mainly relies on financial contributions from the European Union and 30 member states, including the United States. These funds are crucial for maintaining ongoing operations and expanding its support and assistance capabilities in this critical region. Should Russia agree to the proposed withdrawal plan, the IAEA may urgently need a substantial influx of capital and specialized equipment. This financial boost would be essential to sustain its operational tempo, which involves regular inspections, monitoring, and on-the-ground support. Additionally, ensuring that the IAEA’s teams have the necessary resources and supplies will be vital for their effectiveness in overseeing nuclear safety and preventing potential risks associated with the ongoing conflict in Ukraine.xxii
The author is responsible for the content of this article. The views expressed are the author’s own and do not reflect the official policy or position of the United States Navy, the Department of Defense, the National Intelligence University, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the U.S. Intelligence Community, or the U.S. Government.
References:
i U.S. Department of Energy, “Russia’s Disregard for Nuclear Safety and Security in Ukraine,” Energy.gov (DOE, March 4, 2023), https://www.energy.gov/nnsa/russias-disregard-nuclear-safety-and-security-ukraine.
ii Christos Tsagkaris, Lolita Matiashova, and Anna Isayeva, “The Impacts of Putting the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant in the Line of Fire,” Public Health Challenges 1, no. 4 (October 17, 2022): 1, https://doi.org/10.1002/puh2.26.
iii Mark Holt and Mary Beth D. Nikitin, “Russian Military Actions at Ukraine’s Nuclear Power Plants,” CRS Reports (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, April 12, 2024), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IN/IN11883
iv International Atomic Energy Agency, “Two Years of IAEA Continued Presence at the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant,” IAEA (IAEA, September 3, 2024), Foreword, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/documents/two-years-of-iaea-continued-presence-at-the-zaporizhzhaya-nuclear-power-plant.pdf.
v Ibid., 1.
vi Ibid., 1.
vii Ibid., 8.
viii Mark Holt and Mary Beth D. Nikitin, “Russian Military Actions at Ukraine’s Nuclear Power Plants,” CRS Reports (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, April 12, 2024), 1, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IN/IN11883
ix Ibid., 1.
x Ataman Yurii et al., “Protecting the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Plant: A Call for Global Action!,” Public Health Challenges 1, no. 4 (September 12, 2022): 1, https://doi.org/10.1002/puh2.23.
xi International Atomic Energy Agency, “Two Years of IAEA Continued Presence at the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant,” IAEA (IAEA, September 3, 2024), 8, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/documents/two-years-of-iaea-continued-presence-at-the-zaporizhzhaya-nuclear-power-plant.pdf.
xii Ibid., 8.
xiii Ibid., 1.
xiv Ibid., 4.
xv Ibid., 4.
xvi Yevheniia Duliba and Nataliіa Chudyk, “Good Lessons Based on Bad Experience: Confronting Risks and Governing Nuclear Safety in Ukraine,” Polityka Energetyczna 26, no. 3 (September 19, 2023): 139, https://doi.org/10.33223/epj/166688.
xvii Christos Tsagkaris, Lolita Matiashova, and Anna Isayeva, “The Impacts of Putting the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant in the Line of Fire,” Public Health Challenges 1, no. 4 (October 17, 2022): 1, https://doi.org/10.1002/puh2.26.
xviii Behshad Valizadeh et al., “A Simulation to Assess the Probability of the Spread of Radioactive Materials from the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant Using the HYSPLIT Model,” Pollution 10, no. 1 (January 17, 2024): 603, https://doi.org/10.22059/POLL.2024.367237.2115.
xix Ibid., 596, 597.
xx Ibid., 600, 603.
xxi Mark Holt and Mary Beth D. Nikitin, “Russian Military Actions at Ukraine’s Nuclear Power Plants,” CRS Reports (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, April 12, 2024), 3, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IN/IN11883
xxii International Atomic Energy Agency, “Two Years of IAEA Continued Presence at the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant,” IAEA (IAEA, September 3, 2024), 20, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/documents/two-years-of-iaea-continued-presence-at-the-zaporizhzhaya-nuclear-power-plant.pdf.