The governments of the five post-Soviet Central Asian nations are warily monitoring the tumultuous situation in Syria, marked by the downfall of Bashar al-Assad’s authoritarian regime and the ascent to power of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) leader Ahmed al-Sharaa, widely known by his nom de guerre, Abu Mohammad al-Julani, in December. Their alarm has escalated following the brutal suppression of pro-Assad armed resistance and the killing of Alawite minorities in the coastal cities of Latakia and Tartous in March. This period saw significant participation from Uzbek, Tajik, Uyghur, and Kyrgyz jihadists who played a crucial role in supporting the newly established HTS provisional government.
Notably, HTS (formerly Jabhat al-Nusra) and its associated Uzbek and Uyghur jihadi battalions—namely, Katibat Tawhid wal Jihad (KTJ), Katibat Imam al-Bukhari (KIB), the Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP), and Katibat al-Ghuraba (KG)—were designated as terrorist organizations by the Central Asian countries from 2014 to due to their affiliations with al-Qaeda. The operations of these militant groups have raised significant security concerns for the governments of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, particularly due to fears that their radical Islamist ideology could spread and further destabilize the densely populated Fergana Valley, a region already fraught with ethnic and religious tensions.
Thus, despite Turkey’s diplomatic initiatives to garner global recognition and support for al-Sharaa’s new pro-Sunni Islamist regime, the Central Asian states maintain a cautious stance. Despite sharing cultural, historical, and religious ties, they regard the nascent Syrian leadership with suspicion and mistrust.
Moreover, Central Asian governments were particularly disturbed by reports that interim President al-Shaara had appointed dozens of foreign fighters to senior positions in the nascent army of post-Assad Syria. Among these appointees were four Central Asian militants: Sayfiddin Tojiboy, a well-known Uzbek KTJ commander from Tajikistan; Abdulaziz Davud Hudaberdi, also known as Abu Muhammad al-Turkestani, who serves as the chief military commander and deputy emir of the TIP’s Syrian branch; and Mawlan Tarsun Abdüssamed and Abdulselam Yasin Ahmed, both mid-level TIP commanders who support Uyghur independence from China.
This legal recognition is critical for the Central Asian Muhajireen (foreign fighters/migrants) in Syria, as it not only grants their representatives leadership roles within the emerging state apparatus but also provides a fragile basis for claiming legitimacy as part of the government rather than a designated terrorist organization.
Acting as liaisons between the Syrian Armed Forces and Central Asian militant networks, Tojiboy and Khudabardi enhance al-Sharaa’s grip on power and his strategic use of various Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) to quell potential uprisings of Alawite, Druze, and Kurdish minorities. They are also strategically preparing for future conflicts with Shiite Hezbollah and Israeli forces in the Golan Heights.
Following these appointments, Ayyub Hawk (whose real name is Sherzod), the leader of the Uzbek Muhojir Tactical jihadi contractor group, and Abu Saloh (real name is Sirojiddin Mukhtarov), the former KTJ leader, expressed hope that they might soon also legitimize their status and obtain Syrian citizenship. Such recognition would shield them from extradition and legal action by the governments of Central Asia, Russia, and China. Al-Sharaa’s decision strongly resonated with the Quranic concept of partnership between the Ansar (locals) and Muhajireen (migrants) from the time of the Prophet Muhammad, as he reaffirmed his allegiance to foreign fighters, who had fought alongside HTS against al-Assad’s forces for over 13 years.
Here is a brief overview of two Central Asian militants who have risen to senior positions within the Syrian Army while continuing to lead the Uyghur-led Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP) and the Uzbek-dominated Katibat Tawhid wal Jihad (KTJ).
Colonel Saifuddin Tojiboy: An Uzbek Commander in the Syrian Army
Appointed as the commander of Qaid Amaliyat fil-Livo (Chief of the Operational Headquarters) within the Syrian Ministry of Defense, Saifuddin Tojiboy Mamur (real name is Saifiddin Tajiboyev) was born on July 23, 1982, in the village of Spitamen, Sughd region, Tajikistan, devout Uzbek family. He began his education at Salikh Secondary School in his hometown, actively participating in the Youth Movement of Tajikistan. Under the tutelage of his grandfather, Tojiboy, Saifuddin embarked on his Islamic studies. After completing his secondary education, he advanced his studies at the Sheikh Mukhlisiddin Madrasah in Khujand, a prominent center for Islamic learning in Central Asia. There, he specialized in Quranic sciences, including Quranic interpretation (tafsir), Islamic creed (aqidah), and jurisprudence (fiqh).
Driven by his Islamist beliefs, Saifuddin joined the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT) in 2001, a party that had been active in the 1992-97 Tajik civil war, which resulted in 50,000 lives. After spending two years working as a labor migrant in Russia, he returned in 2005 to lead the IRPT branch in Spitamen. There, he discreetly challenged President Rahmon’s authoritarian rule by criticizing the state’s stringent controls over Islamic practices, education, and dress.
Facing severe governmental crackdowns on the IRPT, Saifuddin was compelled to leave Tajikistan. In 2013, he made hijrah (migration) to Syria, aligning himself with the Caucasian Russian-speaking group Jaish-ul Muhajireen wal Ansar (JMA), a faction that fought alongside Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) near Aleppo. During this period, he played a pivotal role in establishing the Uzbek KTJ under the leadership of the infamous emir, Abu Saloh. In 2015, the group pledged bay‘ah to al-Qaeda as a wing of Jabhat al-Nusra (JN). While JN officially disavowed al-Qaeda in 2016, KTJ has never formally renounced its allegiance to Ayman al-Zawahiri. Notably, both KTJ and TIP continue to uphold a staunchly pro-al-Qaeda ideology.
Saifuddin advanced from a rank-and-file fighter to commander of KTJ’s Abu Ubayda ibn Jarrah military wing in 2020. In December of the previous year, his division actively fought against Bashar al-Assad’s forces and Iranian Shiite militias to seize control of Aleppo, Hama, Homs, and Damascus. His proficiency in Quranic Arabic enabled him to study Quranic sciences at the Imam al-Shafi’i Institute from 2015 to 2017. In 2020, he also graduated from HTS’s Military Academy in Idlib, earning the trust of Abu Jolani.
The Tajik government has accused him of terrorism and recruiting citizens into KTJ for jihad, enforcing a complete ban on his financial transactions. In an interview, Saifuddin contended that Rahmon’s anti-Islamic regime is propped up by Russian bayonets and predicted that once Putin departs, the corrupt, nepotistic Tajik government will inevitably collapse. After joining the Syrian Ministry of Defense, Saifuddin closed his Telegram channel and withdrew from public view, likely to ensure that his anti-Rahmon stance and pro-al-Qaeda ideology do not hinder efforts to lift international sanctions on al-Sharaa’s Syria.
Syrian Brigadier General Abdulaziz Davud Hudaberdi: China’s Most Wanted Terrorist
The promotion of Abdulaziz Davud Hudaberdi to brigadier general in the Syrian Army, where he serves as the chief military commander and deputy emir of the TIP’s Syrian branch, has ignited international debate. Speaking at the UN Security Council, China’s Ambassador to the UN, Fu Cong, voiced grave concerns over the elevation of foreign terrorist fighters to senior military positions in Syria, specifically citing the leader of the Security Council-designated terrorist organization, the Turkistan Islamic Party, also known as the East Turkestan Islamic Movement. Additionally, China called for a swift repatriation of the substantial number of foreign terrorist fighters (FTF) remaining in Syria.
Abdulaziz is well-known among both Chinese and post-Soviet Central Asian Uyghur communities not just for his staunch resistance to the Chinese Communist Party, but also for his profound Islamic scholarship and fervent defense of Uyghur national identity. This identity is under persistent threat due to the aggressive Sinicization of East Turkestan, officially known as the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR).
He was born on March 7, 1977, in Aral City, Wensu County, Aksu Prefecture, Xinjiang, to a deeply religious Uyghur family. During his childhood in Aksu Prefecture, he began his Islamic teachings under the guidance of his family, and by the age of 19, in 1996, he had memorized the entire Quran, earning him the distinguished title of Hafiz—a notable achievement in Islamic studies.
Abdulaziz was imprisoned in 1997 for anti-communist and separatist activities following the first major wave of Uyghur Muslim resistance against Han Chinese expansion in Urumqi. According to TIP’s media outlet Islam Awazi, after his release in 1998, he shifted from anti-China propaganda to armed resistance, training supporters in weaponry and explosives in the Aksu and Gulcha mountains. Chinese authorities quickly uncovered his activities, leading to multiple arrests—five in total by 2010.
Following his last release from a Chinese prison in April 2010, devoid of all possessions, he resolved to persist with the armed struggle for East Turkestan’s independence from outside China. He escaped to Malaysia and later, using a forged passport, traveled through Iran to Afghanistan in June, where he joined the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP).
An examination of Abdulaziz’s audio and video speeches on religious doctrines and jihad reveals his profound respect for the Uyghur tradition of venerating aksakals (male elders) and his unwavering obedience to Abdul Haq al-Turkistani, the emir of the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP), who serves on Al-Qaeda’s shura council and resides in Afghanistan. His demonstrated leadership skills and firm stance against Chinese policies prompted the TIP leader to appoint Abdulaziz as the military commander of the group’s Syrian branch and deploy him to Jisr al-Shughur in late 2012.
Despite his advanced age and residence in Kabul, Abdul Haq maintains firm control over the TIP’s Syrian faction, according to the UN Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team’s latest 1267 report in February 2025. Consequently, the elevation of Abdulaziz Hudaberdi to Brigadier General of the Syrian Army’s 130th Division has undoubtedly strengthened TIP leader Abdul Haq’s influence in advancing the anti-Chinese stance of the Uyghur armed resistance within Syria’s new military and political echelons. This strategic positioning is further evidenced by the Syrian Ministry of Education announcement in January that Uyghur children and youth from China’s Xinjiang will be granted free education from primary school through to university level.
Notably, like Uzbek KTJ military commander Saifuddin, Uyghur TIP’s Abdulaziz also graduated from HTS’s Military Academy in Idlib in 2021. This indicates that al-Joulani, then leader of HTS, was deliberately developing a group of skilled and dependable non-Arab foreign fighters, training them at Idlib’s military academy to enhance their combat effectiveness in a post-Assad Syria.
According to a newsletter from the Uyghur community in Syria, Abdulaziz Davud Hudaberdi led fighters in over twenty major battles during the Syrian revolution, including the capture of the Assad regime’s military base in Aleppo, Abu Zubayr Airport, and the cities of Idlib and Ras al-Ayn. Uyghur TIP fighters also played a pivotal role in the battles of Hama, Homs, and Latakia, paving the way for the advance toward Damascus. During the Syrian jihadi campaigns against the pro-Iranian militias and the Bashar al-Assad regime, he suffered the loss of his two sons, his father-in-law, and his childhood friend, commander Hassan Husayin.
Limited information is available from open sources and jihadi media about the two newly appointed Syrian Army colonels, Uyghur TIP jihadists Mawlan Tarsun Abdüssamed and Abdulselam Yasin Ahmed, making it difficult to ascertain their broader backgrounds and ideological convictions.
Strategic Lessons from HTS’s Victory for Central Asian Militants
The integration of Central Asian Islamist militant factions into the Syrian Army demonstrates that they have absorbed a crucial lesson from the victory and resistance strategies of their parent organizations, HTS and the Taliban. This has enabled them to evolve from mere jihadi movements into ruling authorities in Syria and Afghanistan, with the international community compelled to engage with them despite their terrorist pasts.
The Central Asian jihadi groups affiliated with HTS and the Taliban — including KTJ, KIB, TIP, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), and the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) — have learned a vital lesson: to shift their focus from global jihad to local jihad. By embedding themselves more deeply within local communities, they seek to win the hearts and minds of fellow believers, providing everyday assistance much like HTS’s Salvation Government did in Idlib until December 2024.
The severe consequences faced by ISIS and al-Qaeda have made one thing unmistakably clear to these groups: never test America’s patience with direct strikes on its interests, lone-wolf attacks on Western soil, or the reckless display of the black flag of global Sunni jihad in its own backyard. The dramatic demise of IS caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, hunted down by dogs, the secret sea burial of al-Qaeda’s Osama bin Laden, the targeted drone strike on Ayman al-Zawahiri, and the relentless bombing of Daesh’s final stronghold in Baghuz all underscore a clear lesson: Central Asian jihadi groups must never test the patience of the U.S.
The instinct for survival encourages Central Asian militant groups to adopt a moderate approach to Islamism, steering clear of extreme takfiri jihad while leveraging anti-Western rhetoric to bolster their recruitment efforts and enhance their jihadi appeal.
After the fall of the Assad regime, Abu Saloh, the notorious ideologue of Central Asian jihadism, declared that the main threat to the Islamic Ummah was no longer the Kharijites (he means ISIS) or the Western Kafirs, but the autocratic Taghut (idols) regimes of Central Asia, which oppress Muslim faith, banning men from wearing beards and women from donning the hijab.
This perspective was further elaborated by KTJ leader Abdul Aziz Ustoz (real name is Ilmurad Hikmatov), who maintained that the threats to the Tajik, Uzbek, and Kyrgyz governments arise not from KTJ’s Mujahideen but from their own policies that undermine Islam in the region. He urged on Central Asian governments to stop persecuting individuals for their Salafi convictions and for wearing beards and hijabs. Following HTS’s ascent to power, the media outlets of KTJ and KIB shifted their focus from denouncing the ‘Munafik’ (hypocrite) Assad regime to targeting the ‘Murtad’ (apostate) rulers of Central Asia, presenting themselves as the sole defenders of oppressed Muslims in the region. By doing so, they aim to emulate the strategies of HTS and the Taliban, endeavoring to garner the support and allegiance of the local Muslim populace. Unlike their parent organizations, however, these groups are not present within Central Asia but are dispersed across Syria and Afghanistan.
Recently, three prominent Uzbek jihadi propagandists—Abu Saloh, Ayyub Howk, and Abu Walid (real name is Khudoyor Nuriddinov)—have escalated their ideological assault on the Muftiate of Uzbekistan. They have publicly clashed with the pro-government Islamic scholar Abror Mukhtor Aliy, accusing him of complicity with the Taghut rulers and of betraying the principles of true Islam.
The success of HTS and the removal of al-Sharaa from the international terrorism watchlist have emboldened Central Asian militants, who now insist they are not terrorists but defenders of Islam. They present themselves as Muhajireen, responding to the pleas of ordinary Syrian Muslims for protection against Assad’s oppressive regime. Their jihadi online propaganda indicates that this narrative is resonating increasingly with Central Asian audiences, particularly as the replacement of the Alawite Assad with the Sunni al-Sharaa has been positively received by many Sunni Muslims across the region. In response to their growing influence, Marat Imankulov, Secretary of Kyrgyzstan’s Security Council, announced that Central Asian governments will coordinate efforts to prevent militants from infiltrating the region and replicating the HTS model of power seizure.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the integration of Central Asian jihadi groups into the Syrian state apparatus presents both potential benefits and significant risks for the region’s governments. On the one hand, their inclusion into the Syrian Army might encourage these militants to remain in Syria permanently, thereby diminishing the direct threat to Central Asian security. On the other hand, the continued repression of religious freedoms, particularly in Tajikistan, risks fueling popular unrest, potentially opening the door for these so-called “defenders of Islam” to return from Syria under the banner of aiding their fellow believers.