In an era of heightened political polarization, finding bipartisan consensus in Washington, D.C. is often difficult. However, elected leaders from both parties have largely agreed on the danger posed by potential foreign influence operations and TikTok, as evidenced by the recently signed federal legislation, The RESTRICT Act. The act bans TikTok unless it is sold by its parent company, ByteDance, within a year.1 Influence operations, which are often part of a country’s information warfare strategies, refer to the “deliberate use of information (whether true or false) by one party on an adversary to confuse, mislead, and ultimately to influence the choices and decisions that the adversary makes.2”
Russian influence operations surrounding the 2016 Presidential election are well-documented.3 Russian influence operations directed at the U.S. remain an important national security issue due to Russia’s history of targeting the U.S. and its allies in influence operations and Russia’s use of information warfare in Ukraine. However, influence operations conducted by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) are also a serious concern for national security for multiple reasons.4
First, the PRC has executed numerous influence operations internationally. Within China’s regional sphere of influence, these operations have aimed to affect public opinion in Taiwan and Hong Kong and discredit pro-democracy activists in the region. The operations have also sought to manipulate international opinion regarding the treatment of the Uyghurs in the Xinjiang Province. Globally, numerous democracies have been targeted by China’s influence operation efforts. For example, India, South Korea, and the U.S. have all been on the receiving end of the PRC’s influence operations to manipulate public sentiment and potentially affect voting behavior.5 TikTok is relevant to the discussion on influence operations and national security because the platform’s data can be used to conduct information warfare to manipulate public opinion or affect elections.
TikTok, which is owned by ByteDance, is a privately owned Chinese company. Under Chinese law, the company must share its data with the PRC upon request.6 This requirement separates TikTok from many other social media companies that are not required to share all of their data with specific nation-states under most circumstances. The data collected by TikTok is a concern for U.S. elections and national security because it can be used by China to microtarget individuals in influence operations to increase division in the U.S. or affect elections. In this context, microtargeting refers to the use of personalized data to manipulate an individual’s opinions or behavior.7 The Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) stated that specific candidates from both political parties who were critical of China were targeted in influence operations on TikTok in the 2022 U.S. midterm elections, and the operations were carried out by Chinese government affiliates.8
In conducting influence operations, China uses a mixed approach, relying on professional social media influencers, artificial intelligence programs, and fake social media accounts to spread disinformation to achieve its information warfare goals.9 TikTok employs an advanced and highly effective algorithm to determine which videos individuals are most likely to engage with based on prior activity on the platform.10 Thus, access to TikTok data provides a specific blueprint for manipulating individuals’ opinions and behavior. Given China’s history of information warfare in East Asia, internationally, and in the U.S., it is reasonable to be concerned that the data provided by TikTok could be weaponized for extremely efficient influence operations directed at the U.S., particularly in periods leading up to a national election. In addition, the strengthening relationship between China and Russia could also potentially affect the nature of influence operations directed at the U.S. that could impact elections.
Russia and China have forged closer political, economic, and military ties in recent years as evidenced by more public and private military and diplomatic meetings, joint military exercises and military operations, arms sales, and coordinated military strategies, China is also considered to be the primary supplier of resources to support Russia’s defense industrial base for its war against Ukraine. Thus, based on the growing ties between Beijing and Moscow, it is not unrealistic to assume that TikTok data could be shared with the Russian government in certain circumstances for specialized or combined influence operations directed at the U.S. While there is no current evidence that this has occurred, it is a realistic concern given the growing political and military relations between the two countries and their positions toward the U.S.11
In summary, both China and Russia have reasons to attempt to distract or weaken the U.S. so they can pursue their global ambitions more easily (Russia in Ukraine and China in Taiwan).12 One strategy both countries have adopted has been to utilize information warfare tactics that aim to increase division and polarization13 and target political leaders from both sides of the aisle who are critical of Russia or China.14 Although a TikTok ban (in the event the company is not sold) may inconvenience millions of Americans who enjoy the platform or have monetized it, security concerns are paramount given the potential for the platform or the platform’s data to be weaponized in influence operations directed at the U.S. At a time when political polarization is at concerningly high levels in the U.S.,15 the potential danger of foreign influence operations affecting election outcomes or undermining confidence in the U.S. electoral system must be taken seriously and guarded against. The RESTRICT Act is a reasonable bipartisan effort to address these concerns.
Sources
1 https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/congress/congress-biden-bill-ban-tiktok-when-2024-election-rcna14879
2 https://cyberdefensereview.army.mil/Portals/6/Documents/2022_fall/02_Lin.pdf
3 https://time.com/5565991/russia-influence-2016-election/
4 https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/counterintelligence/the-china-threat
5 https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/election-security-influence-operations-and-china-new-threat-for-democracies
6 https://bigdatachina.csis.org/can-chinese-firms-be-truly-private/
7 https://cyberdefensereview.army.mil/Portals/6/Documents/2021_winter_cdr/04_CDR_V6N1_Dawson.pdf
8 https://www.axios.com/2024/03/11/tiktok-china-us-elections-influence
9 https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14751798.2024.2321736
10 https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2022/oct/23/tiktok-rise-algorithm-popularity
11 https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2023-03-26/chinese-russian-alliance-has-epic-ambitions-to-roll-back-us-power
12 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/russia-and-china-are-part-of-the-same-problem-for-the-united-states/
13 https://cyberdefensereview.army.mil/CDR-Content/Articles/Article-View/Article/3606588/weaponizing-words-using-technology-to-proliferate-information-warfare/
14 https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/national-security/china-russia-ai-divide-us-society-undermine-us-elections-power-rcna142880
15 https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2022/01/what-happens-when-democracies-become-perniciously-polarized?lang=en
Dr. Lance Hunter, professor of International Relations and faculty member within the Master of Arts in Intelligence and Security Studies Program at Augusta University.