GAO: Coast Guard Should Gain Key Knowledge Before Buying More Ships

Key Takeaways:

• The stage 1 OPC shipbuilder–Eastern Shipbuilding Group–has experienced persistent challenges in completing construction of four ships. The Coast Guard terminated two of these ships in July 2025, and DHS issued a request for information to identify vendors capable of towing and completing construction of OPCs. It is also unknown how the remaining two will be delivered after the shipbuilder announced that it stopped work on them this month.
• Like the first shipbuilder, the program’s stage 2 shipbuilder–Austal USA–began construction of its first ship without a stable design. This may drive cost increases and schedule delays, which may be hard to monitor given weaknesses with the company’s schedule and cost tracking system.
• The Coast Guard is unlikely to have results from performance testing of any OPCs before it starts stage 3 procurement activities. As a result, it could end up buying more ships before knowing if OPCs meets requirements and operational needs.

What GAO Found

The Coast Guard urgently needs Offshore Patrol Cutters (OPC) to replace aging cutters that conduct law enforcement and search and rescue operations. The Coast Guard plans to acquire 25 OPCs in stages: stage 1 initially included OPCs 1-4, stage 2 includes OPCs 5-15, and stage 3 will include OPCs 16-25. Construction for stages 1 and 2 is underway by two different shipbuilders. But each shipbuilder’s design remains incomplete, and both have yet to deliver any ships.

The stage 1 shipbuilder made limited progress since GAO last reported on OPC. In 2023, GAO says it found that construction of OPCs 1-4 began without a stable design, contrary to shipbuilding leading practices. This led to rework, which delayed ship deliveries. The Coast Guard took steps in 2024 to prioritize delivery of OPC 1, such as adding payments at certain milestones, but these steps were largely unsuccessful. As of July 2025, the Coast Guard terminated construction of OPCs 3 and 4 as part of an ongoing review of the current stage 1 contract, and delivery of OPC 1 was expected more than 5 years late.

The stage 2 shipbuilder and Coast Guard incorporated some leading practices while developing the stage 2 design, such as conducting collaborative design reviews that supported timely decisions. But construction of OPC 5 began in August 2024 without a stable design. Starting construction of more stage 2 OPCs before stabilizing the design, as the Coast Guard plans to do, increases the risk that stage 2 will also encounter costly rework and schedule delays.

The OPC program is at risk of not meeting its cost goals, in part, because the program used outdated cost information to establish them. The program is updating this information to account for recent stage 1 cost increases. GAO also found that the program reported an aggregated cost goal for all 25 OPCs instead of by stage. Reporting cost goals by stage would enable decision-makers to hold the program and OPC shipbuilders accountable for their performance.

The program plans to acquire stage 3 ships after testing whether the existing designs meet OPC’s performace goals, which is consistent with Department of Homeland Security (DHS) policy. However, the program is unlikely to have the test results before starting stage 3 procurement activities, such as developing the request for proposals. Incorporating the knowledge gained from testing—as well as other shipbuilding leading practices—into the procurement process for stage 3 could help the Coast Guard make better investment decisions. It could also improve the timeliness of future OPC deliveries.

Why GAO Did This Study