- Drug cartels have evolved into hybrid non-state actors, blending criminal enterprise with insurgent tactics—controlling territory, deploying military-grade weapons, and using drones for surveillance, attacks, and intimidation.
- Their operations are increasingly transnational and networked, linking Latin American production zones to global markets while expanding influence across the United States, Europe, and beyond through alliances, franchising models, and supply-chain control.
- Leadership decapitation and enforcement pressure are not weakening these groups but accelerating their transformation, as seen after El Mencho’s death—creating either fragmentation into more violent cells or consolidation into even more powerful and adaptive organizations.
Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth hosted the first Americans Counter-Cartel Conference on March 5 at SOUTHCOM headquarters in Doral, Florida, alongside SOUTHCOM Commander Marine Gen. Francis L. Donovan. Stephen Miller, Deputy White House Chief of Staff, stated, “Cartels that operate in this hemisphere are the ISIS and Al-Qaeda of this hemisphere and must be treated just as ruthlessly,” adding that “hard power” and lethal force—not criminal justice—must be used to defeat them. Two days later, at the Shield of the Americas Summit, President Trump was direct: “Leaders in this region have allowed large swaths of territory to come under the direct control of the cartels. Transnational gangs have taken over, and they’ve run areas of your country.” These statements reflect a transformation driven by the strategic rationale of criminal organizations.
A hybrid non-state actor combines the traits of a criminal organization, an insurgent group, and a governing body—using military force, controlling territory, providing services, and corrupting or replacing state institutions.
Ecuador, situated between Colombia and Peru, has become a key transit point for cocaine. Cartels have enhanced their smuggling techniques, including using drones to deliver cocaine to Panama. Clan del Golfo is believed to have developed this method; drones can carry up to 10 kilograms per trip, travel as far as 100 km, and are used for surveillance. Local gangs and CJNG have contributed to increased territorial violence since 2018. According to President Noboa, 70% of cocaine from Colombia and Peru passes through Ecuador’s ports for distribution to Central America, the United States, and Europe.
In 2024, the Ecuadorian government declared itself in an “internal armed conflict.” By 2025, Secretary of State Marco Rubio designated Los Choneros and Los Lobos as Foreign Terrorist Organizations, enabling increased military cooperation. On March 3rd, the US and Ecuador carried out the first-ever US-assisted land operation targeting cartels in the country. The US provided special forces advisors offering planning, intelligence, and operational support. The DEA European division arrested 16 suspects and seized six tons of cocaine, dismantling a network linked to Los Lobos. Three days later, a joint operation bombed a drug trafficker’s training camp on the northeastern border with Colombia, made up of FARC dissidents with a capacity of about 50 people.
CJNG has been confirmed to operate across several countries in Latin America, with associates in nearly all 50 U.S. states and a presence in 10 to 12 Latin American countries, including Colombia. They have attempted to monopolize cocaine purchases from Colombian suppliers and to stop the Cartel de Sinaloa, fueling violence among Colombian proxies to consolidate control over the cocaine trade.
In January 2025, the ELN launched a coordinated attack against FARC dissidents in the Catatumbo region, triggering ambushes, targeted killings, and open warfare. The area has approximately 44,000 hectares of coca crops. The attack caused 80 deaths and displaced 11,000 residents. Colombian President Gustavo Petro described it as “one of the most dramatic events in modern history.” While direct coordination with Mexican cartels cannot be confirmed, documented structural links exist: Mexican cartels finance coca laboratories, manage distribution, and buy directly from Colombian producers. The conflict in the Catatumbo is essentially a war over the cocaine supply chain.
Perhaps no development more clearly illustrates this transformation than the adoption of drone warfare. What started as aerial smuggling has developed into a capability for intelligence, surveillance, targeted killings, and swarm attacks against security forces—reflecting what William S.. Lind and Thomas X. Hammes describe as Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW), in which non-state actors use irregular tactics and emerging technologies to challenge state authority.
In August 2025, FARC dissidents shot down a Black Hawk helicopter during an anti-narcotics mission in Antioquia using a drone, killing 13 people. On the same day, a car bomb targeting the Marco Fidel Suarez Air Base in Cali killed 6 civilians, including a child, and injured 71 others. Armed groups in Colombia have carried out more than 320 drone attacks since 2024, resulting in 225 casualties. Colombia now experiences a drone attack approximately every 38 hours.
Across the hemisphere, Mexican cartels have expanded their influence. In Guatemala, CJNG built alliances with Los Huistas along the Pacific corridor. Competition between the Sinaloa Cartel and CJNG has caused violence in Perú, and Chile has become a new frontier. Canada has grown into a key hub in CJNG’s network, utilizing major ports and money laundering operations. In January 2025, Toronto Police seized 835 kg of cocaine linked to CJNG, the largest in the city’s history. Canada designated Mexican cartels as Foreign Terrorist Organizations, followed by Argentina and Perú in October 2025.
CJNG operates a franchise model with smaller local cartels, expanding through violence against rivals and law enforcement. Jorge Ramirez, a sociologist from the Universidad de Guadalajara, said that the cartel is not just a criminal organization but a franchise that “produces” mass violence, which becomes their most valuable commodity.
In February 2026, Nemesio Oseguera Cervantes—“El Mencho,” founder and leader of CJNG—was killed during a raid led by the Mexican Army, with support from Mexico’s National Intelligence Center and the Attorney General’s Office. His death triggeredcoordinated retaliatory attacks that left more than 60 people dead, including 25 members of the National Guard. El Mencho’s death does not mark the end of CJNG—it marks the start of its most dangerous phase. Security forces must now prepare for two scenarios: fragmentation into independent violent cells or consolidation under a successor. This transition is not just a Mexican problem—it is a hemispheric one.
Over time, drug cartels have started using military-grade weapons and drone technologies in their strategy to project power, control territory, and challenge government authority. As cartels increasingly employ military-grade weapons, advanced tactics, and drone capabilities, their transformation into hybrid non-state actors becomes unavoidable. Mexico’s involvement in the U.S. Northern Command framework highlights that tackling cartel influence requires a multinational approach rather than isolated national efforts.
The central question is no longer whether cartels have become hybrid non-state actors—the evidence makes that case conclusively. The question now is whether the institutions designed to protect sovereignty, security, and the rule of law can evolve as rapidly as the organizations determined to undermine them.
