On August 23, 2024, pro-ISIS Central Asian militants launched yet another violent attack against representatives of the Russian authorities, directly challenging President Putin’s and FSB Chief Aleksandr Bortnikov’s assertion that U.S. and Ukrainian intelligence orchestrated the March ISKP Moscow Crocus City Hall attack, which resulted in 145 deaths and over 551 injuries. The Islamic State is likely to intensify its terror attacks within Russia to assert its sole responsibility for the Crocus City Hall attack and to forcefully demonstrate its “irreconcilable enmity” toward “all Kafirun” states, including the U.S. and Russia.
The recent attack by pro-IS Central Asian prisoners aligns with the threat issued by ISKP’s Al-Azaim Foundation in March. Al-Azaim Media had released a poster in Russian, Tajik, Uzbek, and English, warning of a brutal massacre against all Russians, including Vladimir Putin, in retaliation for the torture of its four Tajik fighters. Five months after the initial threat, IS-aligned Central Asian prisoners—comprising two Uzbek and two Tajik hardline Salafists—launched a lethal assault on guards and took several staff members hostage at a correctional colony in Russia’s Volgograd oblast. They claimed the attack was “revenge for the torment of the Crocus City attackers and the oppression of Muslim believers in Russia.”
The Russian Federal Penitentiary Service (FSIN) reported in a statement that four prison guards were killed when four inmates took eight guards and four other inmates hostage at Correctional Colony No. 19 in Surovikino, Volgograd Region. According to the FSIN, the assailants inflicted various stabbing wounds on four prison staff members, resulting in the deaths of three. The fourth guard, who resisted, was hospitalized but later succumbed to his injuries. Additionally, four other inmates sustained injuries during the hostage crisis.
The Baza Telegram channel, affiliated with Russian law enforcement, reported that prison warden Andrei Devyatov was hospitalized after he and four other hostages, including an inmate, managed to escape. However, another Telegram channel, Shot, claimed that the pro-IS militants themselves had “betrayed” the head of the colony.
Notably, according to video footage disseminated by Salafi-Jihadi media resources in Uzbek, Tajik, and Russian, the ISIS supporters imprisoned in Volgograd meticulously prepared for the surprise attack. They were armed with knives and hammers, filmed the entire assault, and broadcast the footage live on the Internet.
In the video, the four Central Asian inmates who seized the prison identified themselves as “Islamic State Mujahideen.” Five days later, on August 29, ISIS officially claimed responsibility for the attack by its Uzbek and Tajik fighters in Volgograd, as reported in issue 458 of its al-Naba magazine. In an editorial titled ‘A Jihad in Europe,’ al-Naba glorified its Central Asian jihadists, boasting that they ‘drowned Russian security forces in their own blood.’ The editorial praised the attackers as ‘IS lions who placed the religion of Islam above worldly life’ and were accepted by Allah during their battle against the ‘Russian crusaders.’ Al-Naba also ridiculed Putin and his security forces, celebrating the attack as ‘revenge for the tortures of the Crocus attackers.’ This statement unequivocally confirms the connection between the Islamic State and the Volgograd prison attackers.
It is evident that all four attackers were radicalized by Islamic State jihadi ideology during their imprisonment. Central Asian and Caucasian so-called ‘Salafi Prison Jamaats’ operate effectively within Russia’s penal colonies and pretrial detention centers, recruiting inmates for ISIS and al-Qaeda. This attack further exposes the significant failures in the Russian penitentiary system in monitoring, detecting, and countering Jihadi-Salafi ideology.
Following the widespread distribution of videos and photos from the scene via the pro-ISKP Abu Turob Uzbek channel and the pro-Kremlin Baza and Mash Telegram channels– showing the harrowing image of prison inmates with knives standing over bloodied guards– FSIN identified the attackers as IS Mujahideen and revealed the crimes for which they had been incarcerated.
The attackers were identified as follows:
- Rustamchon Navruzi, a Tajikistan native, was sentenced to seven years for drug distribution in conjunction with an accomplice.
- Nazirchon Toshov, originally from Uzbekistan, received an 8.5-year sentence for drug distribution alongside an accomplice in October 2022.
- Shobdulkarimkhon Karimov, also from Tajikistan, was convicted in 2019 for attempted large-scale drug distribution by a group.
- Shokhijahon Sayfiev, a native of Uzbekistan, was convicted in 2022 for attempted large-scale drug distribution.
Inside the Volgograd Mutiny: The Influence of ISIS Ideology on Central Asian Inmates
The video recordings of the IS militants in Volgograd prison suggest that they adhere to the rigid religious views of the hardline al-Salafiyya al-Jihadiyya movement, which advocates for a return to the pure Islam practiced during the time of Prophet Muhammad and serves as the foundational ideology of both ISIS and Al-Qaeda. One of the attackers, who was holding a black Islamic flag, inscribed Quranic verses on the wall in Arabic, indicating his proficiency in Quranic Arabic calligraphy. An analysis of their video statements reveals a deep-seated hatred toward Russia, Israel, and the Taghut regimes of Central Asia. They accuse Zionists of killing thousands of innocent Muslims in Gaza and denounce Russian infidels for bombing Muslims in Syria, where Central Asian Muslim women continue to languish in prisons.
One of the militants then recited Surah Al-Ma’ida (5:51) from the Quran, saying, ‘O believers, do not take the Jews and the Christians as allies,’ and urged Central Asian Muslims to wage holy jihad in the path of Allah. He concluded his speech by asking the Almighty God to accept their Shahadat (martyrdom), a term in Jihadi Salafi ideology that signifies sacrificing one’s life for the exaltation of Allah’s religion.
From the video statements, it appears that the true ideological leader and mastermind behind the IS attack on the Volgograd correctional colony was the Tajik Salafist Shobdulkarimkhon Karimov, whose beliefs strongly resonate with the anti-Russian ideology of the Uzbek and Tajik factions of ISKP.
In another video, one of the IS Uzbek attackers displayed the bodies of three dead, bloodied prison guards and a wounded staff member, proclaiming that “with the help of Allah Almighty, the Islamic State Mujahideen killed those Kafirs (unbelievers) who violated Muslims’ rights, humiliated, and tortured believers. They confiscated our Qurans and took away our prayer rugs, so we repaid them in kind. No mercy,” the man stated. He continued by asserting that they ’embarked on the path of holy jihad to defend the Islamic Ummah, the oppressed Muslim brothers and sisters imprisoned by the Kafirun, to establish Sharia, and to exact revenge for the torture of the Tajik Crocus City Hall attackers.’
IS-Uzbek militant Karimov further called Muslims to reject the official Muftiyats of Russia and Central Asia, accusing them of betraying Islam by aligning with the Taghuds and Kafirs. He condemned these religious authorities for issuing fatwas prohibiting the hijab and niqab. Notably, the Tajik government recently banned the hijab, and the grand mufti of Dagestan prohibited the niqab following simultaneous attacks targeting churches and synagogues that killed 22 people in Derbent in June. In this context, Uzbek, Tajik, and Russian IS propagandists sought to capitalize on the discontent among hardline Salafi believers regarding these prohibitions. They aimed to portray ISIS as the sole defender of Muslim religious rights, thereby intensifying their recruitment efforts.
In another video, an inmate pleaded with Russian President Vladimir Putin to meet the demands of the hostage-takers and requests medical assistance. Subsequent developments confirmed that President Putin addressed the IS attack on the Volgograd prison by convening an emergency meeting with permanent members of the Security Council via videoconference. In televised remarks, Putin stated that he had been briefed on the situation by the head of the FSIN. Following Putin’s video conference, the Russian National Guard stormed the Volgograd prison, resulting in the elimination of all four IS Central Asian fighters.
Conclusion: Implications of the Volgograd Crisis for Global Jihadi Threats
This violent incident once again laid bare the systemic failures within Russian counter-terrorism intelligence. The agency’s inability to thoroughly understand Central Asian Jihadi-Salafi ideology, effectively monitor its propaganda and terror activities, and preemptively dismantle potential Islamist extremist cells within the substantial Central Asian and Caucasian migrant communities has been starkly highlighted.
A significant flaw in President Putin’s administration is that Russian law enforcement and migration services, through their stringent measures against Central Asian labor migrants, frequently infringe upon the religious sensitivities of believers. This often exacerbates feelings of alienation and can drive individuals towards religious radicalism.
Thus, tactical and organizational missteps in the FSB’s scorched earth counterinsurgency tactics during the ISKP’s Crocus City Hall attack—including the torture of Tajik suspects through brutal methods like ear mutilation, xenophobic actions against Muslim migrants, and the prohibition of religious practices in public spaces—were skillfully exploited by IS propagandists to incite their Uzbek and Tajik supporters to launch the attack on the Volgograd prison.
Targeting Russia and the post-Soviet Central Asian “Taghut” countries has long been a focal point in the propaganda of ISIS and al-Qaeda-linked Uzbek and Tajik Salafi-Jihadi groups, many of whose members were recruited while working as labor migrants in Russia. Their jihadi media has incited revenge-driven violence against Russia’s security forces. Our long-term research reveals that jihadi propaganda consistently portrays Russia as an oppressor of Central Asian Muslims, both historically and in recent times, particularly due to its tightening of migration policies that restrict the economic, legal, and religious activities of Central Asian migrants.
The coercion of Central Asian inmates to fight on Moscow’s side in the Russia-Ukraine war, the revocation of Russian citizenship in absentia for those evading military registration, and the escalating xenophobic pressure from pro-war chauvinistic-patriotic socio-political forces all contribute to the anti-Russian ideological foundation of Central Asian and Caucasian jihadi propaganda. Russia’s military involvement in modern Syria, along with its past brutal campaigns in Afghanistan, Chechnya, and Dagestan, are depicted by Russian speaking Jihadi groups as acts of aggression not only against post-Soviet Muslims but against the entire Islamic world.
In conclusion, the audacious attack by pro-IS Tajik and Uzbek inmates in the Volgograd penal colony, the brutal massacre by Tajik ISKP Mujahideen at Moscow’s Crocus City Hall, and external operations by Tajik ISKP militants in Iran and Turkey underscore the escalating threat of violent extremism among Central Asian Salafists. These incidents demonstrate their capacity to strike at the heart of major regional and global powers, highlighting their resolve to become the vanguard of the Islamic State.
It is evident that, in their quest for dominance in the global jihadi landscape, ISKP and its Khorasan branch are plotting high-profile attacks in both the Eurasian region and the West, necessitating closer collaboration between the counter-terrorism intelligence services of nations hosting Central Asian migrants.
