The Debate Over Reviving Civil Defense
Recently, a proposal surfaced to revitalize Civil Defense groups in the United States under the umbrella of modern Emergency Management. The idea rests on fears that war could once again reach our shores. While I understand the instinct, I remain skeptical.
Today’s law enforcement and intelligence agencies are far more advanced than their 1940s counterparts. Combined with the capabilities of state and territorial National Guard units, these forces already provide a robust defense against homeland threats. Adding a Civil Defense mission to Emergency Management would blur lines that are better kept clear.
The missions some envision for Civil Defense fall into the “Prevention” and “Protection” categories of FEMA’s National Preparedness Goal. Yet, Emergency Management should not—and cannot—be recast into a wartime function. We are not living in 1941. Our threats look very different, and our national defense architecture is already designed for them.
Cyber Defense as Today’s Civil Defense
Let’s acknowledge reality: the homeland is under attack every day, but not from enemy bombers or submarines. Instead, it’s through cyberattacks. In this realm, the Department of Homeland Security’s Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) has rightly built a whole-of-government, whole-of-community defense network. This is civil defense for the 21st century—bringing together government, private industry, and even individual households under one umbrella of preparedness and vigilance.
This is the correct model. Everyone has a role in defending against cyber threats. But when it comes to armed conflict on U.S. soil, Emergency Management should not be pulled into a warfighting role. Wars with enemy combatants—state or non-state—are Type 0 extinction-level events that go beyond Emergency Management’s mandate and capabilities.
Mission Priorities: Defense vs. Offense
Military objectives differ fundamentally from Emergency Management objectives. In wartime, mission priorities are framed around defeating the enemy, often at the cost of sacrificing troops, equipment, or infrastructure. Commanders pursue SMART goals (Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Realistic, Timebound) that may prioritize holding territory or destroying targets above all else.
Emergency Management operates under a different set of priorities, captured in the LIPER framework:
- Life Safety
- Incident Stabilization
- Property/Asset Protection
- Economic Restoration
- [Environmental] Recovery
No Emergency Manager would consider it acceptable to sacrifice human life to achieve an operational goal. Military commanders sometimes must. That is why trying to graft Civil Defense back into Emergency Management today is dangerous. It risks importing an “offense” mindset into a profession designed to protect, stabilize, and recover.
We saw the strength of Emergency Management principles during the Key Bridge Collapse in Baltimore (2024). Civilian and military assets worked together under unified command, prioritizing diver safety and human remains recovery over reopening the port for commerce. That is how Emergency Management should function: defense first, not offense.
The Laws of War Don’t Fit Emergency Management
Wars also have rules—complex ones. International Humanitarian Law (IHL), rooted in the Geneva Conventions, sets principles of necessity, proportionality, distinction, and limiting unnecessary suffering. Military officers study these rules for years.
Expecting Emergency Managers—or hastily trained Civil Defense volunteers—to navigate IHL is unrealistic. The moment you label adversaries as enemy combatants on U.S. soil, you shift into the realm of warfighting. Civilians tasked with this role would not only be ill-prepared but would blur dangerous lines between military and civil authority.
The U.S. has a checkered history of adhering to these rules. Repeating mistakes under the guise of “modern civil defense” would be disastrous.
Public Trust and Mission Creep
Emergency Management succeeds because the public trusts it. When disaster strikes—hurricanes, wildfires, floods—people believe Emergency Management will focus on keeping them safe and helping them recover. That trust erodes when Emergency Management is drawn into politically charged “wars” on drugs, crime, or terror.
Mission creep is already a national debate. FEMA, state, and local Emergency Managers face pressure to expand into prevention and interdiction roles that look more like law enforcement. Meanwhile, federal preparedness funding is shrinking across the board, straining the very systems that communities rely on for disasters. Who would pay for a national Civil Defense revival? If left to states and territories, uneven coverage would leave exploitable gaps across our geography.
The more Emergency Management looks like a militarized force, the more it loses its defensive, humanitarian identity. And when the public no longer trusts Emergency Managers to show up in their worst moments, the entire system is compromised.
A Better Division of Labor
Civil Defense today is best understood as a shared mission across three domains:
- Homeland Security & Law Enforcement: responsible for interdiction, disruption, and offensive operations against adversaries.
- National Guard & Military: prepared to respond to armed attacks on U.S. soil while preserving constitutional protections under the Posse Comitatus Act.
- Emergency Management: focused on the all-hazards defensive mission of life safety, stabilization, and recovery.
This separation protects constitutional rights, clarifies mission priorities, and preserves public trust. Homeland Security and the military play offense. Emergency Management plays defense.
The Path Forward
If intelligence indicates imminent state-based threats to the homeland, we may need to revisit national Civil Defense structures. But if so, these must live within Homeland Security and the National Guard, not Emergency Management.
Congress is already considering the FEMA Independence Act of 2025, which would elevate FEMA to a cabinet-level department. This could help sharpen the distinction: Homeland Security would handle offense, while FEMA would remain dedicated to defense.
The reality is that modern warfare spans cyber, space, and critical infrastructure in addition to traditional battlefields. Defending the homeland against these threats requires agility, but it must not come at the cost of confusing the missions of Emergency Management.
Conclusion
The threats we face today are real and evolving. But reviving a 1940s-style Civil Defense under Emergency Management is not the answer. Homeland Security and the military exist to play offense against adversaries. Emergency Management exists to play defense—protecting lives, stabilizing incidents, and helping communities recover.
If we collapse those roles into one, we risk losing the trust of the very public we serve. And in the end, trust is Emergency Management’s most critical asset.
