Effective homeland security is dependent on mission technologies—autonomous systems, sensors, identity management tools, and command-and-control platforms—that were peripheral, or nonexistent, just a decade ago. 2026 will be a period of heightened operational tempo for both the Department of Homeland Security and the entire homeland security enterprise in support of security operations, including major Special Events in 2026 such as the World Cup and America 250. This means that mission technologies will be deployed faster and at greater scale. The issue is not whether DHS should embrace innovation in mission technologies—it must—but whether the department has aligned the authorities, processes, and incentives needed to manage the supply chain risks that accompany rapid adoption.
Recent experience underscores why this matters. Technologies such as DJI drones and Hikvision cameras were widely adopted across the homeland security enterprise because they were effective, affordable, and readily available. In both cases, supply chain and technical risks became a policy concern only after these systems were already deeply embedded in operations, leading to disruptive bans and costly transitions that were difficult to unwind. These outcomes were not the result of poor judgment by operators; they reflected the absence of clear, enterprise-wide expectations for how mission technologies should be evaluated for supply chain risk before they were deployed at scale. Once systems are embedded, options narrow quickly.
This challenge extends well beyond DHS. State, local, tribal, and territorial governments rely heavily on Federally funded technologies to support daily operations and major events. Private-sector partners design, build, and maintain many of the systems on which homeland security now depends. Absent a common understanding of what supply chain risk standards mission technologies are expected to meet, the result is uneven expectations, inconsistent risk exposure, and uncertainty for operators and vendors alike. Clearer, risk-informed expectations would benefit the entire enterprise. They reduce surprise, accelerate adoption, and give partners greater confidence that new capabilities can be deployed securely.
While DHS has made meaningful progress strengthening cybersecurity supply chain risk management, it has not yet applied the same enterprise-level focus to the mission technologies that increasingly define homeland security operations.
Autonomous systems, sensors, screening technologies, communications platforms, and command-and-control tools are frequently acquired through grants, pilots, or component-driven programs that emphasize speed and operational need. That approach has helped DHS and its partners move quickly, but it has also produced a fragmented landscape in which supply chain risks—such as provenance, foreign ownership, software dependencies, and concentration risk—are assessed unevenly, if at all.
The rapid expansion of counter-unmanned aircraft systems highlights both the urgency of this challenge and the opportunity to address it differently. Counter-UAS capabilities are being fielded quickly to protect critical infrastructure and major events, seeded with DHS funding and in partnership with state and local agencies. That speed is operationally necessary. It also creates a window for DHS to establish clearer expectations for how mission technologies are assessed for supply chain risk before they are deployed widely. If DHS can get this right for counter-UAS—by setting transparent, risk-based standards rather than relying on after-the-fact restrictions—it can establish a model that applies across the broader homeland security enterprise.
The objective, then, should not be to create new barriers to innovation or to centralize technology decisions within DHS. Instead, the focus should be on replacing reactive, case-by-case decision-making with clearer, risk-based expectations for how mission technologies are evaluated and operationalized before they are deployed at scale. By establishing a common baseline for supply chain risk management—one that emphasizes transparency, proportionality, and early visibility—DHS can help the enterprise move faster with greater confidence.
Any such approach should be guided by a few simple principles: supply chain risk management for mission technology should emphasize early visibility rather than late restriction, and it should be applied proportionally based on the operational and strategic importance of a given capability. The goal is not to eliminate risk, but to ensure that operators, partners, and policymakers understand it well enough to make informed choices before technologies become deeply embedded in operations.
Building on those principles, DHS has several practical options available:
- Set baseline SCRM expectations for Federally funded mission technologies.
DHS could require basic supply chain transparency—focused on ownership, provenance, software dependencies, and lifecycle support—for mission technologies acquired through grants and other Federal funding mechanisms, without mandating specific vendors or solutions.
- Apply a risk-based lens to mission-critical technology categories.
Rather than treating all technologies the same, DHS could identify a limited set of mission technology areas—such as autonomous systems, counter-UAS, identity technologies, communications, and command-and-control—where additional supply chain risk visibility is warranted due to operational importance or concentration risk.
- Use counter-UAS as a proving ground for a more coherent approach.
The rapid deployment of counter-UAS capabilities ahead of major events creates an opportunity to establish clearer expectations early, rather than relying on after-the-fact restrictions. Lessons learned here could inform how DHS approaches other emerging mission technologies.
- Leverage incentives, including the SAFETY Act, to encourage better practices.
Voluntary mechanisms such as the SAFETY Act already provide a way for DHS to evaluate security technologies and incentivize risk mitigation without mandating adoption. More deliberately aligning these tools with supply chain transparency could encourage vendors to invest in stronger practices while preserving flexibility for operators.
- Identify where supply chain risk is structural, not programmatic.
In some areas, risk reflects market concentration or limited domestic capacity rather than acquisition choices. DHS can help by identifying these gaps and coordinating with interagency partners to assess where tools such as the Defense Production Act could help signal and address long-term resilience gaps.
- Strengthen enterprise coordination without centralizing decisions.
Addressing mission technology SCRM will require clearer ownership within DHS, even if authority remains distributed. Offices that already shape technology policy and innovation can help define common approaches, while management and acquisition functions can ensure guidance is applied consistently across components and funding pathways.
The choices DHS makes in the near term will shape how effectively it can harness technology during a period of heightened operational demand. The 2026 special events calendar will test the department’s ability to deploy mission technologies quickly, at scale, and in partnership with state, local, and private-sector operators. That moment should be met with clarity rather than improvisation. DHS can take meaningful steps now to strengthen mission technology supply chain risk management in ways that support innovation rather than constrain it—and Congress should be prepared to support that effort by reinforcing the authorities, incentives, and coordination mechanisms needed to make it work. Doing so would help ensure that the technologies meant to protect the homeland remain a strategic advantage rather than an avoidable source of risk.