While ISIS remains a global threat, the capabilities of ISIS-core in Syria have steadily declined. The Syrian Government’s offensive in early 2026, followed by a subsequent integration deal between the Kurdish-led SDF and the Syrian Government, led to a sharp decline in ISIS attacks in Syria. ISIS retains remnants of its explosive manufacturing capabilities and the ability to conduct high-casualty SVIED (Suicide Vest Improvised Explosive Device) attacks. However, the group lacks the support zones, popular support, financial resources, and logistics and organizational capabilities it once possessed.
ISIS in Syria Post Assad
The fall of Damascus to Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) was a blow to ISIS. HTS was a former al-Qaeda affiliate that, alongside ISIS, formed the other half of the original force sent by al-Qaeda into Syria in the early days of the Syrian Civil War. The bitter rivalry between these two groups stems from this initial schism. The new interim government sought Western assistance in combating ISIS and ultimately joined the US-led coalition against ISIS. For its part, ISIS declared the new Syrian government apostates and quickly announced its intent to fight the new government just as fiercely as it fights every other group on the globe, save for its affiliates.
A desire to strike, however, does not equate to capability. In 2025, ISIS launched sporadic attacks against the new Syrian Government, but these strikes paled in comparison to ISIS’ attacks on its more immediate rival, the Kurdish-led and US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). For most of 2025, ISIS maintained a high rate of attacks. These attacks were overwhelmingly concentrated in Deir Ezzor and Raqqa provinces, overwhelmingly targeted the SDF, and were usually either bombings with Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) or hit-and-run strikes with small arms, often carried out by gunmen on motorcycles.
After the fall of the Assad regime, the SDF lost most of its Arab support, making its position in areas such as Deir Ezzor and Raqqa precarious. The SDF was seen as a foreign force occupying and subjugating the local population. ISIS inflamed these tensions by attacking the SDF, hoping it would crack down in the regions, then used the anger against SDF searches and arrests to recruit incensed Arabs.
ISIS in Syria in 2026
In early 2026, the Syrian Government launched an offensive that dislodged the SDF from non-Kurdish areas. As a result, the Deir Ezzor and Raqqa provinces, the heartland of the ISIS insurgency, were firmly placed under the control of the new Syrian state. While grievances remained among the populations of the region, resentment of perceived Kurdish dominance has been the primary fomenter of violence. ISIS attacks notably declined in the aftermath of the 2026 offensive and have remained low throughout 2026.
Several factors beyond Arabs in rural Syria finding the Damascus government more agreeable than the SDF might contribute to the decline in attacks. First, the SDF used US-style counterinsurgency tactics, including checkpoints, patrols, and frequent raids on suspected insurgents. The Damascus government does not widely employ the same high-visibility tactics, giving ISIS fewer potential targets. Second, the slow but steady creation of institutions in the new Syrian state has fostered cautious optimism that the fledgling democratic process will be an effective means of airing grievances and settling intergroup disputes, decreasing the allure of armed groups. Finally, the war-weary Syrian population is generally eager to proceed with reconstruction. ISIS’ message of continual jihad and total war is not widely appealing to a people who have finally achieved a chance at safety and stability.
Despite these tailwinds, there remain potential hazards in Syria’s course toward stability that could be exploited by ISIS. One major hazard is the debate over retribution against former Assad regime members and supporters. In the early days of the new government, Saraya Ansar al Sunnah and ISIS thrived on these sentiments, waging waves of coordinated attacks. As the new government centralized its control, these attacks decreased, but pressure is mounting on the government to hold more trials. Another potential hazard is the resentment among families in Deir Ezzor and Raqqa over the arrest and deportation to Iraq of their family members suspected of being ISIS members. Over the last month, both resentments have led to increasingly frequent protests. Left to fester, ISIS may leverage these frustrations to regenerate support.
Conclusion
Halfway through 2026, ISIS is far weaker than it was at the start of the year. The continued stabilization of Syria’s domestic situation has eroded the group’s support zones. The climate of economic recovery and institution building has invalidated many of the justifications ISIS previously cited to rationalize its own existence. The wider decline of the global jihadist movement has further eroded the group’s political clout and international support networks.
Through 2026, and as a result of the government offensive in the early months of the year, the tempo of ISIS attacks in Syria has decreased from multiple per week to less than once a week on average. At the beginning of the year, these attacks were primarily IED or small-arms attacks targeting SDF patrols or checkpoints. The current trend in ISIS attacks in Syria is targeted assassinations of Syrian government officials, sporadic ambushes of Syrian government forces in Deir Ezzor and Raqqa province, and occasional major attacks in Damascus and other urban areas.
ISIS in Syria still retains some outsize capabilities in global communication, IED manufacturing, weapons stockpiles, and organizational capacity from its period of significant territorial control. In its current state, however, the group lacks the ability to launch international attacks that once made it a significant global threat. It also lacks the secure support zones and international support that once enabled it to fight conventional battles and take and hold territory. While the group has a demonstrated capability for self-resurrection that should not be underestimated, it is generally overshadowed by its affiliates in Central Asia and the Sahel. The US should facilitate the continued integration of the SDF into the Syrian government and of Syria into the broader international order.
There is a real opportunity for Syria over the next six months to begin a transformation from a source of instability to a source of regional stability. In neighboring Lebanon, for example, President Trump has openly advocated for a greater Syrian role. Over the next six months and beyond, it seems likely that Syria will continue on its trajectory away from being defined by instability and the feared return of ISIS and will begin to be a contributing partner in wider regional stability.
