Six days of public mourning ceremonies for Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei—killed during the joint U.S.-Israeli military operation Epic Fury in February—unfolded on a grand scale beneath a sea of red flags as mourners chanted, “Ya Latharat al-Khamenei” (“O Avengers of Khamenei”). Within Twelver Shi’a martyrdom theology, the red flag and the battle cry “Ya Latharat al-Hussein“ symbolize the religious obligation to avenge the martyrdom of Imam Hussein, the grandson of the Prophet Muhammad, who was killed at the Battle of Karbala in 680 CE. By appropriating this historical Shi’a narrative for Khamenei, the regime cast retaliation as both a religious obligation and an instrument of state policy, effectively sacralizing state-sponsored terrorism. Placards proclaiming, “We will kill Trump,” further fused Shi’a martyrdom symbolism with an explicit call for political assassination.
Having solidified its position as the dominant pillar of the Iranian regime amid the joint U.S.-Israeli military campaign, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) transformed the funeral into a carefully choreographed demonstration of regime cohesion, dynastic succession, and national unity. The centerpiece was a public bay’ah (oath of allegiance) to the new Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, the slain leader’s son, though his conspicuous absence fueled uncertainty and speculation over his fate.
In his first written statement following Khamenei’s funeral at the Imam Reza Shrine in Mashhad—Iran’s holiest Shi’a Muslim site—the new Supreme Leader vowed to avenge his father’s death, reaffirming “Death to America” as a guiding principle of the Islamic Republic and reinforcing the funeral’s explicit calls for retaliation: “We will kill Trump.”
From a U.S. homeland security and counterterrorism perspective, the critical question is whether Tehran’s public calls to kill the U.S. president constitute a credible state-sponsored terrorist threat or merely perpetuate the Islamic Republic’s longstanding anti-American rhetoric that has defined the regime since 1979
Despite its constrained operational capabilities, the clerical regime’s invocation of the “Ya Latharat al-Khamenei” doctrine of sacred vengeance may have served as a mobilizing signal for Iranian operatives, proxy networks, and ideologically motivated lone actors in the West, posing a significant challenge for U.S. counterterrorism agencies.
This risk is further underscored by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s warning following Khamenei’s death of potential lone-actor attacks and cyber operations, prompting heightened vigilance among federal, state, and local authorities. Moreover, the Washington Institute for Near East Policy documented 157 Iranian overseas operations over the past five years, including 27 plots in the US and 54 targeting Europe between 2021 and 2024, suggesting that the possibility of the IRGC translating the “Ya Latharat al-Khamenei” narrative into operational activity cannot be dismissed. Notably, U.S. law enforcement and intelligence agencies have disrupted at least 17 Iranian plots in the US over the past five years, involving both Iranian operatives and terrorist and criminal proxies.
In response to Iran’s “Ya Latharat al-Khamenei” threats, President Donald Trump warned that any assassination attempt against him would trigger overwhelming U.S. military retaliation. On Truth Social, he stated that thousands of missiles were “locked and loaded” and that standing orders were in place for a massive strike should Tehran carry out its threats.
Iran has previously threatened President Donald Trump, most notably after the January 2020 killing of IRGC Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani and following U.S. strikes on three Iranian nuclear facilities in June 2025, when Tehran allegedly warned that it could activate sleeper cells inside the United States.
Throughout its 47-year history, the Islamic Republic has been implicated in multiple high-profile terrorist plots targeting the United States, including the IRGC-directed plots targeting President Trump in 2024 and former National Security Advisor John Bolton in 2021, both foiled by U.S. law enforcement and intelligence agencies.
Following Ali Khamenei’s death, two Iran-linked terrorist attacks occurred in the US: the March 1, 2026, shooting at a bar in Austin, Texas, that killed three people and wounded 15, where the suspect wore a sweatshirt reading “property of Allah” over a T-shirt displaying the Iranian flag, and the March 12, 2026, attack on Temple Israel in Michigan carried out by an individual linked to Hezbollah.
The IRGC’s current threat, however, carries heightened significance. By invoking the “Ya Latharat al-Hussein” doctrine of sacred vengeance, Tehran fuses state messaging with Twelver Shi’a martyrdom theology, framing retaliation as a religious obligation. Calls to kill Trump therefore transcend political rhetoric, echoing the logic of Khomeini’s 1989 fatwa condemning Salman Rushdie to death for alleged blasphemy and raising concerns over potential mobilization by Iranian operatives, proxy networks, and ideologically motivated lone actors on U.S. soil. Consequently, U.S. law enforcement and intelligence agencies remain on heightened alert to disrupt Iranian-linked plots at their earliest stages, consistent with the Department of Homeland Security’s June 2025 terrorism advisory warning of potential Iranian attacks in the United States.
IRGC’s Proxy Mobilization and the Weaponization of Shi’a Martyrdom Theology
By invoking Twelver Shi’a martyrdom theology and staging Khamenei’s funeral beneath a sea of red flags symbolizing sacred vengeance, the IRGC likely sought to mobilize its Iran-aligned Shi’a militant partners across the anti-Western Axis of Resistance. Framing calls to kill President Trump as a religious obligation rather than merely a political slogan may have been intended to strengthen ideological cohesion and encourage further escalation against the US and Israel. As Iran struggles to preserve the regime through missile and drone strikes against U.S. military installations and critical oil and civilian infrastructure—including power and desalination plants, major airports, and key energy terminals across Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain—the IRGC is increasingly reliant on non-state partners, including Hezbollah, Yemen’s Houthis, and Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), to project pressure on the US, Israel, and their Gulf Arab allies.
Indeed, the IRGC and its Axis of Resistance partners are united not only by a common interest in preventing the collapse of Iran’s theocratic regime but also by a shared militant Shi’a ideology. By framing calls to kill President Trump through the “Ya Latharat al-Hussein” doctrine of sacred vengeance, the IRGC may further strengthen the ideological cohesion of Iran-aligned Shi’a militant groups and encourage renewed attacks against U.S. military personnel and strategic interests across the Middle East.
Against this backdrop, on July 16, Iran reportedly instructed Yemen’s Houthi movement to close the Bab el-Mandeb Strait if the US strikes Iran’s power infrastructure, as President Trump threatened in a July 14 interview. The Bab el-Mandeb serves as a critical maritime chokepoint through which roughly 7 percent of global oil shipments transit. A successful Houthi blockade would significantly advance Tehran’s coercive strategy by disrupting global energy markets, increasing economic pressure on the US and its regional partners, and raising the costs of continued military confrontation.
The IRGC also organized public mourning ceremonies for the late Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in the Iraqi Shi’a holy cities of Najaf and Karbala, where millions of pilgrims gathered and Iraqi authorities declared a public holiday to accommodate the mass processions. By extending the “Ya Latharat al-Hussein” narrative beyond Iran’s borders, the IRGC likely sought to mobilize Iraq’s Iran-aligned Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), particularly Kata’ib Hezbollah (KH), the coalition’s most powerful and heavily armed faction. Portraying Khamenei as a Shi’a martyr whose death demands sacred vengeance under the “Ya Latharat al-Hussein” doctrine serves Tehran’s longstanding objective of intensifying pressure to expel U.S. forces from Iraq while consolidating Iranian influence over Baghdad.
The religious framing of threats against President Trump and the invocation of Twelver Shi’a martyrdom theology also appear aimed at preventing further fragmentation within Iran’s Axis of Resistance, particularly amid signs of weakening cohesion among its Iraqi partners. In Iraq, Iran-aligned militias, Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq and Kata’ib Imam Ali, announced plans to separate from the PMF framework and place their weapons under state authority, challenging Tehran’s long-standing model of maintaining armed non-state actors outside full government control. By elevating Khamenei as a Shi’a martyr whose death demands sacred vengeance under the “Ya Latharat al-Hussein” doctrine, Tehran sought to reinforce ideological cohesion among its proxy networks and preserve the broader resistance narrative centered on opposition to the US and Israel, including the liberation of Gaza.
From Shi’a Martyrdom Theology to Sunni Jihadist Rejection: Central Asian ISKP and al-Qaeda Responses to Khamenei’s Death
Unlike Iran-aligned Shi’a militant groups within the Axis of Resistance, Central Asian Salafi-jihadist movements affiliated with the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) and al-Qaeda-linked organizations interpreted Khamenei’s death and the “Ya Latharat al-Hussein” doctrine of Twelver Shi’a sacred vengeance through a deeply sectarian and hostile ideological lens.
On July 12, the Uzbek-language pro-ISKP Telegram channel Tavhid Makoni (“Land of Tawhid”), which criticizes both secular Central Asian governments and Uzbek and Tajik al-Qaeda-aligned clerics and militants in Syria, celebrated Khamenei’s death following his funeral. The channel described him using the sectarian slur “Rafidha” and claimed that the former Supreme Leader had been sent to hell. It also condemned the reported delay in burying Khamenei’s body, accused authorities of displaying his remains publicly, and mocked millions of Shi’a mourners who gathered to pray over him, arguing that such practices represented religious deviation by elevating a human figure above God.
Similarly, the Tajik-language pro-ISKP Telegram channel Ansor Tojiki targeted Tajik President Emomali Rahmon after he attended Khamenei’s funeral procession in Tehran. The channel published Rahmon’s photograph and claimed that “murtads” were identical everywhere—from Shi’a Iran to Sunni Central Asia—accusing both leaders of “betrayal of Islam, tyranny, and treachery.” It further condemned Rahmon as a taghut (an illegitimate ruler in Salafi-jihadist terminology) and called for divine punishment against him alongside Khamenei. The message underscores ISKP’s broader ideological rejection of both Iran’s Shi’a theocracy and Central Asia’s secular governments, which it frames as part of the same anti-Islamic political order.
It is important to note that Uzbek and Tajik ISKP militants maintain deep hostility toward Iran’s Shi’a population, whom they routinely denounce with the sectarian slur Rafidha and accuse of apostasy. This sectarian animosity has translated into operational violence, with Tajik ISKP members conducting three high-profile attacks inside Iran that significantly expanded the group’s geographic reach beyond Afghanistan and South Asia.
On January 3, 2024, a Tajik ISKP operative, Abdollah Tajiki, carried out a suicide bombing during a memorial ceremony for Qassem Soleimani, commander of the IRGC’s Quds Force, in Kerman, killing at least 95 people and injuring 284 others. In August 2023, Tajik ISKP militant Rahmatollah Nowruzov carried out an attack against the Shah Cheragh mausoleum in Shiraz, killing two people and wounding seven. Earlier, on October 26, 2022, Tajik ISKP militant Sobhan Kamrouni launched an armed assault against the same shrine, one of Iran’s most important Shi’a religious sites, killing at least 13 people and injuring more than 30 others.
In each instance, ISKP selected targets with profound religious significance for Shi’a Muslims, reflecting the group’s characterization of Shi’a communities as apostates and heretics. While ISKP supporters ridicule Iran’s “Ya Latharat al-Hussein” doctrine of sacred vengeance and reject Tehran’s calls to kill President Donald Trump, their ideological hostility extends equally to the US and the broader Western order, which they define through the Salafi-jihadist concept of kufr (disbelief). The intersection of anti-Shi’a sectarianism and anti-Western extremism demonstrates that ISKP’s confrontation with Iran is rooted in ideological rivalry, not a convergence of interests with Washington.
Unlike ISKP, Central Asian Salafi-jihadist groups aligned with al-Qaeda also welcomed Khamenei’s death, but their reaction was expressed through a more calculated sectarian and ideological narrative. On March 1, 2026, amid the Israel-Iran conflict, the Uzbek-language Telegram channel Guraba Medya, affiliated with the Uzbek al-Qaeda-linked group Katibat al-Guraba (KG), published an excerpt from the eighth-century Islamic scholar Abd al-Rahman al-Awza’i’s Kitab al-Siyar: “If Allah kills one of two unbelievers fighting each other, it is good; if He kills both warring unbelievers, it is even better.” By invoking this religious interpretation, KG framed Khamenei’s death as a divine judgment and expressed hope that Israeli and U.S. leaders involved in the conflict would suffer the same fate.
Similarly, the Uzbek-language pro-al-Qaeda Telegram channel Abu Haris, operated by Salafi-jihadist supporters in Syria’s Idlib province, mocked Khamenei’s death by portraying him as a persecutor responsible for the killing of Sunni Muslims in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and Lebanon. The channel argued that the Iranian leader had ultimately faced the same fate as those he allegedly oppressed and would now be held accountable before God for his crimes.
Conclusion: Countering Converging Terror Threats from Iran, ISKP, and al-Qaeda
The reactions of ISKP and al-Qaeda-aligned Central Asian Salafi-jihadist actors demonstrate that Iran, Israel, and the US remain enduring adversaries within their respective extremist worldviews. Despite their opposition to Tehran and rejection of Iran’s Shi’a ideological framework, these groups do not regard Washington as a partner or a temporary ally. The principle that “the enemy of my enemy is my friend” does not apply in the Salafi-jihadist threat environment, where sectarian rivalries and anti-Western ideology frequently reinforce one another.
For U.S. counterterrorism and intelligence agencies, this evolving landscape requires sustained attention to a dual-spectrum threat: potential retaliatory violence from Iran-aligned Shi’a actors, including individuals inspired by Tehran’s messaging, alongside attacks driven by Sunni Salafi-jihadist movements such as ISKP and al-Qaeda affiliates. Although these actors pursue distinct ideological and strategic objectives, they ultimately converge in their opposition to the United States and its interests. Mitigating this complex threat environment will require persistent intelligence collection, robust interagency coordination, early disruption of emerging plots, and continuous monitoring of extremist narratives across both state-sponsored and non-state threat ecosystems.
