Eighteen days into the U.S.-Israel war on Iran’s theocratic regime, Arab states remain easy targets for Iranian drones and missiles that hit energy facilities, military sites, and civilian infrastructure daily. Iran’s aim seems to be shifting the battlefield from Tehran to the Gulf region, upon which the global energy supply heavily relies. The Arab countries most directly impacted across the Arabian Peninsula (such as Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Oman, and Kuwait) have yet to respond militarily. They continue to exercise high self-discipline while effectively defending themselves with advanced systems that they have invested tens of billions of dollars in accumulating in the past two decades.
While Arabs’ choice not to retaliate militarily against Iran might be understood as a strategic calculus, it remains hard to rationalize why Iranian embassies are still open and Iranian diplomats remain active and protected in most states across the Arabian Peninsula and beyond. Why cannot Arab states, whether on the Gulf or in Egypt, Jordan, and Iraq, simply dismiss the Iranian diplomatic missions to send a clear and strong message that Iran’s long-standing treatment of Arab countries as a disposable backyard is no longer acceptable?
The answer primarily lies in the Arabs’ perception of what this war truly is, and most importantly, what it is not. Most Arabs see this war as a US-Israel campaign to weaken Tehran’s military and nuclear capabilities, not as an invitation to a regional conflict. This is not a war initiated by Arabs, nor one whose outcome they can fully control. Arabs are delighted to see the US and Israel finally handling the Iranian regime that wreaked havoc all over the region and threatened their security for decades. However, they still perceive that the Iranian regime is not yet weakened enough for them to trust the US operation or declare Israel as the victor.
Another layer of Arab restraint stems from the geo-military asymmetry between Iran and the Gulf states. The Gulf countries have advanced Western military systems, host major operational platforms, and have heavily invested in modernizing their armed forces over the last twenty years. In straightforward technical terms, Arab Gulf states can strike Iran. However, Iran’s vast, rugged terrain and dispersed military infrastructure make it difficult for less-experienced Gulf forces to cause significant damage to vital targets inside Iran. Conversely, the Gulf states are densely populated, highly urbanized, and economically concentrated. Their critical assets (energy facilities, desalination plants, ports, and shipping routes) are exposed and within the medium to short range of Iran’s extensive missile and drone arsenal.
As a result, any direct exchange between Arab Gulf militaries and Iran would not resemble a traditional interstate war. Instead, it would likely take the form of a prolonged campaign targeting infrastructure, where even limited successful strikes could produce outsized economic and political repercussions. In such scenarios, retaliation risks causing damage far more costly than any potential gains.
Arab Gulf states are clearly aware that the decisive theater of this war is outside their borders. The balance of power between Iran and its adversaries will be determined by the cumulative impact of military actions on Iranian capabilities, not by the participation of additional regional actors. Joining the war directly, at this stage, would not accelerate that outcome. It would instead multiply the number of vulnerable fronts and increase the probability of a prolonged regional conflict.
The continuation of diplomatic ties with Tehran follows the same strategic logic. Keeping Iranian embassies open does not mean endorsing Iranian conduct. It is a calculated risk management strategy. Dismissing Iranian diplomats may satisfy the symbolic need for a “strong message,” but it would also eliminate one of the few tools able to prevent uncontrolled escalation. In this way, diplomacy is not a concession. It acts as a form of defensive infrastructure, just as vital as missile interceptors. As long as embassies remain open, there is still a ceiling to escalation. The moment Arab states begin downgrading or severing relations with Tehran, it will signal that they no longer believe the conflict can be contained. That shift, if it comes, will be a prelude to a broader regional confrontation.
This logic extends beyond the Gulf. Countries such as Egypt, Jordan, and Iraq have adopted similar patterns of calibrated restraint. They are neither neutral nor aligned with Iran. Their top priority is to prevent the conflict from spreading into a regional war that could overwhelm their already fragile economic and security systems. What emerges, then, is a regional posture that appears contradictory only when viewed through the narrow lens of traditional deterrence theory. Rather than signaling weakness, it may actually indicate political maturity. In a region long characterized by reactive escalation, restraint itself has become a form of power. The ability to absorb pressure, manage risk, and avoid getting caught in a larger war in today’s Middle East holds greater strategic importance than immediate retaliation.
In that sense, Arab military restraint and diplomatic patience toward Iranian aggression are more about calculating for all possible future scenarios, including the survival of the Iranian regime, than about proving Arab strength in wrestling with Iran. One Arab senior diplomat told me that his country has learned the hard way that it cannot put all its bets on a single US Administration because of the checks-and-balances system and the relatively rapid pace of power rotation in American domestic politics.
What matters now, as the war approaches its fourth week, is not why Arab states have chosen restraint but how long they can maintain it and under what circumstances it might break down. The current posture holds as long as Iranian strikes remain calibrated, largely intercepted, and below the threshold of mass casualties or systemic disruption. That threshold is the real red line to watch. A successful strike on a major oil facility, a desalination plant, or a densely populated urban area could force a shift from defense to retaliation, regardless of current strategic calculations.
Equally important is the trajectory of the U.S.–Israel campaign. If Washington and Jerusalem succeed in significantly degrading Iran’s missile capabilities and command structure, Arab states will be vindicated in their decision to stay out and will likely double down on this model of “defense without war.” If, however, the conflict drags on without decisive results, pressure will build, both domestically and regionally, for a more assertive Arab role.
In this context, the next phase of the war will be determined less by battlefield developments inside Iran than by whether the Gulf remains a controlled secondary front or becomes the primary arena of escalation. Arab states are buying time, hoping the war will end before they are forced to choose.
