On May 1, the MEMRI Violent Extremist Threat Monitor (VETM) project published a landmark report on Russia’s use of drones in the Russia-Ukraine war. The drones are being used by both the traditional military and by other actors operating outside it, including groups affiliated with designated terrorist organizations.
MEMRI VETM director Dr. Simon Purdue explained the importance of this report as follows: “As MEMRI’s extensive research on the use of drones in the Ukrainian theater shows, the use of these technologies is on the rise and is becoming increasingly accessible to militant and terrorist organizations. Drone technology is becoming cheaper and easier to utilize in offensive, kinetic attacks. The Homeland Security community in the U.S. and interests in the West should take note of the growing danger of drone usage by extremists, particularly in the context of the recent theft of several-grade drones from a facility in New Jersey, foreign fighters returning from the Ukrainian theater with direct experience utilizing drones in combat, and increasing threats from Iran-backed groups within the U.S. The risk of drone-enabled explosive attacks, biochemical dispersal, or infrastructural sabotage is increasing exponentially.
“Understanding how drones are being used by militants and state-aligned forces in the Ukraine conflict is essential for understanding how they might soon threaten interests closer to home.”
This report is part of the MEMRI National Security Initiative. Below is its introduction:
Introduction
This study documents a transformation in warfare that is at once technical, organizational, and social. The materials collected here do not present drones merely as weapons systems. They show how drone warfare, in the Russian case, evolved into a distributed ecosystem – one that extends beyond formal military procurement into a network of volunteer formations, ideological groups, Telegram-based fundraising channels, paramilitary organizations, and semi-independent technical initiatives operating at or near the front.
Across the entries, a consistent pattern emerges: the Russian state’s drone capability has been supplemented – and at times materially enabled – by actors operating outside traditional military-industrial pathways. Units such as the 88th Brigade “Espanola” illustrate this dynamic in concentrated form. The documents describe a coalescing process that promotes, funds, develops, produces, and then deploys them. Espanola is shown cooperating with the “CROK” cyberwarfare group; raising funds through a charitable foundation linked to the Russian “Green Alternative” party; operating a frontline drone-manufacturing workshop; training operators; and testing electronic warfare (EW) systems. This is not a conventional brigade model. It is a hybrid entity combining battlefield function, technical experimentation, recruitment infrastructure, and public-facing fundraising.
The same structure appears, in different variations, across a wider set of actors. Groups engages in fundraising for drones, soliciting public donations for equipment. Some also offer drone training courses. Smaller Telegram channels, ideological networks, and individual public figures raise money for thermal drones, signal amplification systems, and drone components. Even marginal or extremist spaces intersect with this ecosystem, either by propagating drone-related content or by participating in fundraising and distribution.
What distinguishes this environment is not only its breadth, but its method. The compilation repeatedly shows that when drones or related equipment are unavailable through conventional channels, Russian soldiers and their supporters turn to improvised solutions. These include crowdfunding campaigns, ad hoc procurement networks, and local manufacturing efforts at or near the front. Both cryptocurrency and traditional banking mechanisms are used to raise funds, sometimes in amounts reaching tens of thousands of dollars. The result is a bottom-up logistical layer that operates alongside – and occasionally compensates for – state supply systems.
The groups using these technologies present a threat themselves to the West, and to Europe in particular. Many of these groups, including those affiliated with terrorist-designated groups, are militantly aligned with the expansionist and irridentist ideology of the Russian state, and have some have expressed a desire to expand their kinetic operations beyond the borders of Ukraine. Many of these groups have a clear fascist worldview which has been war-hardened and radicalized by the Ruso-supremacist rhetoric of leading figures within the movement, and as such their expertise in offensive drone operations presents a looming threat to the entirety of Europe.
This distributed model also extends into the technical domain. The materials reference not only unmanned aerial vehicles, but also anti-drone systems and defenses, electronic warfare experimentation, and adaptations intended to counter Ukrainian capabilities. The battlefield becomes iterative: drones are deployed, countered, modified, and redeployed in rapid cycles. In this sense, the war has accelerated a form of real-time military innovation in which frontline units, volunteers, and loosely affiliated technical actors contribute directly to the evolution of tactics and tools.
At the same time, the compilation captures how drone warfare is mediated through information spaces. Telegram channels in Russian, Ukrainian, Belarusian, and Lithuanian contexts disseminate footage, fundraising appeals, technical commentary, and ideological framing. The war is therefore fought not only in physical space, but in an online environment where narratives, tactics, and resources circulate continuously. The presence of pro-Russian foreign volunteers, references to darknet listings of U.S.-supplied drones, and cross-border discussions further underscore the permeability of this ecosystem.
The significance of these materials lies in their cumulative effect. Individually, many entries describe discrete events: a fundraising campaign, a training initiative, a drone strike, a technical experiment. Taken together, they reveal a systemic shift. Drone warfare, in the Russian case, has become decentralized, participatory, and adaptive – integrating state power with informal networks, ideological mobilization, and improvised innovation. This compilation documents that shift as it unfolded over the first three and a half years of the war.
This report presents items from MEMRI VETM research and VETM reports on Russia’s use of drones in the Russia-Ukraine war between January 2022 and April 2026.
The full report can be found at MEMRI.org.
