U.S. President Donald Trump’s decision to authorize strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities has significantly escalated tensions across the Middle East, placing the region in a state of heightened uncertainty as global actors closely monitor Tehran’s potential response. On June 13, 2025, Israel intensified the conflict by targeting key figures associated with Iran’s nuclear program and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), further aggravating an already volatile situation. The ongoing tit-for-tat exchanges between Israel and Iran have resulted in the deaths of hundreds of Iranian civilians and dozens of Israeli civilians, deepening regional instability. While questions persisted regarding the extent of U.S. involvement in the unfolding conflict, President Trump’s recent confirmation of American strikes on nuclear sites in Fordo, Isfahan, and Natanz marked a clear shift in U.S. engagement. Despite this escalation, U.S. officials have emphasized that the objective of the strikes is not regime change but rather the dismantling of Iran’s nuclear capabilities, which are perceived as a growing threat to regional and international security.
Since the September 11, 2001 attacks, U.S. security policy has predominantly prioritized the Global War on Terrorism. However, over the past decade, a shift in strategic paradigms has emerged, placing greater emphasis on addressing the geopolitical challenges posed by the increasingly assertive global postures of Russia and China. In response to critiques that U.S. policy had become overly focused on counterterrorism at the expense of broader strategic competition, recent administrations have recalibrated national security priorities to reflect the evolving international landscape. As part of this strategic pivot, the United States has pursued a gradual military drawdown in Iraq and Syria, signaling a desire to reduce its direct footprint in the region.
One consistent factor behind longstanding U.S. engagement in the Middle East has been the security of Israel, a key ally. Successive U.S. administrations have sought to ensure that Israel maintains the capability to defend itself independently, thereby justifying a reduction in American forces in the region. However, the Hamas-led terrorist attacks on October 7, 2023, raised serious concerns regarding Israel’s preparedness and deterrence capabilities. Additionally, the recent territorial advances by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in Syria—an organization previously linked to al-Qaeda—have further compounded anxieties about regional security dynamics and the broader implications for Israeli national defense. These developments have prompted renewed debates in U.S. policy circles about the risks associated with retrenchment from the Middle East and the necessity of re-evaluating America’s role in safeguarding regional stability.
Israel has increasingly adopted a step-by-step counterterrorism strategy that initially focused on neutralizing immediate threats from Hamas and Hezbollah and has since expanded to include broader operations targeting Iran’s regional influence. This strategic shift is grounded in a recognition by Israeli officials of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s central role in providing logistical, financial, and ideological support to Hamas and other Iran-aligned militia groups throughout the Middle East.
Data from the Global Terrorism Trends and Analysis Center (GTTAC), which compiles and analyzes terrorism-related incidents on behalf of the U.S. Department of State, highlights the escalating threat posed by Iran-backed militias and underscores Tehran’s long-term objective of regional expansion. This objective is increasingly evident through the coordinated actions of its proxy forces, such as the Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI) in Syria, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the Houthis in Yemen, which have carried out simultaneous attacks targeting U.S. and Israeli interests. GTTAC’s records reveal a dramatic surge in attacks by these groups, with 2,266 incidents recorded in 2024 alone—accounting for 28% of all global terrorism incidents that year. This represents a sharp increase from previous years: 6.2% in 2021, 6% in 2022, and 13.9% in 2023, reflecting a more centralized and strategic mobilization of proxy forces likely directed by Tehran.
This pattern provides critical context for Israel’s decision to expand its counterterrorism efforts beyond non-state actors to directly target Iranian assets. Israeli security officials appear increasingly concerned about the long-term threat posed by Palestinian groups, particularly Hamas, who may regroup and seek retaliation for the tens of thousands of Palestinian civilian casualties incurred during Israel’s counteroffensive operations in the Gaza Strip. The potential for such groups to reorganize with Iranian backing has likely reinforced Israel’s perception of Iran as the strategic nucleus behind sustained regional instability.
Undoubtedly, the Tehran regime is likely to pursue retaliatory measures against both Israel and the United States in response to recent U.S. strikes targeting its nuclear facilities. Since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, the Iranian leadership has consistently sought to consolidate domestic power by framing external adversaries—most notably the “Great Satan” (the United States) and the “Little Satan” (Israel)—as existential threats. This strategic use of foreign enemies serves not only to justify Iran’s regional interventions and aggressive foreign policy but also to rally internal political support. In the current context, the regime is expected to leverage the conflict to stoke nationalist sentiment, suppress dissent, and unify the population under the banner of resistance to foreign aggression.
Iran’s involvement in regional terrorism and destabilizing activities is fundamentally driven by its strategic doctrines of extended deterrence and forward defense. These frameworks seek to mitigate external threats not through conventional military engagement, but by projecting influence beyond Iran’s borders via asymmetric tactics—primarily through proxy networks and non-state actors. This strategy is ideologically underpinned by the doctrine of velayet-e faqih (guardianship of the jurist), which vests Iran’s Supreme Leader with overarching religious and political authority. This authority extends not only within Iran’s borders but also to aligned movements and militant groups abroad, enabling Tehran to exercise ideological and operational influence across the region.
Since the early 1980s, these strategic doctrines have yielded tangible outcomes for the Islamic Republic. The regime has established deep-rooted connections and influence among Shi’a communities across the Middle East, as well as in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Iran has also made attempts to expand its influence into Türkiye, notably through the alleged establishment of covert operational cells. A prominent case in the early 2010s involved an Iranian-linked terrorist group accused of plotting to attack the U.S. Consulate in Istanbul. However, the investigation into this plot was obstructed by high-level political figures in Türkiye, allowing members of the IRGC to exit the country without accountability.
Furthermore, Iran’s influence extends into Latin America, where it has leveraged historic migration patterns of Middle Eastern communities to build ideological and operational footholds. This global reach reflects Tehran’s long-standing commitment to exporting its revolutionary model and maintaining a strategic posture against perceived Western and regional adversaries.
While the exact nature of Iran’s response to U.S. strikes remains uncertain, it is highly likely that the Iranian regime will use these developments to consolidate the authority of the Supreme Leader and galvanize domestic support. A direct missile strike on U.S. territory appears improbable due to geographic limitations; however, retaliation against U.S. military assets in the Middle East is a far more plausible scenario. Currently, approximately 40,000 American troops are stationed across 19 military sites in the region, presenting numerous potential targets for Iran and its affiliated proxy forces.
Iran is expected to activate its extensive network of militias, particularly in Syria and Lebanon, with Hezbollah playing a central role in any coordinated retaliatory campaign. Iraq also remains a critical theater in this context. The aftermath of the 2003 U.S. military intervention contributed to the rise of a Shi’a-dominated governments in Baghdad, many elements of which are ideologically aligned with Tehran. This alignment has created an enabling environment for Iran-backed militias to operate with relative impunity within Iraqi territory.
According to data from GTTAC, of the 28 groups implicated in terrorist attacks in Iraq since 2018, 19 were identified as Iran-backed militias. This statistic underscores Iran’s capacity to mobilize asymmetric actors in Iraq against U.S. interests. Given this infrastructure, it is likely that Tehran will orchestrate a series of indirect confrontations through these proxies, targeting U.S. military installations and personnel across the region as part of its broader deterrence and retaliation strategy.
Despite Iran’s strong ideological alignment and long-standing support for Shi’a militias across the Middle East, the Islamic Republic has also maintained complex and often opaque relationships with Sunni jihadist groups, most notably al-Qaeda. One striking example is the reported long-term presence of al-Qaeda’s former second-in-command, Saif al-Adl, within Iranian territory. While conspiracy theories frequently circulate in the region, there is credible reason to believe that Tehran may exert influence over, or even direct, certain jihadist networks. These groups, driven by anti-American ideologies, could be mobilized—either independently or as coordinated proxies—to participate in attacks against U.S. assets, further complicating the regional security landscape.
Additionally, Iran’s operational reach transcends ideological and sectarian boundaries through its documented ties to international organized crime networks. A notable example includes a foiled assassination plot in New York, where the FBI uncovered that Iranian operatives had sought to enlist an Eastern European criminal syndicate to target a prominent dissident. This case highlights the regime’s increasing reliance on transnational criminal actors to achieve covert objectives abroad. Such networks represent a serious and underappreciated threat, particularly with regard to potential targeted attacks on U.S. soil.
Cyberwarfare also remains a potent tool in Tehran’s arsenal. Iranian-affiliated cyber units have already engaged in numerous cyberattacks targeting U.S. infrastructure and private entities. As tensions escalate, Tehran may escalate its cyber operations as a low-cost, high-impact means of retaliation. Other strategic options include disrupting global oil markets—particularly in the Strait of Hormuz—resuming aggressive nuclear development, or even returning to the negotiation table under new leverage.
Beyond questions of how Iran might respond to U.S. strikes lies a critical consideration: the extent to which such actions might serve as a credible deterrent. It is implausible to assume that Iran will surrender its nuclear ambitions in the face of military pressure. The Islamic Republic has long demonstrated its resolve to develop nuclear capabilities, despite sustained international sanctions. Since the early 1980s, the U.S. has imposed comprehensive sanctions aimed at constraining Iran’s nuclear program, yet the Iranian regime has systematically developed mechanisms to evade these restrictions.
One illustrative case occurred in 2013, when Turkish law enforcement arrested Reza Zarrab, an Iranian-Turkish businessman at the center of a massive sanctions-evasion and money laundering scheme. Zarrab allegedly orchestrated a complex financial network to bypass U.S. sanctions, leveraging high-level corruption and bribing senior Turkish government officials—including ministers. The Turkish government subsequently shut down the investigation and imprisoned the prosecutors and police officers involved, framing it as a politically motivated plot. After Zarrab was later arrested by U.S. authorities in 2016 upon his entry into the United States, the investigation expanded into American jurisdiction, further exposing the extent of Turkish complicity in violating U.S. sanctions. There have been credible concerns that the Turkish government has attempted to influence or obstruct the legal proceedings in the U.S., reflecting Ankara’s interest in suppressing further disclosures that could implicate senior Turkish officials.
While Israeli and American strikes may inflict temporary damage to Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, they are unlikely to shift the regime’s long-term strategic posture. The most effective countermeasure—comprehensive political transformation within Iran—is highly improbable under the current domestic and international conditions.
In conclusion, while the international focus has shifted in recent years toward great power competition with Russia and China, the October 7 Hamas attacks and the subsequent escalation between Israel and Iran underscore the persistent and volatile nature of terrorism as a global threat. The U.S. strikes on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure may serve immediate tactical objectives, but they are also likely to be weaponized by Tehran for internal consolidation and external defiance. Historically, the Islamic Republic has maintained domestic control by constructing and exploiting narratives around foreign threats—primarily the United States and Israel. Despite economic hardship and growing internal discontent, the regime has demonstrated a consistent ability to redirect popular frustration through external confrontations. In light of Iran’s entrenched regional influence and evolving global networks, U.S. policymakers must reassess Tehran’s full-spectrum capabilities and anticipate a broad array of possible responses.
