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The exploitation of humanitarian causes by militant groups to garner sympathy among Muslims and secure increased funding is a longstanding tactic, not a novel phenomenon. Entities linked to the Islamic State in Pakistan Province (ISPP) previously capitalized on last year’s February earthquakes in Turkey and Idlib, soliciting cryptocurrency donations. The evident exploitation of digital currencies is not limited to the European or Russian-IS linked networks. IS’ has been increasingly using virtual assets like Tether to raise and move money in Africa, owing to its cheaper and faster movement of funds, apart from informal money services like cash couriers forming the lynchpin of its money laundering strategies. Notably, the group and its affiliated networks have thus demonstrated operational security in their cryptocurrency usage, providing followers with guides on secure asset transfers, alongside advocating for decentralized currencies and crypto mixers to obfuscate transaction records.
Thus these campaigns have utilized a multitude of block chains and employed a wide array of techniques like the utilization of shared addresses, favored wallet providers, temporary addresses, privacy coins, and cash out mechanisms for moving illicit money as a part of their convoluted money laundering system. With crypto transfers, nearly all of the monitored networks soliciting donations for IS women exhorted prospective donors to send money to various IS-linked intermediaries in Istanbul through Western Union, reinforcing Turkey’s role as a logistic base for the group’s illicit financial flows, alongside serving for years as a hub to transfer IS fighters and otherwise support IS. One jihadist fighter from the EU who spoke to the second author confirmed that during the IS Caliphate any money that entered Turkey via the hawala system was essentially available to those in Syria. Likewise, another IS fighter told the second author about running a hawala system in Turkey, with the full knowledge of Turkish police and other intelligence authorities, to finance the IS fighters in Syria during its territorial Caliphate.
In the province of Idlib, controlled by jihadist group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, foreign fighters affiliated with various jihadist groups are also gradually turning to running crowdfunding campaigns seeking cryptocurrency donations. A troubling development emerges as a German jihadist who claims to be in Syria since 2013, offers firsthand experiences from the frontlines in Idlib on his Telegram channel. While advocating for humanitarian aid to the war-torn populations of both Idlib and Gaza, funds from his platform have been diverted to support his own family and the militant group he belongs to. Notably, the Tron wallet shared by the militant for accepting transfers has received $12,000 over the past four months, signaling a significant flow of funds diverting to sponsoring his jihadist groups’ operations.
In summary, this study sheds light on the persistent financial strategies employed IS and it’s linked or affiliated international networks which include the exploitation of various financial mechanisms, such as cryptocurrencies and European banking systems, to raise funds for detainees and for fulfilling IS’s militant goals. These findings underscore the necessity for enhanced international monitoring and robust collaboration between various countries and UN bodies to disrupt the financial infrastructure of terrorist organizations like IS which is vital for mitigating the ongoing threat posed by the group and its networks to global security and stability. This is particularly salient when it comes to the illicit funds received into the camps by IS women who are busy recruiting children born and brought into the Caliphate to become future wives, fathers and fighters for its next generation—fighters our troops may be facing down in the future.