Cognitive Engagement as a Strategic Imperative of Irregular Warfare

Irregular warfare is one of the most enduring modalities of human conflict; persisting across epochs because it exploits asymmetries inherent in human cognition, sociopolitical organization, and technical capability. Axiomatically, irregular warfare leverages operations that are contrary to the status quo. By defying expectation, such operations introduce uncertainty, refute predictive models, and exploit gaps in preparedness. The result is a cascade of cognitive effects that amplify perceived threat, destabilize coordinated responses, and degrade defensive efficacy.¹ In this sense, we view cognitive engagement as a fundamental aspect of irregular warfare.

Indeed, irregular warfare endures because it opportunizes core elements of human cognition and decision-making. Humans are predictive organisms who rely upon pattern recognition, heuristics, and prior experience to navigate uncertainty. The structured force-on-force engagements of conventional warfare allow for the development of such predictive schemas. Irregular warfare, in contrast, deliberately subverts them, operating outside expected norms, and imposing cognitive strain upon adversaries. This strain manifests as increased cognitive load for both individual warfighters and command structures.

The unpredictability inherent in irregular operations renders it impossible to accurately anticipate when, where, and how an adversary will act. This denigrates the utility of conventional intelligence cycles and compresses decision timelines, often forcing reactive rather than proactive responses. The value of surprise in warfare is well established, and irregular warfare maximizes such violations of expectation to produce disproportionate psychological effects. Such violations activate neurocognitive mechanisms associated with threat detection, uncertainty processing, emotions of dread, and increased volatility in decision-making and resultant behaviors that can serve adversary objectives.

The resultant cognitive volatility introduces ambiguity into the information environment. Disinformation, misinformation, and perceptual manipulation complicate the identification of ground truths, and affect the interpretive frameworks through which information is processed. Taken together, these cognitive destabilizations can lead to inconsistent or conflicting directives, fragment command and control structures, and can induce decision paralysis or, conversely, uncoordinated impulsive actions. Importantly, these effects are not confined to the battlefield. In an era of globalized information ecosystems, cognitive operations extend to civilian populations, political institutions, and allied networks. The resulting cross-domain effects can compromise strategic coherence and alliance cohesion.

Nations such as China and Russia have explicitly articulated doctrines that emphasize the cognitive domain as a primary battlespace of irregular engagement. China’s concept of “intelligentized” conflict and its integration of operations in psychological, informational, and legal domains (i.e.- the “Three Warfares”) reflect a comprehensive approach to shaping perception and decision-making.² Similarly, Russia’s doctrines of “reflexive control” aim to influence adversary behavior by manipulating the informational inputs upon which decisions are based.³

Emerging technologies are fortifying the overall capability of these approaches.⁴ Big data tools and methods, artificial intelligence (AI), and advanced sensing systems allow for the collection and granular analysis of vast quantities of diverse information. This facilitates increasingly precise targeting of cognitive vulnerabilities at both individual and collective levels. Toward such targeting, social media and digital communication platforms provide vectors for rapid dissemination of influence operations, that employ deepfakes, algorithmically amplified narratives, and micro-targeted messaging. Further, current neurotechnologies (e.g.- highly specific pharmacological agents, and various forms of brain stimulation devices) afford viable vectors for direct modulation of cognitive states.⁵

Cognitive Engagement as Method and Objective of Irregular Warfare

We posit that cognitive engagement in irregular warfare functions in two complementary ways: as a method of operation and as an objective of conflict. As method, cognitive engagements (inclusive of influence operations, psychological warfare, and information manipulation) entail deliberate shaping of perception, belief, and decision-making processes. As objective, cognitive engagement seeks achievement of both acute and enduring changes in attitudes, values, and behaviors by eroding trust in institutions, fostering societal division, and/or undermining individual or collective motivation and will to resist.

In this sense, victory would not be defined solely by territorial control or military attrition, but by successful reconfiguration of the adversary’s cognitive landscape. This underscores the necessity of 1) appreciating and recognizing the cognitive component of irregular warfare, and 2) integrating cognitive considerations within all aspects of military planning and execution. We opine that failure to do so (particularly given explicit recognition of the reality of cognitive effects and peer-competitor and adversaries’ iterative investments in this space) risks ceding a critical domain of competition and conflict to adversaries who are becoming increasingly adept at its exploitation.

Recommendations

In light of the foregoing considerations, we propose the following recommendations to fortify U.S. posture against cognitively driven irregular warfare:

1. Establish a unified doctrine of cognitive engagement. The Department of War (DoW) should develop and promulgate comprehensive doctrine that explicitly defines cognitive engagement as a core component of military operations. This doctrine should integrate extant concepts of information operations, psychological warfare, and cyber operations into a cohesive framework that clarifies terminology and operational boundaries to ensure alignment across services and with allied partners. Importantly, it should incorporate ethical and legal considerations consistent with the Law of Armed Conflict, and Rules of Engagement.
2. Invest in cognitive readiness andresilienceeducation and training. Warfighter preparedness must include cognitive resilience. Education and training programs should be developed to enhance situational awareness, critical thinking, and resistance to manipulation. This includes instruction on cognitive biases, stress management, and information literacy and discernment. Scenario-based training (inclusive of AI modeling, tabletop exercises and wargaming) should simulate cognitively contested environments and aim to develop and sustain adaptive responses to uncertainty and ambiguity.
3. Leverage advanced technologies for cognitive defense and engagement. TheDoWshould prioritize investment in technologies that enable both defensive and offensive cognitive capabilities. This includes AI-based tools for detecting disinformation, modeling adversary behavior, and assessing cognitive effects. Neurocognitive monitoring technologies can enable insight to warfighter performance and resilience, and, when coupled to state-of-the-science neuromodulatory approaches, can enable real-time interventions toward optimizing operational effectiveness. However, any such applications should be pursued with diligent attention to ethical and legal considerations and concerns. Partnerships with academic and industrial sectors should be fortified toward maintaining technological advantage in this rapidly evolving domain.
4. Enhance intelligence integration of cognitive tools, methods and indicators. Intelligence processes should incorporate cognitive technologies, techniques and indicators as key elements of surveillance and reconnaissance practice(s) and analyses. This should entail expanding collection and analytic frameworks to include metrics of perception, sentiment, and behavioral intent. Developing standardized approaches for assessing cognitive states (what we have referred to as neurocognitive intelligence, NEURINT) both within adversary populations and friendly forces, will be important to engage current and emerging cognitive technologies to improve situational awareness and decision-making.⁶ Integrating these approaches within and across intelligence disciplines (HUMINT, SIGINT, OSINT) will be necessary to achieve a comprehensive understanding of the cognitive battlespace operative in irregular warfare operations.
5. Strengthen interagency and allied coordination. Irregular (and cognitive) methods and practices of warfare transcend traditional military boundaries, and conjoin diplomatic, informational, and economic domains. Effective deterrence, defense and response thus require purposive coordination across US government agencies, national resources (viz.- toward a whole-of-nation approach), and with international allies. Joint task forces and information-sharing mechanisms focused on cognitive threats should be developed to enhance collective resilience.

Conclusion

In an era characterized by rapid technological advancement and global interconnectedness, irregular warfare engages the most fundamental vulnerabilities of human cognition through the use of ever more capable tools and methods, which are becoming increasingly accessible to a range of both state and non-state actors. In this way, cognitive engagement is a decisive domain of conflict.

The US must recognize this and actively develop capabilities to both counter adversaries’ enterprise in this space and leverage the cognitive domain to US advantage. By embracing a comprehensive approach integrating technology, intelligence, doctrine, training, and coordination, the DoW can fortify posture against cognitively driven irregular warfare. In so doing, operational effectiveness will be enhanced to safeguard the cognitive integrity of both its forces and the society they serve. To be sure, the contest for cognitive capability and control is an element of irregular warfare focal to achieving tactical capability and strategic advantage. We opine that the DoW should regard this reality as a prompt for deliberate dedication and unwavering commitment to the enterprise and principles that define and distinguish US military power.

References.

1. Giordano J,DiEuliisD. (2026). Perceptions of threat, correlates of dread, and collective instability: Implications for cognitive engagement and deterrence strategy. Open J Soc Sci 14 (2):188-206.
2. Lee S. (2014). China’s ‘ThreeWarfares’: Origins, applications, and organizations. J Strat Stud, 37(2), 198–221.
3. deGoeij, MWR. (2023). Reflexive control: Influencing strategic behavior.Parameters 53, 4.
4. DeFranco JP,DiEuliisD, Bremseth LR, Snow JJ. Giordano J. (2019). Emerging technologies for disruptive effects in non-kinetic engagements. HDIAC J 6(2): 49-54.
5. DeFranco JP,DiEuliisD, Giordano J. (2019). Redefining neuroweapons: Emerging capabilities in neuroscience and neurotechnology. PRISM 8(3): 48-63.
6. Giordano J,Wurzman R. (2016). Integrative computational and neurocognitive science and technology for intelligence operations: Horizons of potential viability, value and opportunity. STEPS- Sci, Technol, Engineer, Policy Stud, 2(1): 34-38.

Disclaimer

The views and opinions presented in this essay are those of the authors, and do not necessarily represent those of the United States government, Department of War, the National Defense University, or the institutions and organizations that support the authors’ work.