The Office of Inspector General (OIG) has found that U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) apprehended and subsequently released a migrant without providing information requested by the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) that would have confirmed the migrant was a positive match with the Terrorist Screening Data Set, also known as the Terrorist Watchlist.
OIG said this occurred because CBP’s ineffective practices and processes for resolving inconclusive matches with the Terrorist Watchlist led to multiple mistakes. For example, IG’s review found that CBP sent a request to interview the migrant to the wrong email address, obtained information requested by the TSC but never shared it, and released the migrant before fully coordinating with the TSC.
The migrant was apprehended by U.S. Border Patrol on April 17, 2022, along with 14 family members in Yuma, Arizona and released after screening two days later. After Border Patrol apprehended the migrant and conducted record checks, the TSC informed the CBP National Targeting Center (NTC) that the migrant was an inconclusive Terrorist Watchlist match and requested that NTC conduct an interview to obtain additional information. This request however was sent to the wrong email address. NTC asked the Yuma processing center to help determine whether or not the migrant was a Terrorist Watchlist positive match but this communication went unanswered due to a heavy workload caused by an increased flow of migrants at the time. The Yuma processing center then processed the migrant and transferred them for release before the NTC finished coordinating with the TSC.
On April 21, 2022, at the Palm Springs International Airport, California, the migrant and the migrant’s family members checked in for a flight to Tampa, Florida. During pre-flight screening, the TSC obtained additional information from the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and confirmed the migrant was a positive Terrorist Watchlist match.
TSA screens individuals for the Terrorist Watchlist before they board domestic flights. Aircraft operators must provide information for all travelers to TSA for pre-flight screening. TSA checks traveler information against the Terrorist Watchlist and contacts the TSC to obtain its determination of whether a traveler is a positive Terrorist Watchlist match. Travelers who are positive Terrorist Watchlist matches and on the U.S. Government’s No Fly list are prohibited from boarding an aircraft. Travelers who are positive Terrorist Watchlist matches and are not on the No Fly list are generally allowed to fly but are subject to enhanced physical inspection before the flight and may be subject to observation by the Federal Air Marshal Service during the flight.
Once the migrant was identified as a positive match with the Terrorist Watchlist, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) prioritized arresting the migrant. However, OIG found that ICE faced multiple challenges sharing information within its Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO) department while planning and conducting the arrest. Once ICE received the necessary information, it was able to safely apprehend the migrant but this was on May 6, 2022, more than two weeks after the migrant’s release.
Challenges leading to the delayed arrest included a delay in receiving the migrant’s hard copy file. Fugitive Operations wanted to review the migrant’s file before the arrest to enhance officer safety and help plan the operation, but this was only received eight days after requesting it. Officials told OIG that the delay in receiving the file may have been because the ICE ERO Yuma Office receives approximately 1,000 such files once or twice a week from the Yuma processing center and must sort, box, and ship them to ICE ERO offices near migrants’ destinations nationwide. ICE officials said although they rely on this file information to plan arrests, delays in obtaining these hard copies are common. In fiscal year 2022, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) piloted the use of electronic versions of these files to streamline immigration processing at a Texas facility but has not yet expanded the pilot. Fugitive Operations also had challenges accessing the migrant’s GPS data when conducting the arrest, due in part to the early hours of the operation.
To help prevent a repeat of this incident and the release of a potential risk to the United States being released, the Inspector General is making three recommendations, two to CBP and one to ICE. OIG says CBP should develop and implement a process to maintain updated Border Patrol email distribution lists for NTC information requests. In addition, it should identify and share best practices for resolving inconclusive Terrorist Watchlist matches before releasing migrants. The watchdog calls on ICE to develop and implement a process to ensure ICE officers have immediate access to GPS data relevant to their law enforcement operations.
DHS concurred with the recommendations and has taken actions to meet them or plans to do so swiftly. For example, Border Patrol personnel stationed at the NTC will lead a work group to identify best practices for resolving inconclusive vetting and will provide a written report of those best practices to be shared with all Border Patrol sectors. DHS estimates completion by August 31, 2023.
Read the partially redacted report at OIG
