Transnational organized crime actors present a threat to the U.S. through illicit activities such as trafficking of drugs, humans, and firearms, and cybercrime. In 2015, the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) Terrorist Screening Center developed the Transnational Organized Crime (TOC) Actor Detection Program, which maintains a watchlist of TOC actors and organizations. Partner agencies—in carrying out daily responsibilities such as adjudicating visa applications—may screen individuals to determine if they match an identity in the watchlist and take actions, as appropriate.
A review by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) has found that as of June 2022, the TOC watchlist contained about 39,600 identities of individuals known or reasonably suspected to be involved in such crimes. These individuals, called TOC actors, have known or reasonably suspected ties with 56 transnational criminal organizations. The Federal Bureau of Investigation, Customs and Border Protection, and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) nominated about 94 percent of the individuals added to the watchlist from fiscal year 2015 to June 2022. The watchlist does not include U.S. persons, but program officials said they are considering whether to include them in the future.
In December 2021, in response to continually increasing TOC-related threats to public health, public safety, and national security, the President issued an Executive Order stating that addressing TOC requires a coordinated federal framework accompanied by a cohesive whole-of-government effort executed in collaboration with state, local, tribal, territorial, and civil society partners in the U.S., and in close coordination with foreign partners.
GAO found that the TOC watchlist program does outreach to increase participation in using the watchlist or nominating individuals for inclusion in the list. However, the number of screening partners has generally remained the same since the program’s inception. Reported challenges include agencies’ concerns about information security. Developing strategies to seek new partners and mitigate barriers to participation could help increase participation, GAO said, which in turn could enhance the usefulness of the list for the program’s partners in identifying potential TOC.
According to ICE officials, ICE’s Homeland Security Investigations has multiple units—including the National Targeting Center-Investigations, Narcotics and Contraband Smuggling Unit, National Gangs and Violent Crimes Unit, Human Smuggling Unit—that could use the TOC program for screening, but currently do not participate in the program. The officials noted that the lack of an updated Concept of Operations, which has since been updated, factored into decisions to delay their units’ participation in the program.
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) currently uses the TOC watchlist for vetting purposes, but it does not include the watchlist data in its Secure Flight system, which it uses to screen passengers before boarding a flight. Terrorist Screening Center and TSA officials have discussed conducting a joint assessment to compare aviation passenger data against TOC data, but TSA officials stated that current TSA policy does not authorize such collaboration or assessment. TSA officials also noted that screening aviation passengers against the TOC watchlist could result in unacceptably high rates of false positive matches. Specifically, the officials said that false positives may result from the system’s automated daily screening of millions of records and collection of limited identifying information (name, date of birth, and gender) for matching, due to the limited biographic data provided as part of Secure Flight Passenger Data. In addition, current procedures would not include immediate verification of matches and would require manual calls with the airline and passenger for resolution of the match.
The government watchdog notes in its report that the Terrorist Screening Center has issued guidance for the TOC watchlist, including how agencies are to nominate individuals. Partner agencies also have developed guidance for addressing complaints from travelers—such as those seeking entry to the U.S. at a port of entry—who raise TOC watchlist or other concerns. The center’s redress office monitors such travel-related complaints which may relate to the TOC watchlist, but is not positioned to do the same for potential TOC-related complaints unrelated to travel—such as complaints arising from an encounter with state or local law enforcement.
Ultimately, GAO found that the center has not leveraged available encounter data or established goals or metrics to assess how well the TOC watchlist program is working.
GAO is making five recommendations to DOJ, including that the Terrorist Screening Center develop strategies to seek additional partner agencies, request redress data from partners, develop goals and metrics, and leverage data to assess program performance. DOJ concurred with the recommendations.
