By endorsing the integration of foreign fighters into the Syrian army, President Trump aimed to curb the influence of the Iranian-led ‘Axis of Resistance.’ Simultaneously, his decision sets the stage for containing the Salafi-jihadi threat within Syria and across Central Asia and China’s western Xinjiang region.
In mid-August, the General Security Directorate of the Syrian Interim Government arrested Ayyub Hawk (real name Sherzod Abdurakhmon), one of the most prominent Uzbek jihadists in Syria. Hawk, founder of the jihadi contractor group Muhojir Tactical and a prominent military instructor, has long been recognized as an influential figure, with his training propaganda materials in Russian and Uzbek on YouTube amassing over one million views. His detention sparked deep dismay, anger, and frustration among Central Asian jihadi factions operating in Syria.
The Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), a staunch adversary of both Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and al-Qaeda, quickly sought to exploit the discontent among Central Asian jihadists integrated into the newly established Syrian Ministry of Defense. A pro-ISKP Uzbek-language Telegram channel accused Ahmed al-Sharaa, Syria’s interim president, of “betraying Islam just as he had previously betrayed his bayʿah (oath) to al-Dawla (the Islamic State) and of continuing to sacrifice those who had facilitated his rise to power.” The group further alleged that al-Sharaa was acting under the directives of U.S. President Donald Trump—whom ISKP’s Uzbek wing regards as the foremost enemy of Islam—by expelling foreign fighters from Syria and moving to normalize relations with Israel. ISKP propagandists have urged Uzbek jihadist groups Muhojir Tactical and Katibat Tawhid wal-Jihad (KTJ) to align with them and turn their weapons against both the Syrian army and its Western supporters.
Hawk’s arrest underscores how al-Sharaa is navigating the delicate issue of granting citizenship to foreign jihadists, balancing pressure from Syria’s non-Sunni communities for their deportations against growing demands from his foreign jihadi allies for Syrian passports.
Ahead of the May 2025 meeting between President Trump and Ahmed al-Sharaa in Riyadh, the U.S. government outlined seven conditions, chief among them the detention or expulsion of foreign fighters from Syria—a key prerequisite for the potential lifting of U.S. sanctions. However, during an April meeting in New York between Syrian Foreign Minister As’ad al-Shibani and senior U.S. State Department officials, both sides agreed that foreign fighters from the post-Soviet space and China’s Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region would be integrated into the new Syrian army. By June, U.S. envoy Tom Barrack confirmed that Washington would no longer insist on their deportation and would provisionally support their integration into the Syrian armed forces. Following this accord, Damascus promptly began organizing them into a dedicated formation—the 84th Division.
On June 30, 2025, President Trump signed an executive order effectively dismantling the sweeping sanctions regime on Syria, thereby opening the way for international investment, financial services, and unrestricted commercial transactions. Although the U.S. has de-blacklisted HTS, its Central Asian and Caucasian affiliate groups remain under sanctions and are unlikely to be released from stringent U.S. restrictions in the foreseeable future. Hawk’s arrest did not indicate compliance with Trump’s initial demands; al-Sharaa has consistently delayed decisive action, arguing that foreign fighters who contributed to Assad’s defeat merit recognition and respect.
Today, al-Sharaa confronts the dual challenge of integrating foreign jihadists into the Syrian army while recalibrating their transnational Salafi-jihadi ideology. This must be achieved in a way that does not provoke Syria’s diverse religious and ethnic minorities—particularly Alawites, Kurds, Shiites, Christians, and Druze—many of whom remain deeply hostile to the presence of foreign fighters. At the same time, he must contain the insurgent impulses of Uyghur, Uzbek, and Caucasian militant factions, whose formative experiences are rooted in an uncompromising Salafi-jihadi doctrinal framework that seeks to assert its ideological vision over surrounding communities and regards non-Sunni groups as immutable adversaries of Islam.
Foreign militants who violate the rules established by the transitional HTS government—specifically, prohibitions against interfering in Syrian domestic politics, participating in interethnic or sectarian conflicts, and displaying symbols of former jihadi groups—are subject to punitive measures. By selectively disciplining certain foreign jihadists, al-Sharaa aims to prevent them from turning into active opponents of his government. The case of Ayyub Hawk illustrates this approach: he traveled to Suwayda without authorization to support Sunni Arab tribes against the Druze, thereby risking sectarian tensions and undermining the government’s efforts to maintain stability. In early September, the leader of Muhojir Tactical was released from custody. According to Uzbek jihadi media discussions, Syrian prison guards reportedly treating him cordially, particularly given his past role in Assad’s overthrow and his second marriage to a local Arab woman, with whom he has a son, Yahya.
As of today, the Syrian Ministry of Defence has integrated nearly 3,500 Uyghur fighters from the Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP), around 300 Uzbek militants of Katibat Tawhid wal-Jihad (KIB), and the majority of Chechen and Dagestani combatants from Jaysh al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar (JMA) into the ranks of the newly established 84th Division of the Syrian Army. Meanwhile, several mid-level commanders of the Chechen faction Ajnad al-Kavkaz (AK), excluded from this integration process, voiced their discontent and refused to dissolve their group. Tensions with the Ministry of Defence escalated when a splinter faction issued a statement in June accusing the interim government under al-Sharaa of repression, betrayal of the principles of holy jihad, and arbitrary arrests of foreign fighters who had long fought against the Assad regime. Despite these frictions, Syrian authorities ultimately managed to defuse the crisis, securing the partial integration of Chechen militants into the state’s security apparatus.
The integration of Central Asian, Caucasian, and Xinjiang Uyghur militant groups into the Syrian Ministry of Defence provides several advantages for regional and global stability.
First, the decision to absorb formerly independent jihadi factions significantly reduces the transnational terrorist threat. Abandoned by HTS and left vulnerable, these foreign fighters might otherwise have been drawn into ISKP or al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. Their return to their Central Asian countries of origin remains highly unlikely, given the near certainty of arrest and prosecution upon repatriation.
Second, the establishment of government oversight, a unified command structure, and rigorous screening mechanisms ensures that foreign fighters operate within a disciplined framework, where breaches of internal regulations are met with firm accountability—as exemplified by the case of Ayub Hawk. Moreover, government-provided financial support serves as a strong incentive to disengage from former jihadi organizations, with fighters currently receiving around $200 per month—a substantial sum given the widespread poverty and unemployment in post-war Syria.
Third, alongside the formal dissolution of foreign jihadi organizations, the Syrian government barred their imams, ideologues, and propagandists from promoting Salafi groups, spreading internal conflicts, or recruiting online. Since integration, Uzbek, Uyghur, and Chechen groups have sharply reduced their online activity. TIP, KTJ, AK, and JMA have not updated official media platforms or Telegram channels for the past two months. Only a handful of independent bloggers—such as Faruh Shami, Abdullah Zufor, Abu Zubair Dagestani, Arslan Bulgarsky, Abu Huzaifa Qazvini, and Abdulaziz Ahmad—continue to cover their activities, but they now function largely as vocal defenders of al-Sharaa’s government.
Finally, al-Sharaa’s government is gradually distancing itself from traditional Jihadi-Salafism—the doctrine that attracted Central Asian, Caucasian, and Xinjiang Uyghur fighters under HTS—and moving toward Madkhali Salafism. Unlike al-Qaeda or ISIS, Madkhali Salafism emphasizes strict adherence to Islamic law and obedience to authority, categorically rejecting political activism, protest, and rebellion, arguing that fitna (chaos) is more dangerous than enduring an unjust ruler.
Whether al-Sharaa and his theologians can instill this softer Madkhali doctrine in post-Soviet hardline Islamists—steeped in takfiri ideology of Jihadi-Salafism and committed to toppling Taghut (apostate) rulers of Central Asia through armed jihad —will depend on their integration into Syria’s defense structures and the resilience of the HTS political regime itself.
If the Syrian government successfully integrates Central Asian, Caucasian, and Xinjiang Uyghur jihadi factions into the local population while curbing their global Salafi-jihadi ideology through Madkhali Salafism, the impact on regional security would be significant. This approach would weaken transnational jihadi networks and bolster the stability of Central Asian states and China by reducing the risk of fighters returning to militancy. Strategically, it represents a model of controlled ideological reorientation, transforming former extremists into actors aligned with state authority and contributing to broader regional counterterrorism and political stability.
Al-Sharaa, a hardline yet pragmatic Islamic leader with a gift for political survival, has repeatedly reshaped his religious convictions and jihadi ambitions. He outmaneuvered ISIS’s Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and al-Qaeda’s Ayman al-Zawahiri, leveraged the combat power of Central Asian, Caucasian, and Xinjiang Uyghur jihadists against Assad, and—despite his terrorist record—managed to secure a handshake with President Trump and the lifting of Western sanctions. Today, he has emerged as an unlikely symbol of hope for many foreign fighters.
Al-Sharaa has long relied on a calculated carrot-and-stick strategy to keep foreign fighters in line, rewarding loyalty while coming down hard on those who drift toward al-Qaeda or ISIS. In 2020, former KTJ leader Abu Saloh learned this the hard way after defecting to pro–al-Qaeda Jabhat Ansar al-Din with 50 Uzbek fighters. Al-Sharaa had him arrested, then released on the condition that he abandon any plans to form a new Uzbek jihadi jamaat. Though permitted to stay in Idlib with his second Arab family, his ability to rebuild a militant base was effectively dismantled. More recently, Al-Sharaa used the same approach against Muhojir Tactical’s leader, Ayub Hawk, whose defiance—marked by independent attacks on the Druze in Suwayda—was treated as a direct challenge to Syria’s internal order.
Although foreign jihadi groups have been gradually integrated into the Syrian Ministry of Defense, Ahmad al-Sharaa has deliberately stalled the granting of Syrian citizenship, reneging on a pledge he made in January 2025. The delay has fueled frustration among foreign fighters, some of whom staged a rally on August 15 demanding passports without further postponement. Al-Sharaa, however, has adopted a cautious and pragmatic line, warning that naturalizing foreign militants could provoke backlash from Syria’s national and religious minorities. He is also wary that, once armed with citizenship, some fighters may rekindle global jihadi ambitions and resume terrorist activity abroad—risks that could seriously damage the Syrian government’s image. For now, despite their integration into the Syrian army, the prospect of citizenship appears increasingly remote.
By endorsing TIP’s integration into the Syrian army, President Trump has made a calculated gamble: containing the Salafi-jihadi threat and confronting the Iranian-led Axis of Resistance. While Turkey, several Arab states, and Central Asian governments view the move as strategically advantageous, it has unsettled Israel, Iran, and Russia. At stake is more than the fate of thousands of foreign fighters; it is the stability of Syria itself and the political survival of President al-Sharaa.