Terrorist activity across Asia, Africa, and the Middle East in 2025 underscored the persistence and geographic expansion of jihadist violence beyond Western countries. Despite sustained counterterrorism pressure, groups affiliated with ISIS and al-Qaeda continued to exploit protracted conflicts, weak governance, and security vacuums to conduct attacks against civilians, religious minorities, and security forces. As the international system moves into 2026, nearly a quarter-century after the September 11 attacks, these regions remain central to the global terrorism landscape, serving both as primary theaters of violence and as sources of transnational inspiration and operational spillover. This article examines key terrorist incidents and regional trends in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East during 2025 and assesses their implications for the evolving threat environment in 2026.
Asia: Insurgency, Ideological Violence, and Regional Spillover
In 2025, Asia experienced a series of deadly terrorist attacks reflecting a mixture of ideological extremism, insurgency, and separatist violence across multiple countries. In Pakistan, the country continued to face unintended consequences from its support for the Taliban, who took over the country in 2021. The Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) group in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Baloch separatist groups in Balochistan, and ISIS-Khorasan opportunistically expanded their operational capacity, benefiting from the breeding ground of spread Salafism and weak counterterrorism policies. The 2025 attacks in Pakistan were marked by high-casualty incidents targeting both civilians and security forces. On February 28, a suicide bombing struck Darul Uloom Haqqania in Nowshera, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, killing eight people, including the prominent cleric Hamid Ul Haq Haqqani, with ISIS-K suspected as the perpetrator. On March 11, Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) militants carried out a coordinated attack in Sibi District, derailing the Jaffar Express train, opening fire on passengers and security personnel, and taking hostages, resulting in 33 attackers killed and dozens of casualties among civilians and security forces. Subsequent attacks included the Mastung bus bombing on April 15, targeting Pakistani security personnel with an improvised explosive device, clashes in North Waziristan between the Pakistani Armed Forces and TTP militants from April 25–28, and a May 19 drone strike in Hurmuz village that killed four children. Throughout the year, additional major incidents included a suicide vehicle-ramming attack on an Army Public School bus on May 21, a car bombing and mass murder in Khadi, Mir Ali, on June 28, an IED bombing under a government vehicle in Bajaur District on July 2, and a suicide car bombing followed by gunfire outside the Frontier Corps headquarters in Quetta on September 30. Attacks continued into November with coordinated vehicle and suicide bombings, shootouts, and grenade attacks in Wana, Islamabad, and Peshawar, often attributed to TTP, ISIS-K, and Jamaat-ul-Ahrar.
Terrorist incidents spanned India, Iran, and Indonesia, reflecting both ideological and insurgent motives. In India, Maoist insurgents carried out multiple deadly clashes and bombings in Chhattisgarh, including a January 6 roadside bombing targeting a District Reserve Guard vehicle in Bijapur district that killed all nine security personnel inside, and a February 9 clash at Indravati National Park that left two security forces and 31 Maoists dead. Later in the year, militants associated with The Resistance Front conducted a mass shooting in Pahalgam, Jammu and Kashmir, on April 22, killing 26 people. In Iran, a mass shooting and stabbing at the Supreme Court in Tehran on January 18 left two judges dead and several injured. In Indonesia, a grenade attack in a Jakarta mosque on November 7 injured 97 worshippers. Additionally, a November 10 car bombing near the Red Fort in New Delhi killed 15 people and injured over 20. These incidents highlight the persistence of both domestic and transnational extremist activity across Asia, with frequent use of improvised explosive devices, coordinated shootings, and vehicle-bombing attacks to maximize casualties in public and symbolic spaces.
Afghanistan continues to occupy a central position in the landscape of Salafi-jihadist terrorism. Despite early assurances by the Taliban regarding counterterrorism cooperation, the country has demonstrated limited capacity and inconsistent commitment to effectively suppress al-Qaeda and ISIS–affiliated groups operating within its territory. The ISIS-K remains active in Afghanistan and has reportedly maintained training infrastructure used to support jihadist operations beyond the country’s borders. Notably, investigations following an armed confrontation between ISIS militants and Turkish police on December 29, which resulted in the deaths of three police officers and six militants, indicated that the perpetrators had received training in camps located in Afghanistan. In addition, al-Qaeda–affiliated militants are assessed to continue benefiting from training and safe haven arrangements within Afghan territory, underscoring the enduring role of Afghanistan as a permissive environment for transnational jihadist activity.
Middle East: Persistent Jihadist Networks and Security Vacuums
In 2025, the Middle East experienced a persistent wave of terrorist attacks driven by both ideological militancy and ongoing regional conflicts, targeting civilians, security forces, and symbolic locations across multiple countries. In Israel and the Palestinian territories, violence reflected both organized militant operations and lone-actor assaults. On January 6, in Al-Funduq in the West Bank, gunmen opened fire on a car and a bus on Highway 55, killing three Israelis, including a police officer, and injuring eight others; Hamas’s Al-Qassam Brigades claimed responsibility. On February 4, Muhammad Daraghma ambushed a military base in Tayasir, Tubas Governorate, killing two soldiers and injuring eight before being killed in a shootout, with the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) responsible. Later in February, attacks in Israel included the detonation of bombs in parked buses in Bat Yam on February 20, a vehicle-ramming and attempted stabbing at Karkur Junction on February 27, and a combined vehicle-ramming, stabbing, and shooting attack in Yokneam Illit on March 24. Violence continued in the West Bank throughout the year, with shootings and stabbings at Gush Etzion Junction on July 10 and November 18, and vehicle-ramming and mass stabbing attacks in Harod Valley, Israel, on December 26. In addition, Palestinian civilians were victims of Israeli settler violence, including the shooting of activist Awdah Hathaleen in Umm al-Khair on July 28. These incidents demonstrate the ongoing cycle of violence, the involvement of both organized groups—such as Hamas and PIJ—and individual actors, and the frequent targeting of civilians, security forces, and public spaces.
Terrorist activity in Syria, Iraq, and neighboring states remained pronounced throughout the period, largely driven by the continued operations of ISIS networks. The government led by Ahmad al-Shara in Syria, which completed its first year in power following its takeover on December 8, 2024, has thus far demonstrated limited success in addressing the country’s deep-seated political, social, and economic challenges. While al-Shara’s opposition to ISIS appears credible—stemming in part from ideological rivalry and his origins within al-Qaeda–aligned circles—his government’s stance toward al-Qaeda itself remains ambiguous. As in Afghanistan, al-Qaeda-affiliated individuals may continue to benefit from permissive conditions or informal protection networks within Syrian territory. Moreover, despite the government’s declared hostility toward ISIS, limited institutional capacity, resource constraints, and persistent security vacuums have created opportunities for ISIS to sustain operational activity in both Syria and Iraq.
These dynamics were reflected in a series of attacks across the region in 2025. On April 1, a Syrian national carried out a stabbing attack against Assyrian civilians during the Khab-Nisan festival in Duhok, within the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. In Syria, ISIS conducted bombings in the Tulul al-Safa region of Suwayda Governorate on May 22 and May 28, targeting both Syrian government forces and fighters affiliated with the U.S.-backed Syrian Free Army. On June 22, a suicide bombing followed by a mass shooting at the Mar Elias Church in Damascus killed at least 31 people, including children, and injured 54 others; responsibility for the attack was claimed by ISIS and the jihadist group Saraya Ansar al-Sunnah. Jihadist-linked violence later extended beyond Syria and Iraq, including a mass shooting at a police station in İzmir, Turkiye, on September 8, which killed three police officers and injured several others, and a shooting at the Allenby Bridge border crossing in Jordan on September 18, where two Israeli soldiers were fatally shot. Toward the end of the year, on December 14, an alleged ISIS attack near Palmyra killed two U.S. soldiers and a civilian U.S. interpreter during a counterterrorism engagement, underscoring both the persistence of jihadist violence and the fragility of Syria’s post-Assad security environment. On December 26, a bomb detonated during Friday prayers at a mosque in Homs, killing eight people and injuring 18, an attack also attributed to Saraya Ansar al-Sunnah.
Africa: Expanding Jihadist Fronts and State Fragility
In 2025, terrorist violence in Africa was dominated by Salafi-jihadist groups, including Boko Haram, Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), and multiple ISIS affiliates such as ISIS-DRC, ISIS-Greater Sahara (ISIS-GS), and Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), with attacks concentrated in the Sahel, the Horn of Africa, and Central Africa. These groups employed mass shootings, suicide bombings, kidnappings, and coordinated assaults on military installations, religious sites, and civilian populations, underscoring the persistent instability across large parts of the continent.
In the Sahel and West Africa, jihadist organizations conducted large-scale and highly coordinated attacks against state forces and civilians. On January 8, Boko Haram fighters attacked the vicinity of the presidential palace in N’Djamena, Chad, killing two security personnel before being repelled. The same day, JNIM militants carried out a deadly assault in Benin’s Alibori Department near the tri-border area with Niger and Burkina Faso, killing at least 28 soldiers. ISIS-GS expanded its operational footprint through kidnappings in Niger and Mali, including the abduction of international aid workers in Agadez, and carried out mass-casualty attacks such as the February 7 ambush of a convoy in Gao Region, Mali, and the March 21 assault in Fambita, Niger. Violence escalated further with a March 28 JNIM attack in Diapaga, Burkina Faso, killing at least 60 soldiers, and a June 19 ISWAP-claimed assault on a Niger Armed Forces base in Banibangou that left 71 soldiers dead. These incidents highlight the ability of Sahel-based jihadist groups to mount complex, high-fatality operations across porous borders.
In the Horn of Africa, Al-Shabaab remained the most active and capable terrorist organization, conducting sustained attacks against Somali government institutions, security forces, and civilians. On March 11, militants stormed the Cairo Hotel in Beledweyne, Somalia, killing clan elders and security personnel, followed on March 18 by a roadside bombing near the convoy of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud in Mogadishu. Additional major attacks included a suicide bombing outside the Damaanyo military base on May 18, an assault at the Jaalle Siyaad military academy on July 9, and a coordinated siege of a high-security prison in Mogadishu on October 4. Outside Somalia, Al-Shabaab fighters also attacked a police reservists’ camp in Garissa, Kenya, on March 23, killing multiple officers. Collectively, these attacks demonstrated the group’s continued capacity for complex operations and its intent to undermine state authority across the region.
In Central Africa and the Lake Chad Basin, ISIS affiliates and Boko Haram continued to target civilians, religious communities, and local security forces. On February 12, ISIS-DRC militants carried out a mass killing in Lubero Territory, North Kivu, Democratic Republic of the Congo, followed by another major attack on July 27 in Ituri Province, where militants assaulted a Catholic church and abducted children. Boko Haram maintained operational pressure in Chad and northeastern Nigeria, while in Nigeria’s Niger State, gunmen abducted more than 300 students from a Catholic school on November 21, highlighting the enduring threat of mass kidnappings even when perpetrator attribution remains uncertain. Together, these incidents underscore the resilience and adaptability of jihadist networks across Africa, characterized by territorial ambition, mass-casualty violence, and persistent targeting of vulnerable populations.
Looking Ahead in 2026 and Policy Implications
Based on terrorist activity observed across Asia, Africa, and the Middle East in 2025, the threat landscape heading into 2026 is likely to remain both resilient and geographically diffuse, driven primarily by jihadist organizations exploiting weak governance, unresolved conflicts, and security vacuums. Groups affiliated with the Islamic State and al-Qaeda—along with their regional branches such as ISIS-K, ISIS–Sahel, ISIS–DRC, JNIM, ISWAP, and al-Shabaab—are expected to continue prioritizing localized insurgency and terrorism rather than externally directed mass-casualty operations, while still enabling transnational inspiration, training, and spillover effects.
In Asia, the persistence of insurgent violence in South Asia and the Levant-adjacent regions suggests that 2026 will likely see continued attacks targeting security forces, religious minorities, and civilians, particularly in contested or militarized areas such as Kashmir, Pakistan’s border regions, and parts of the Middle East–South Asia nexus. Afghanistan is expected to remain a critical permissive environment, with ISIS-K and al-Qaeda–linked elements continuing to benefit from limited counterterrorism capacity and ambiguous enforcement, potentially enabling training, recruitment, and ideological diffusion beyond national borders.
In Africa, jihadist violence is likely to intensify further in 2026, particularly in the Sahel, the Lake Chad Basin, Somalia, and eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. The trend observed in 2025—marked by mass-casualty attacks, assaults on military installations, kidnappings, and attacks on religious sites—is expected to persist as groups such as JNIM, ISWAP, ISIS–Sahel, ISIS–DRC, and al-Shabaab capitalize on state fragility, overstretched security forces, and declining international military engagement. Civilian populations, religious communities, and local security forces are likely to remain primary targets, with attacks increasingly designed to assert territorial control, undermine state legitimacy, and generate fear rather than achieve strategic military breakthroughs.
In the Middle East, jihadist organizations are expected to sustain a low-to-moderate operational tempo in 2026, particularly in Syria and Iraq, where ISIS continues to exploit political uncertainty, resource constraints, and fragmented security architectures. While large-scale territorial resurgence remains unlikely, continued bombings, assassinations, and attacks on religious institutions, security forces, and foreign personnel are probable.
In conclusion, terrorist activity across Asia, Africa, and the Middle East in 2025 emphasizes both the persistence and flexibility of jihadist networks, which continue to exploit weak governance, ongoing conflicts, and security gaps. Similarities among attackers, including ISIS and al-Qaeda-affiliated groups, include the ability to carry out complex, coordinated operations, dependence on low- to medium-tech methods, and the use of local and transnational training networks to sustain efforts and inspire affiliates abroad. Looking ahead to 2026, counterterrorism strategies should focus on strengthening local security capacities, enhancing intelligence coordination, and tackling underlying political and socioeconomic vulnerabilities that support extremist activity. Combining military pressure, governance support, and community engagement through integrated strategies will be crucial to reducing immediate threats and building long-term resilience against these groups.
