Frontline Watch provides a weekly update on emerging terrorist activities and global threat trends, with Counterterrorism Managing Editor Dr. Mahmut Cengiz examining the developments shaping the security landscape both domestically and internationally.
This week’s edition examines the expanding effects of ongoing bilateral strikes between the United States, Israel, and Iran, including Iranian retaliatory attacks targeting U.S. military bases across the Middle East. It also explores the likely consequences of Ali Khamenei’s killing and provides a review of notable terrorist attacks recorded between February 20 and February 27.
Hotspots & Emerging Threats
Iran’s Proxy Strategy, Ideological Framework, and the Expanding Impact of Ongoing Conflict
Since the 1979 Shah Revolution that ousted Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, the Islamic Republic of Iran has maintained hostile relations with the Western world, especially the United States and Israel. Based on the doctrine of Velayat-e Faqih (Guardianship of the Jurist), which grants ultimate authority to the Supreme Leader, Iran developed a strategic model focused on forward defense and extended deterrence. In this framework, Tehran aims to project power beyond its borders by supporting and directing non-state armed groups aligned with Iranian national interests.
Iran’s leadership often frames its foreign policy within a religious narrative, but its strategy combines ideological mobilization with state-centered power projection. By mobilizing sectarian solidarity, especially among Shia populations in geopolitically sensitive states, Iran has expanded its influence across the Middle East. To gain strategic depth, Tehran has supported, funded, trained, and equipped armed groups that act as proxies. These relationships allow Iran to pressure opponents while maintaining plausible deniability. Over time, Iran has demonstrated a willingness to enable or facilitate violent tactics through its proxies as part of a broader asymmetric warfare strategy. Consequently, the US Department of State has designated Iran as a state sponsor of terrorism since 1984.
The scale of this investment became especially clear after the October 7, 2023 attacks carried out by Hamas against Israel. Iran was widely accused of playing a role in enabling or supporting the operational environment that allowed the attack to happen, though Tehran denied direct involvement. According to GTTAC data, Iran-backed groups made up about six percent of global terrorist attacks between 2021 and 2023; however, in 2024, that number increased to over 30 percent, with 2,266 attacks attributed to Iran-backed organizations. This sharp rise highlights how long-term strategic investments in proxy networks can lead to rapid escalation during regional crises.
Iran’s primary surrogates include Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq, Kataib Hezbollah, the so-called Islamic Resistance in Iraq and Syria, and the Houthis in Yemen. These groups have conducted attacks against U.S. military installations and Israeli targets, particularly following October 7. Through missile launches, drone strikes, maritime disruptions, and rocket attacks, these actors form a multilayered deterrence ring around Israel and U.S. assets in the region. This “axis of resistance” structure provides Iran with both retaliatory capability and escalation leverage without immediate direct confrontation.
Iran’s activities extend beyond the Middle East. The country maintains influence networks and operational footprints in Turkiye, Afghanistan, and parts of Europe and Latin America, where intelligence, financial facilitation, and ideological outreach mechanisms have been documented. These global linkages demonstrate that Iran’s strategy is not confined to regional rivalries but reflects a broader ambition to shape geopolitical outcomes and contest Western influence in multiple theaters.
Strategic Consequences of Khamenei’s Killing
The ongoing direct confrontation between the United States, Israel, and Iran has escalated dramatically following a series of coordinated strikes targeting senior Iranian leadership and strategic military infrastructure. In a watershed development, Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, was killed in an Israeli airstrike on his Tehran compound. According to the Iranian state news agency IRNA, President Masoud Pezeshkian, judiciary chief Gholamhossein Mohseni Ejehi, and a jurist from the Guardian Council have assumed authority during what has been described as a “transitional phase.” Israeli sources indicated that the initial strike targeted a high-level meeting of senior Iranian officials after intelligence confirmed Khamenei’s presence, and the Israel Defense Forces stated that 40 senior Iranian leaders were killed within a minute across two separate locations—signaling an unprecedented decapitation-style operation.
U.S. and Israeli strikes have reportedly aimed to degrade Iran’s missile infrastructure and nuclear program, seeking to limit Tehran’s long-range strike capabilities and prevent further advancement of its strategic weapons capacity. From Washington and Tel Aviv’s perspective, these operations are intended to restore deterrence, reduce the immediate threat to Israel, and reshape the regional balance of power toward a more stable security environment. President Trump publicly urged Iranians to rise up against their government, calling for Iran’s Revolutionary Guard and police to merge “with the Iranian Patriots,” and signaled that “heavy and pinpoint bombing” would continue as long as necessary. A senior U.S. administration official stated that intelligence indicators suggesting imminent Iranian strikes on American targets overseas influenced the decision to proceed with military action. The operation reportedly followed weeks of lobbying efforts by Israel and Saudi Arabia.
Iran’s response has underscored the inherent risks of escalation. Tehran launched retaliatory missile and drone strikes targeting U.S. military installations across Iraq, Syria, and Gulf states, consistent with its long-standing forward defense doctrine. Eight Arab countries—the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Jordan, Oman, and Qatar—reported missile activity linked to the escalation. In Israel, emergency services confirmed one fatality in central Tel Aviv and more than 100 injuries resulting from retaliatory strikes. The exchange marks one of the most significant interstate confrontations in the region in decades.
The killing of Khamenei introduces a profound strategic variable whose consequences remain highly contested. In counterterrorism practice, eliminating the leader of jihadist organizations or cartels is often believed to produce disruptive and even devastating effects. Yet empirical evidence is mixed. In cartel contexts, leadership targeting frequently produces fragmentation and the emergence of new splinter groups rather than organizational collapse. In jihadist movements, numerous ISIS and al-Qaeda leaders have been killed over the past two decades, yet these organizations remain active across Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. The question is even more complex when the individual targeted is not merely an operational commander but the embodiment of a theocratic state ideology rooted in velayat-e faqih. Khamenei was not only a political authority but the supreme religious jurist within a system that fuses theology, governance, and revolutionary identity.
Two broad scenarios could unfold. The first aligns with the expectations of some U.S. policymakers: Khamenei’s death might energize opposition movements inside Iran, weaken elite cohesion, and lead to internal political change, as well as degrade the country’s missile and nuclear capabilities. However, an equally likely—and perhaps more probable—outcome is the opposite. The Iranian regime, which has shaped public perception since 1979 and retains a substantial loyal base, may use Khamenei’s death to consolidate its hold on power. Public mourning, nationalist mobilization, and heightened security measures could strengthen hardline factions and suppress already strained protest movements. Unlike the removal or arrest of authoritarian leaders in other countries, such as Venezuela, Iran’s political system is not purely personality-driven; it is built upon entrenched ideology, clerical networks, and powerful security institutions. As long as that system remains intact, the strategic objectives anticipated by Washington and Tel Aviv may not materialize.
Unintended consequences could greatly alter the broader security landscape in ways that differ from U.S. and Israeli expectations. First, Iran already has significant influence and operational reach in Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen through well-established proxy networks and aligned militias. These groups have independent strike capabilities and local legitimacy, allowing Tehran to carry out precise revenge operations or delayed retaliatory strikes at unpredictable times. Instead of responding immediately and predictably, Iran may exploit these regions to asymmetrically target Israeli assets, U.S. personnel, maritime routes, or regional infrastructure through indirect means, making deterrence more difficult and extending instability.
Second, instead of weakening the regime domestically, external military pressure—especially the assassination of the Supreme Leader—could boost public loyalty among certain parts of the population. Since 1979, the Islamic Republic has maintained power by shaping political narratives, embedding revolutionary ideology within institutions, and building a strong support base. A leadership decapitation by foreign enemies might foster nationalist unity rather than cause division. A regime that has faced periodic protests could regain strategic momentum, marginalize opposition movements, and justify broader repression under the pretenses of national defense. In this case, dissent may not disappear, but it could become more dangerous and less visible.
Third, regional sectarian dynamics might shift unexpectedly. Although Iran has faced criticism from Sunni communities due to its sectarian and expansionist policies, direct attacks by the United States and Israel could trigger renewed sympathy for Tehran among some groups. Several Arab governments that support or quietly align with U.S. and Israeli efforts are influenced by Wahhabi or state-aligned Sunni doctrines that do not necessarily represent the views of the wider Sunni population. This difference could create space for anti-Western narratives to overshadow sectarian grievances, temporarily portraying Iran not as a sectarian rival but as a target of Western military action. These perception shifts could alter regional public opinion and complicate alliance structures.
Fourth, Iran has decades of experience in supporting, funding, and managing militant groups outside its borders. The case of Saif al-Adel—widely believed to have taken over from Ayman al-Zawahiri—spending a long period under Iranian protection highlights Tehran’s pragmatic approach to Sunni extremist figures when strategic interests are involved. Iran has also offered various forms of support or facilitation to groups like the Taliban, Hamas, and sometimes indirectly to networks linked to ISIS and Al Qaeda. This extensive history of engagement with militant networks suggests Iran might expand its asymmetric retaliation beyond the Middle East. Western nations, including the United States, could face covert or deniable operations through proxies or affiliated networks, making the threat environment more unpredictable.
Regionally, the escalation risks widening conflict across Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and the Gulf. Energy markets, maritime transit routes, and civilian infrastructure remain vulnerable to disruption. Globally, sustained hostilities could intensify great-power competition and embolden non-state militant actors who exploit instability. Rather than producing a swift strategic resolution, the convergence of leadership decapitation, retaliatory strikes, and ideological entrenchment suggests movement toward a more volatile international environment—one in which states and societies alike may feel increasingly insecure amid deepening uncertainty.
Counterterrorism Snapshot: U.S. Operations and Policy Signals
U.S. and Israeli forces conducted coordinated strikes targeting military facilities in Iran, reportedly focusing on missile infrastructure and elements associated with Iran’s nuclear program. In response, Iran launched retaliatory missile and drone attacks targeting U.S. military installations across the Middle East. According to the United States Central Command, as of March 1, 2026, over 1,000 targets inside Iran were hit during two days of operations, including ships, submarines, missile sites, communication links, and command-and-control centers linked to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The command confirmed that three U.S. service members were killed in action and five were seriously wounded—the first reported American casualties in the joint U.S.–Israeli campaign, which also resulted in the death of Ali Khamenei. Israel announced a new wave of strikes in “the heart of Tehran,” while Iran launched retaliatory attacks against Israel and across the Persian Gulf. An Iranian strike killed at least nine people near Jerusalem. Iranian state media, citing the Red Crescent Society, reported 201 dead and 747 injured within Iran. Although President Donald Trump stated that he has “agreed to talk” to Iran’s new leadership, the White House downplayed the chances of an immediate diplomatic breakthrough, signaling continued uncertainty about prospects for de-escalation.
Notable Terrorist Attacks
On February 22, 2026, at least one person, later identified as a policewoman, was killed and dozens were injured in coordinated explosions that struck the western Ukrainian city of Lviv after officers responded to a reported shop break-in around 12:30 a.m. Ukrainian authorities labeled the incident a terrorist attack, with Mayor Andrii Sadovyi confirming multiple hospitalizations, while officials in Kyiv condemned the attack and blamed Russia.
