The two most recent attacks—one at a Christmas market in Magdeburg, Germany, on December 20, 2024, when an SUV was driven into a crowd, killing six and injuring at least 299, and another in New Orleans on January 1, 2025, when a pickup truck was driven into a crowd on Bourbon Street, resulting in at least 10 deaths and dozens of injuries—have raised significant concerns about self-radicalization and lone-actor terrorism. The New Orleans attack, in particular, underscores the ongoing influence of ISIS as an inspirational force in global terrorism and raises questions about the potential for lone-actor terrorism to become a growing trend. It has also spurred discussions about the shifting political climate in the United States, with some speculating that the attack may have been intended as a message to the new Trump administration. This article draws on data from the Global Terrorism Trends and Analysis Center (GTTAC) to examine the evolving patterns of lone-actor terrorism, why ISIS remains a dominant inspiring terrorist group, and why the assailants prefer to present themselves as being inspired by ISIS.
Lone-actor terrorism is widely regarded as one of the most insidious forms of terrorism due to the difficulty in tracking and preventing assailants who often operate independently. In the United States, there are over 11,000 recorded hate crimes and more than 500 mass shootings annually. By comparison, incidents of lone-actor terrorism are relatively infrequent, typically numbering fewer than a dozen per year.
Mass shootings are generally defined as events in which at least four individuals are killed in a shooting spree, with no cooling-off period between attacks, and where the motive remains indiscernible. In contrast, lone-actor terrorism incidents, though less frequent, differ fundamentally from mass shootings in that their motives are often ideological, political, or religious, and typically involve a clear agenda or targeted animus toward a specific group or individual. Unlike hate crimes, which explicitly target individuals based on characteristics such as ethnicity, gender, religion, or race, lone-actor terrorism is driven by broader ideological goals. These assailants, though unaffiliated with formal organizations, are often influenced by a broader terrorist ideology and carry out their attacks on their own terms and timelines. The GTTAC classifies incidents as lone-actor terrorism when the assailants’ motives are identifiable, align with a terrorist agenda, and are intended to convey a broader ideological or political message to a wider audience. Importantly, many of these attacks are committed by individuals who are inspired by, but not directly directed by, terrorist organizations or movements.
From January 2021 to November 2024, GTTAC recorded 538 lone-actor attacks, resulting in 293 fatalities. The number of incidents steadily increased over this period, rising from 90 attacks in 2021 to 100 in 2022, 119 in 2023, and 229 in 2024, as depicted in Figure 1. The majority of these attacks took place in Israel and the West Bank, where self-radicalized Palestinians predominantly targeted Israeli law enforcement, military personnel, and civilians, with stabbing incidents being the most common method. Furthermore, a significant proportion of these attacks involved failed car-ramming attempts.

In the same period, the GTTAC recorded lone-actor attacks across 65 countries, with the majority concentrated in Western nations. Notably, the United States experienced 71 such attacks, while Germany had 19, the United Kingdom 10, Russia 9, Australia 7, and Belgium and the Netherlands each recorded three attacks. These incidents reflect a growing trend of lone-actor terrorism in developed countries, which often face challenges in detecting and mitigating such attacks due to the assailants’ independent nature and decentralized operational tactics.
The tactics employed by assailants in these attacks predominantly involved stabbing and shooting, with these methods being the most commonly used forms of violence. As illustrated in the weapon types category below, stabbing was frequently used in close-range attacks, while shooting incidents tended to have higher casualties. Additionally, a significant number of attacks involved using melee weapons, including blunt and bladed objects, in 289 incidents. Firearms were used in 158 attacks, indicating the continued prevalence of gun violence in lone-actor terrorism. Explosives also played a role, with 30 attacks involving conventional explosives and 47 incidents utilizing homemade explosives, classified as improvised explosive devices (IEDs).

The targets of these attacks varied but often included individuals associated with state authority. Government officials were targeted in 81 incidents, while military personnel were the focus of 58 attacks. Political figures were the victims of 4 incidents, and civilians represented the most common targets, being attacked in 144 cases. This diversity of targets highlights the broad spectrum of individuals and institutions that lone actors aim to strike, often with political, ideological, or religious motives.
Terrorism is driven by a variety of ideologies, including anarchism, left-wing, ethnonationalist, separatist, right-wing, and religious motivations, among others. In the context of lone-actor terrorism, far-right extremism and Salafi-jihadism are especially prominent worldwide, alongside nationalist motives seen in Israel. Right-wing extremist groups, often leaderless and decentralized, consist of individuals who, while inspired by these ideologies, operate independently. According to the GTTAC data, right-wing lone-actor attacks in the United States are commonly associated with anti-government militias, neo-Nazi groups, and white supremacist ideologies, while in Europe, they are frequently characterized by Islamophobia, xenophobia, and anti-immigrant sentiments. In the United States, notable examples of right-wing extremist violence include the 2018 anti-Semitic attack by Robert Bowers at a synagogue in Pittsburgh, which resulted in 11 fatalities and six injuries, as well as the 2019 El Paso Walmart shooting, where the assailant targeted Mexican immigrants, killing 23 people. Recent analyses suggest that right-wing extremism is likely to remain a significant threat in the U.S., particularly under the new administration, which may exacerbate concerns about domestic terrorism.
Social media platforms have faced widespread criticism for their role in radicalizing individuals, particularly during periods of heightened social isolation and uncertainty. This trend was most pronounced during the COVID-19 quarantines, when individuals spent significant amounts of time online due to lockdowns and restricted social interactions. During this period, right-wing extremist groups, among others, effectively exploited social media platforms to amplify their ideological messages and recruit new followers. The algorithms of many platforms, designed to prioritize sensational or emotionally charged content, inadvertently facilitated the spread of extremist ideologies by creating echo chambers where users were exposed to increasingly radical views. This allowed extremist groups to gain traction, spreading misinformation and fostering radicalization on a scale previously unseen.
Another significant source of inspiration for lone actors is Salafi-jihadism. Abu Musab al-Suri, often described as a “strategic thinker” and a “best-model creator,” popularized the concept of leaderless resistance in jihadi Salafist circles through his influential work A Call to Global Islamic Resistance, published in 2004. He argued that Al-Qaeda’s traditional hierarchical structure could not succeed because Western military forces and intelligence agencies were too powerful for a small group to overcome. Instead, al-Suri advocated for a decentralized approach to jihad, urging individuals to take action independently. His ideas were widely praised by figures like Ayman al-Zawahiri, who described them as a “rich river” for “holy warriors,” highlighting the potential of individual action within the broader jihadist movement.
Since the 2010s, European countries have witnessed a marked increase in lone-actor attacks carried out by self-radicalized individuals. France, in particular, has emerged as one of the leading nations in terms of reporting jihadist attacks. According to data from the GTTAC, France recorded the highest number of such incidents, with a total of 28 attacks between 2021 and November 2024. A significant number of these assailants have been characterized as “hybrids,” exhibiting traits of both criminality and terrorism. These individuals are often former criminals who undergo radicalization during periods of incarceration. Additionally, there have been growing concerns regarding discriminatory policies directed at North African populations in France, which some analysts argue may exacerbate vulnerabilities to radicalization within these communities.
Ongoing repression of dissenting groups, increasing authoritarianism, and the suppression of moderate Islamic movements critical of government corruption in many Islamic countries, along with the pervasive influence of social media, are frequently cited as key factors contributing to the radicalization of Muslim assailants. While Islam, in its core teachings, rejects terrorist violence, it has often been exploited by political actors for their own purposes. Corrupt political leaders have utilized mosques in Western countries to promote distorted interpretations of Islam and further political agendas. For instance, Gulf states train and deploy imams to mosques in the West with the aim of spreading Wahhabism and Salafi ideologies. Similarly, the Turkish government funds mosques and trains imams not only to perform religious duties but also to monitor political dissidents, compiling lists of regime critics for submission to the Turkish authorities.
In addition to the influence of online platforms, Islamophobic and xenophobic attitudes toward Muslim communities in Europe, coupled with the perception of discrimination by governments, have contributed to a sense of marginalization and alienation. These factors, combined with the ease of accessing extremist content, have made social media not only a tool for recruitment but also for ideological reinforcement, enabling individuals to radicalize in isolation without direct contact with formal terrorist organizations.
ISIS is widely recognized as a principal organization in the global propagation of radical ideologies. While there is a prevailing view in the West that ISIS’s influence is primarily regional, concentrated in the territories where it has operated, the GTTAC has documented over 1,000 incidents annually linked to ISIS-Core and its affiliates. Concurrently, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which remains officially designated as a terrorist organization by the U.S. government, has succeeded in consolidating control over substantial portions of Syria. The future of ISIS’s relationship with HTS remains uncertain, yet it appears unlikely that ISIS would support HTS’s leadership. Instead, HTS’s achievements may serve as a model for other ISIS affiliates around the world, potentially influencing the broader dynamics of jihadist movements.
ISIS’s ability to establish and maintain territorial control in Syria and Iraq, recruit militants from over 90 countries at its peak in 2014 and 2015, and enlist more than 30,000 fighters, combined with its use of extreme tactics—such as beheadings and burning individuals alive—has solidified its notoriety as one of the most influential terrorist organizations globally. Furthermore, ISIS’s network of affiliates, present in more than 10 countries, has amplified its reach and impact. As a result, lone actors who are influenced by Salafist ideologies often align their actions with the ISIS brand, as demonstrated by the attacker in New Orleans. These individuals are aware that associating their attacks with ISIS will increase the likelihood of widespread media coverage and public attention. In particular, self-radicalized Muslim assailants, such as the one responsible for the truck attack in New Orleans, often seek to frame their actions as inspired by ISIS, knowing that such associations maximize the psychological and media impact of their violent acts.
In conclusion, the growing concern over lone-actor terrorism, particularly as it is influenced by far-right and Salafi-jihadist ideologies, is well-founded. Unlike organized terrorist groups, which operate within defined structures and are often easier to counter, lone actors present a distinct challenge due to their ability to operate independently and launch attacks without warning. Furthermore, lone-actor incidents are more frequently documented in Western countries, where media coverage tends to amplify public fear and heighten perceived threats. As a result, the apprehension surrounding lone-actor terrorism has escalated in recent years, as evidenced by data from the GTTAC. At the same time, ISIS remains a potent source of ideological inspiration. Although its territorial control has diminished, the group’s ability to influence individuals, particularly in the Western world, endures. Many lone-actor perpetrators, seeking to maximize the impact of their attacks, deliberately associate themselves with ISIS, knowing that such an affiliation will amplify the media attention and ideological resonance of their actions.