We are referring to “phenomenon” as a remarkable thing or event, and to narrative as a culturally produced (often antiquated and usually inherited) way a group of people express their understanding of their environment and their identity within it.
Social movements, wars, insurgencies, are generally considered social phenomena but we consider them, more specifically and foundationally, narrative phenomena. That means that a phenomenon does not just pop up out of the blue. Foundational cultural narratives either enable or disenable cultural phenomena. How do they do that? To understand how they do that, it is essential to distinguish between narratives and stories:
Narratives are big thematic cultural products. Stories are small examples and reflections of cultural narratives. The Heroic Quest is a narrative. The Hunger Games is a story.
Narratives are not a neutral reflection of reality, although they express themselves as though they were. Narratives present an understanding of reality, not reality itself. And usually that understanding is the understanding of a dominant group. They are powerful to the extent that a group of people accept a narrative as a metaphysical reality rather than an interpretation of it.
Powerful narratives give the impression that the ideas and interests of a dominant group are fixed metaphysical realities. They may go on for generation after generation aided by reenforcing stories. A weaponized story can manipulate an audience’s connection to the cultural narrative and, as in the examples below, weaponize the narrative itself.
The most effective way to manipulate a foundational cultural narrative is to insert a manipulating story. Some of us working to undermine the capacity of extremists to recruit have understood the power of narrative in that process and that involves understanding the difference between narratives and stories.
Back in 2005 Casebeer and Russell observed, “Failure on our part to come to grips with the narrative dimension of the war on terror is a weakness already exploited by groups such as Al Qaeda; we can fully expect any adaptive adversary to act quickly to fill in story gaps and exploit weaknesses in our narrative.” (2005. P.3).
Note that this quote is not only a comment on our failure to grasp the centrality of narrative to extremist recruitment, but it also points specifically to the “story gaps” as a “weakness in our narrative.” That is because when there is a gap between a foundational cultural narrative and the stories on the ground that are supposed to reflect it, the population and the narrative fabric of the culture itself are vulnerable. They are vulnerable to the insertion of a weaponized story that solves for the gap.
ISIS: The Narrative Foundation of Jurisprudence
Islamic jurisprudence involves the in-depth interpretation of Sharia laws found in the Quran and the Sunna or Hadith (comprising the Prophet’s narrative, speeches, and actions). Within Islamic jurisprudence, there are two categories of Islamic Sharia rules, known as Hukum (حكم) (or Ahkam/احكام in plural): absolute (القطعي) and presumptive (الظني).
Absolute rules are straightforward and require all Muslims to strictly adhere to them. These rules have only one interpretation, are explicitly defined, and allow no room for interpretation – for instance, Salat (the proper performance of ritual prayers five times each day) and Zakat (the obligation to pay taxes for the benefit of the poor and the needy) are considered definitive and indisputable rules.
Presumptive rules, on the other hand, involve the interpretation of Quranic verses or Hadith texts based on the understanding of Islamic theologians and scholars. Presumptive rules are characterized by their complexity and flexibility, permitting various interpretations and stories. In this context, several verses in the Quran have multifaceted meanings.
ISIS: The Weaponized Story of Jurisprudence
The presumptive rules have provided openings for the insertion of weaponized stories that attach themselves to the assumed and accepted foundational narrative thereby contextualizing systemic atrocities against civilians within it. (Note that we are not calling this violence “war crimes” because wars are conducted by nation-states and the so-called Islamic State is not one.)
Within the presumptive category, the directives of God or Prophet Muhammad may be indirect or possess multiple possible meanings in the Quran or Hadith. ISIS has leveraged these presumptive rules to shape its ideology and justify crimes against humanity.
ISIS intentionally manipulated and orchestrated the stories surrounding presumptive rules to portray them as absolute rules, despite the subtle differences between them. This distortion has allowed ISIS to formulate and legitimize mass crimes such as murder, torture, beheadings, kidnappings, and the use of sexual and gender-based violence as tools of genocide as an order of Allah.
Unpacking the Narrative Foundation Hukum Allah, Hukum Al-Mutagalib, and Hukum Al-Wala’ Wa-l-bara
The legal and moral stories regarding harm or the killing of civilians are not novel concepts among theologians and intellectuals associated with Islamic terrorist groups. Within this landscape, the Salafist theological school of Islam emerges as a central ideological incubator, generating Fatwas that justify the use of violence against civilians. The story is a central aspect of their ideology and provides justifications for their activities, including acts against civilians. ISIS has drawn upon a cadre of theologians and intellectuals who align with their jihadi and Takfiri views, which involve excommunication and labeling others as infidels. This roster includes influential figures like Syed Abul A’la Maududi, a key pioneer of Islamic revivalism and Jihadist ideology; Sayyid Qutb; Abu Hassan Azadi, the author of “The Conditions of opponents of the Muslim state” book; Turki al-Binali, the author of the book “Extending Hands To Pledge Allegiance To Al-Baghdadi”; Shakir Nem Allah; Musab al-Suri; Othman bin Abdul Rahman Al-Tamimi the author of The book “Informing People of the Birth of the Islamic State”, Abu Baker Naji, the author of “Idarat Al-Tawah’sh (Management of Savagery)”; and Abu-Abdulla Muhajir, the author of “The Jurisprudence of Blood (Known as the Fiqh al-Dima).” Each of these figures has significantly contributed to shaping the moral and legal stories surrounding presumptive rules. According to Abu-Musab al-Suri, a jihadist ideologue and influential leader within al Qaeda, “Every theologian must develop their religious-scientific theory through personal experiences and build upon their past insights” (Inspire the Believer Mag., 2011). ISIS’s particular focus on manipulating presumptive rules is evident in their declarations of Takfir against all Arabic governments, their emphasis on exposing perceived deviations and corruption within other jihadist groups, their denouncement of democratic systems, their advocacy for puritanical lifestyles, and their use of terrorism as a tool for upheaval and the destruction of their enemies. These facets of the ISIS stories are deeply rooted in the narrative and application of presumptive rules, providing a framework that legitimizes their actions, including war crimes against civilians. ISIS’s theologians and intellectuals frequently cite verses and texts that call for the revival of the Caliphate, notably, they reference the Fatir verse to bolster their claims to the caliphate: “It is He who has made you successors upon the earth. And whoever disbelieves – upon him will be [the consequence of] his disbelief. And the disbelief of the disbelievers does not increase them in the sight of their Lord except in hatred; and the disbelief of the disbelievers does not increase them except in loss” (Fatir, 35:39)
In this context, the story acts as the bridge between theology (Narrative) and action, providing a justification for their crimes against humanity.
A comprehensive examination of each of these rules individually sheds light on the underlying narrative that influences the decision-making process behind these war crimes. These rules include Hukum Allah (Allah as the sole legislator and authority), Hukum Al-Mutagalib (the rule of conqueror/caliph), Hukum Al-Wala’ Wa-l-bara (the loyalty and disavowal principle), Hukum Al-Tatarus (seeking military cover), Hukum Al-Tankeel (inflicting severe punishment), and finally, Hukum Al-Tawah’sh (inflicting severe destruction upon Allah’s enemies).
Principally, Hukum Allah and Al-Mutagalib assert that Allah is the sole lawgiver and the ultimate authority of legislation, shaping a story that asserts that His rules should be implemented by Al-Mutagalib (the caliph and conqueror) on Earth (Islam Way, 2016). Meanwhile, Hukum Al-Wala’ Wa-l-bara’ contributes to the story by emphasizing unwavering loyalty to the caliph and disavowing infidels. These rules, while not explicitly outlined in the Quran, contribute to the story constructed by major Sunni madhhabs (schools of thought within Islamic jurisprudence) as presumptive rules (Ibid).
Both Hukum Allah and Hukum Al-Mutagalib were resurrected from ancient Islamic texts by figures like Syed Abul A’la Maududi and Sayyid Qutb in the early and mid-twentieth century (Ahel-Quran, 2018).
Maududi, born in colonial India, played a pivotal role in shaping the story by championing the glorification and implementation of Hukum Allah and Hukum Al-Mutagalib,“This was the call for a universal and complete revolution. It loudly proclaimed ‘Sovereignty belongs to no one except Allah.’ No one has the right to become a self-appointed ruler of men and issue orders and prohibitions on his own volition and authority.” (Maududi, 1980)
These rules contribute to the story by implying the utilization of Hukum Al-Mutagalib (the rule of the caliph/conqueror), thereby demanding the implementation of God’s orders by an individual who demonstrates the capability to seize and govern territory under Sharia law (Ibid). According to Al-Maududi, “Hence, a person or a group of individuals are compelled by the innate demands of their faith to strive for the eradication of opposing ideologies’ rule and the establishment of a government that aligns with their faith’s principles” (ibid).
Based on Hukum Allah and Hukum Mutagalib, the story unfolds with the caliph gaining the authority to enforce Hukum Al-Wala’ Wa-l-bara’ (the loyalty and disavowal principle) among all people. Consequently, the story dictates that everyone is obligated to pledge unwavering loyalty to the caliph since he represents Allah’s voice and authority on Earth.
Saalih Al-Munajjid, a Saudi Salafi scholar, solidifies this story by stating, “Judging or ruling contrary to what Allah has revealed is inconsistent with faith and Tawheed (the unification or oneness of God), which are Allah’s rights. Depending on the circumstances, it may be considered Kufr Akbar (major disbelief) or Kufr Asghar (minor disbelief)” (Munajjid, 1988).
Exploiting and applying these rules was significant for ISIS in shaping their worldview and dividing people into ‘us’ (true believers) and ‘them’ (infidels) within the narrative. Consequently, since their rules are constructed based on interpretations of the presumptive rules within Quranic and Hadith texts, the story portrays all of the group’s actions, including mass crimes and casualties, as morally and legally valid: “And whoever does not judge by what Allah has revealed – then it is those who are the wrongdoers’ (Al-Māidah, 5:45). He confirms, ‘And whoever does not judge by what Allah has revealed – then it is those who are the disbelievers” (sūrat Al-Māidah, 5:47).
Consistent with the story, ISIS would have its followers believe that the world was filled with infidels, and they must completely annihilate Allah’s enemies, by inserting it into the foundational narrative, “Have you not seen those who claim to have believed in what was revealed to you, [O Muhammad], and what was revealed before you? They wish to refer legislation to Taught [anything worshipped other than Allah], while they were commanded to reject it; and Satan wishes to lead them far astray” (Al-Nisāa, 4:60).
Thus, for ISIS, the majority of Muslims had obeyed Satan, reinforcing the story that they deserved to be completely exterminated.
To vanquish their enemy within this narrative, ISIS introduced more ruthless rules to justify it is crimes. These rules involved the application of Hukum Al-Tankeel, Hukum Al-Tatarus, Hukum Al-Tankeel and, finally, Hukum Al-Tawah’sh (Al-Hashimi, 2015). These rules, deeply entrenched within the narrative, were essentially theorized from Quranic verses and Prophet Mohammad’s narrative (Yakoon, 2012, Faiuomie, 2012).
While most Sunni Muslim scholars classify them as presumptive rules, ISIS sought to embed them as part of the absolute rules. According to ISIS theologians, these rules were portrayed as an extension of Hukum Allah (Abu-Haniea, 2018, and Al-Saaedie, 2019), signifying that Allah had mandated these rules.
The story drove the idea of employing these rules, stemming from ISIS’s sense of duty to fulfill Allah’s conditions to establish superior authority. “Those who believe fight in the cause of Allah, and those who disbelieve fight in the cause of Taught [anything worshipped other than Allah e.g. Satan]. So, fight against the allies of Satan” (Al-Nisāa, 4:76). According to the narrative, the chosen individual or group must combat the enemies of Allah, reclaim all territory, eradicate corruption on Earth, dismantle Western civilization, and annihilate all disbelievers (Al-Hashimi, 2015). For ISIS, inflicting severe harm upon Allah’s enemies was an integral part of establishing the Islamic State:
“Allah has promised those who have believed among you and done righteous deeds that He will surely grant them succession [to authority] upon the Earth just as He granted it to those before them and that He will surely establish for them [therein] their religion which He has preferred for them and that He will surely substitute for them, after their fear, security, [for] they worship Me, not associating anything with Me. But whoever disbelieves after that – then those are the defiantly disobeyed” (sūrat l-nūr)
Hukum Al-Tatarus and Hukum Al-Tankeel
ISIS’s story is intertwined with the doctrines of “Al-Tatarus” and “Hukum Al-Tankeel,” which they have exploited to justify their heinous acts against those they deemed infidels, including those identified as apostates by ISIS. These doctrines provided what they believed to be conclusive authorization for committing a wide range of gruesome acts, including burning people alive, enslaving women, and perpetrating genocide.
The term “Hukum Al-Tatarus” refers to a set of legal or religious rulings that pertain to situations where a group seeks cover or fortifies itself, especially within the context of military or combat scenarios. Scholars have reached a consensus on this concept, as elaborated by Ibn Taymiyyah. According to Ibn Taymiyyah, “And the scholars have agreed that if the army of non-believers (kuffar) fortifies itself with Muslim captives, and there is a fear that harm may come to the Muslims if they do not fight, then they should engage in battle, even if this leads to the killing of the Muslims who are being used as shields.” (citation)
On the other hand, the concept of “Al-Tankeel” means propagandizing punishment upon Allah’s Enemies. It carries the connotation of displaying severe punishment to physically and mentally terrorize the enemy during wartime, as defined by Ibn Taymiyyah. It encompasses the use of various forms of punishment to defeat the enemy, as articulated in Quranic verses such as:
“So, Allah seized him in exemplary punishment for the last and the first transgression” (Quran, An-Naziat, 79:25).
“When you encounter those who disbelieve in battle, strike their necks until, when you have inflicted slaughter upon them” (Quran, Muhammad, 47:4).
“Those who believe in the former revelations believe in the Quran. But whoever disbelieves in it among the various factions, the Fire is his promised destination. So, be not in doubt about it. Indeed, it is the truth from your Lord, but most of the people do not believe” (sūrat Hud, 11:17).
Crucially, these doctrines did not exist in isolation but were closely intertwined with the presumptive story that ISIS constructed. Incorporating these doctrines into their strategy, ISIS aimed to morally legitimize the perpetration of crimes against civilians, even if it led to mass casualties among Muslims. They also utilized “Al-Tankeel” to eradicate what they perceived as the near enemy, including apostates like government employees and religious minorities. A Hadith stated, “Any non-Muslim slave who escapes to the land of Shirk, it becomes permissible to shed his blood.” In alignment with these rules, ISIS sought to demonstrate its capacity to eliminate the enemies of Allah on a global scale.
Hukum Tawah’sh
In Arabic, “Tawah’sh” denotes the infliction of severe punishment upon enemies. Although the Quran and Hadith do not mention the term “Al-Tawah’sh,” it was coined by the second generation of jihadists. In this context, Islamic researcher Hisham al-Najjar emphasizes that “Al-Tawah’sh has no basis in Islam; it draws influence from the Tatar concept, evoking shock, horror, brutal attacks, and the pursuit of total destruction” (Salah, 2019). This destructive concept was initially propagated by individuals like Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and Abu Bakr Naji, the author of “The Management of Savagery.” They believed in the necessity of waging a destructive war against Allah’s enemies, even justifying such attacks within Muslim societies.
ISIS, inspired by al-Zarqawi and Naji, used this doctrine to rationalize committing crimes against civilians in Iraq and Syria. In 2016, ISIS published a video in which they brutally executed 19 young individuals, drawing a horrifying parallel by referring to them as ‘أضاحي العيد,’ which translates to ‘Eid sacrifices.’ One of the ISIS members said before starting the slaughter process, “Sacrifice, may God accept it from you, and we are sacrificing.” ISIS, in particular, employs the ‘ash strategy,’ which involves leveraging various presumptive rules to justify inflicting extraordinary mass casualties and destruction. This strategic choice is driven by their story, which portrays these actions as just and necessary within the weaponized framework.
