Embedding Meteorologists and Hydrologists into Emergency Operations

Abstract 

Weather-caused disasters such as tornadoes, hurricanes and inclement weather drive a  large portion of emergency management operations in the United States. Incorporating  meteorological forecast information into emergency operations has been a long-standing  need when the weather is either threatening or directly impacting ongoing emergency  management activities during a disaster. A review of historical post-assessment reports for  onsite meteorological services provided to emergency management personnel at emergency  operations centers demonstrates the benefit in having weather information available to  decision makers. Meteorological and hydrologic information has made it into the hands of  emergency managers over the recent decades through the integration of weather forecasters  into emergency operations and the development of processes such as weather watches,  warnings, and advisories. As alert systems have evolved over the years, it has served to enhance  timely coordination between emergency managers and meteorologists, to benefit public safety  and to improve our overall capability to prepare for and respond to emergencies.  

Introduction 

Weather conditions influence a variety of factors in emergency management from disruptions  to supply chain logistics and travel, to the way in which a wildland fire may abruptly shift at  any given moment. Due to the potential changes meteorological conditions generate before,  during, and after an incident, meteorologists and emergency managers must maintain strong  collaborative partnerships throughout all four phases of emergency management: mitigation,  preparedness, response, and recovery. Emergency managers today know to contact the  National Weather Service (NWS) office to obtain weather and water information supporting  emergency management activities; this, however, was not always the case. Past weather-related  disasters fueled the integration of weather forecasting with emergency management activities  to safeguard both the public and first responders. Significant strides have taken place within the  past ten years to standardize the process of embedding meteorologists and hydrologists into  emergency operations centers (EOCs) and incident command posts (ICPs). Today, this integration  provides both in-person and virtual forecasting capabilities and numerous communication  modes to relay weather intelligence in support of disaster response and recovery operations.  

The increase in collaboration and integration is primarily attributed to the National Weather  Service’s initiative in creating and maintaining a cadre of specialists ready to deploy at a  moment’s notice.¹ While this integration and collaboration may have not always been the norm, lessons learned from hindsight served to slowly reveal how the embedding of meteorologists  in EOCs could have significantly improved disaster outcomes years before it became more  routine. For example, strong outflow winds during a concert at the August 2011 Indiana State  Fair triggered the stage to collapse, killing seven people and injuring fifty-eight others. Although  a ten-minute severe storm notice had been provided, emergency management did not evacuate  the venue.² Had emergency managers maintained close contact with an on-site or designated  meteorologist before and during the high-attendance event, a more informed decision could  have been made, with far different outcomes had the call of an evacuation been made. Overall,  meteorological incidents present numerous types of hazards, from the routine such as rain,  wind, heat or cold to the extreme of tornadoes, hurricanes, and hail. These types of weather  incidents compound the effects of other events whether natural (earthquakes, volcanic  eruptions, landslides), technological (power outages, dam failures, industrial accidents), or man made (acts of terrorism, cyberattacks, or civil disorder). Timely weather forecast information  remains vital for all emergency operations regardless of the nature of the event as weather has  the potential to compound and amplify the effects or put survivors and responders in danger.  The Emergency Operations Center (EOC) functions as a platform for coordination that supports  collaboration with meteorologists to receive that timely information.  

Purpose of the Essay 

This essay utilizes small-scale anecdotal overviews of events and disasters where meteorologists  were utilized, underutilized, or even absent. These anecdotal overviews serve to advance the  importance of meteorologist integration into emergency operations to demonstrate the value  of weather information availability and accessibility supporting emergency managers in making  decisions during a disaster. A subsequent discussion will examine the resources government  officials possess at the local, state, tribal, and federal level to provide weather-based forecasting  support for emergency response. Once we identify the resources, we will analyze the  involvement of meteorologists in decision-support services in the context of best practices and  lessons learned in supporting emergency managers at different levels.  

Background 

The Origin of EOCs Supporting Disaster-Related Events 

FEMA defines emergency operations centers (EOCs) as having the following functions: • collect, analyze, and share information; 

• support resource needs and requests, including allocation and tracking; 
• coordinate planning and determine current and future needs; and 
• in some cases, provide strategic coordination and policy direction.³

The establishment and use of EOCs can be traced back to the Cold War era of U.S. civil defense  efforts when the centers, once activated, were utilized to control, and coordinate emergency  activities. While early civil defense actions envisioned EOCs for use during a possible nuclear event,  the focus of EOCs changed over time as their activation and use became more commonplace for supporting natural disaster events.⁴ The EOCs transformed from nuclear threat to natural  disaster preparedness in the early days, to the present where the centers support a broad range  of activities including cyber, fire, epidemic, civil unrest, and weather threat mitigation. With the  stated functions, which an EOC is required to provide, EOCs become an ideal location to maintain  a meteorologist presence to support decision-making and coordination activities. Emergency  managers, within the EOC, gather weather information from various weather applications, both  public and private including those services provided by the National Weather Service (NWS).  The availability and accuracy of these weather forecast capabilities have increased over time as  the NWS has evolved to integrate new and expanding capabilities from remote sensors in the  air, water, and land to satellite capabilities and new supercomputers to aid in the gathering and  interpretation for the massive amounts of data needed to create accurate forecasts.⁵ 

Meteorological and Hydrologic Service  Advances through the Years 

In reviewing post-event assessments from the National Weather Service regarding high impact  events since 1969, there have been continuous improvements to the meteorological and  hydrologic based technology services provided by the organization. The improvements, based  on the service needs of emergency managers and partners aligned upon three main themes:  a) the need to increase collaboration between meteorologists and their partners in emergency  management, b) the importance of meteorologists working with emergency management to  communicate proper calls-to-action during an emergency; and c) the importance of improving  the temporal window within which meteorologists were providing updates to both emergency  management and media partners who were in touch with the public and first responders.  

Additionally, there were noticeable differences in preparedness and communication between  meteorologists and emergency managers in the pre-2011 era for communities that frequently  see severe weather, and those (particularly in the western U.S.), which don’t receive frequent  severe weather as discussed below.⁶ These differences decreased in the 2010s, and not surprisingly, communications between meteorologists and emergency managers tend to excel in  disaster-prone communities.  

The 1960s to 1970 

One example of a successful collaboration resulted from the April-May 1969 Midwest Flood  event and the subsequent creation of the weather warning system. The weather warning  system was established through the collaborative efforts of Weather Bureau officials, Civil  Defense officials, law enforcement agencies, news media, and many local, state, and federal  offices to support the preparedness of local communities.⁷ This collaboration between the  emergency management community and Weather Bureau served to enhance the weather  warning system, as it was demonstrated to have saved lives as a success.⁸ While the Midwest  Floods were deemed to have been a success between meteorologists/hydrologists and  emergency management, not every event was reviewed similarly.

The Palm Sunday tornado outbreak of 1965 brought to light the need to “hold preparedness  meetings in collaboration with the appropriate federal, state, and local government officials and  news disseminators in order to develop emergency plans for alerting all segments of communities,  whenever emergency warnings are issued.”⁹ However, when discussing short-term threats like  tornadoes, every moment counts, and this remains an issue. Currently, a severe thunderstorm  or tornado watch is routinely issued 0-6 hours in advance, however, warnings which serve as the  immediate call to action for storm events affecting specific locations, need to be issued within  minutes of local impact.¹⁰ NWS meteorologists, “regularly and effectively augment these products  with other decision-supporting information based on meteorological insights, interpersonal  relationships, and societal needs, but official NWS watch and warning products remain largely text based,” and leave a gap in between watches and warnings.¹¹ Overall, from the 1960s through the  1990s, emergency managers and the public relied on the development and advancement of warning  systems for meteorological and hydrologic data, with an increased capability regarding the timeliness  of weather information for decision making. The development of these systems would come about  over time as lessons learned from post-event assessments would serve to shape future capabilities.  

The 1970s to 1980 

Understandably, time remains an issue when talking about natural disasters which wreak havoc for  days, such as hurricanes. During Hurricane Agnes in 1972, the nature of the event was so substantial,  with $3.5 billion in damage and more than 118 dead, that it served to prompt the public to receive  direct access to flood information on an “on-demand” basis.¹² This need can best be served by either  telephone or continuous radio broadcasts. Unfortunately, at the time, technology did not allow the  news media to have continuous access to the latest forecasts and warnings. The lack of information  hindered the media’s ability to communicate with the public and prevent public confusion about the  evolving situation.¹³ Communicating to the public is critical during a disaster but so is being prepared  before a disaster strikes. The importance of preparedness from meteorologists working with  emergency managers was noted during the Northeastern United States blizzard of February 1978  when “NWS and local officials emphasized the importance of preparedness, the need to sensitize the  people to the impact of the weather, and the difficulty of maintaining that sensitivity.”¹⁴ 

During the January 1982 San Francisco Bay Area Storm, barriers were identified between the  National Weather Service and the emergency management community. One barrier appeared  to be that weather and water information was an afterthought to immediate emergency  response as “[o]fficials in the severely affected areas either did not have time, due to more  urgent emergency actions, or they did not know how to communicate with the National  Weather Service.”¹⁵ During this event, the presence of meteorological and hydrological support  was identified as something that would have been extremely helpful for emergency response  decision-makers, who were working in a rapidly evolving situation. Researchers found that: 

The real-time advice and support of an operational hydrologist is an important  ingredient in situation assessment and in the formulation of hydrologic advisories. 

This support becomes increasingly important in situations when data are scarce and  flooding is occurring in areas where specific river forecast procedures do not exist.  In these circumstances, hydrologists can and should provide significant assistance to  meteorologists in the form of situation appraisals, judgments of storm impacts, and  other advice. This draws upon the hydrologist’s experience, technical knowledge, and  general knowledge of the affected area.¹⁶

Maintaining close contact with meteorologists and hydrologists in emergency situations would  have supported the media, public, and government officials to make an informed and actionable  decision to provide for a more comprehensive response.¹⁷ 

The 1990s to 2000 

In the early 1990s, weather preparedness continued to improve through communications  between the National Weather Service and emergency management. During this era, the  internet became commonplace in homes and businesses, which changed meteorologists’  communication platforms, allowing weather information to be communicated across the globe.  

Feedback from the December 1992 nor’easter shows that between the 1980s and 1990s,  meteorologists were in frequent communication with emergency managers. However, the  U.S. was starting to demand weather information in an automated manner. One of the most  significant action items to come from this event was the movement “to automate the exchange  of information between the NWS and the emergency management community.”¹⁸ 

The geographical expansion of the weather forecast offices (WFOs) in the mid-1990s greatly  contributed to the National Weather Service refining the services and products provided to the  public. Emergency management was ready on May 3rd 1999, having anticipated a major tornado  outbreak in Oklahoma and Southern Kansas. The City of Moore (OK) emergency management  director broadcasted NWS warnings for the community, providing radio and television  station communications warnings to reach as much of the population as was possible.¹⁹ The  communication of this weather information was not just timely but was novel in terms of  pre-event planning and collaboration between the National Weather Service, emergency  managers, and media partners. These collaborative efforts would continue to support improved  communications on changing meteorological conditions into the 2000s.  

2000s to Current Day 

As the United States rolled into the new millennium, the significance of networking between the  National Weather Service, emergency managers and the public took center stage. Technological  advancements in communications continued to support new improvements as the internet,  cell phones, and other application technologies such as Nixle, a then recently developed public  safety messaging platform, became more commonplace and available to users. Additionally, the  rise and use of social media served to provide yet another and ever-growing communications  platform on which to share information between meteorologists, emergency responders and  the public. 

Hurricane Isabel, in September 2003, serves as an early example where on-site coordination  between meteorologists and emergency managers were deemed to have been very beneficial  for a large regional high-impact event. As was noted post-event, “the FEMA Operations Center  strategically place[d] personnel at the Tropical Prediction Center (TPC) during a hurricane 

threat for the United States to facilitate the flow of information between the two agencies.”²⁰ During this event, meteorologists were not only providing their standard watch, warning, and  advisory services, but were also integrating into emergency response as subject-matter experts  (SMEs). At the national level, the National Weather Service “supported FEMA and state EMs by  delivering twice daily, live televised briefings on the expected precipitation from Isabel.”²¹

The Great Coastal Gale of 2007, a series of three powerful Pacific storms which affected Oregon,  Washington, and British Columbia, occurred in an era when the National Weather Service was  beginning to emphasize the need for Impact-Based Decision Support Services (IDSS) based  on emergency management partners’ needs. While Portland and Seattle weather forecast  offices were able to communicate during this event in real time with emergency managers  and partners, it was clear that not all county emergency management departments had good  communications established with their local National Weather Service offices. ²² The interpretive  service portion of the relationship was missing for some partners, particularly with Grays Harbor  County, Washington, which had anticipated a more routine storm with wind gusts from 40-60  mph. However, despite forecasts, outlooks, and briefings from National Weather Service Seattle  Forecast Office which mentioned the possibility of a period of hurricane force wind gusts, the  force and impact of the storm was far greater than anticipated.²³ 

In 2011, the National Weather Service’s policy and plans began to place greater emphasis on  the use of IDSS in supporting the greater needs of the emergency management community.²⁴ This was done to ensure that emergency managers would be better prepared to understand  

the effects of upcoming weather events so they could provide more actionable and timely  information for emergency managers. Recent event reviews suggest that the agency was already  heading in the direction of in-person collaboration during weather events for emergency  response having recognized the benefits of a closer collaboration. In the case of the June 2012  North American Derecho (linear windstorm) across the Midwest and Mid-Atlantic, National  Weather Service offices began to take steps to improve relationships with emergency managers  and the media. As part of these process improvements which were constantly evolving, email  briefing packages were being prepared in advance by weather personnel and were then later  utilized to provide decision makers with advanced notice of severe thunderstorms taking place  later in the day.²⁵ Emergency managers preferred direct interaction with the NWS and were  largely able to accomplish this through other newly advanced technological developments such  as NWSChat, an instant messaging program, which provided real-time communication between  NWS staff, emergency managers, and media partners.  

Regarding how the meteorological and hydrologic services were operating post-2011, one  can look to the historic Front Range and Eastern Colorado Floods of September 2013, which  significantly affected Boulder, putting homes, businesses, and roadways underwater. During  this event, the NWS utilized various tools to communicate the imminent threat as it unfolded,  including conference calls, one-on-one phone calls, NWSChat, and WebEOC, as an emergency  management instant messaging platform, to relay timely information in near real time.²⁶ Still,  some problems remained as a few counties noted the inability to interact with the NWS during  peak periods of flooding.²⁷ This again revealed a gap in the communication between emergency  managers and NWS offices, where near real-time integrated meteorological and hydrological  support would have proven to be of significant value to decision makers.  

The South Carolina Floods of October 2015 resulted in nineteen deaths and costs exceeding  more than $1.4 billion.²⁸ The NWS improved its services heading into the event with an  increased ability to support emergency management organizations. Emails were distributed  from NWS offices to emergency managers on a proactive basis leading up to and during key  periods of concern without a formal request from emergency managers. Likewise, conference calls between NWS staff and emergency management were a common occurrence with  hydrologists included to address the influx of water associated with the unprecedented  amounts of rainfall.²⁹ Notable as part of this event was the adoption and use of the incident  command system (ICS) by hydrologists for the first time.³⁰ 

Since 2015, the NWS has prioritized the national deployment-ready program, which trains  meteorologists and hydrologists in the use and structure of ICS so they can better understand  their emergency management counterparts. From FEMA’s perspective, the most beneficial IDSS  capabilities have been the weather and flood conference calls, and briefings in support of state  and local emergency management agencies.³¹ 

With improvements to the IDSS capabilities of NWS, the organization was better prepared to  respond to events such as Hurricane Harvey in 2017, with improved communications capabilities  supporting emergency managers and the public. National Weather Service forecasters were  observed to have relayed timely weather intelligence information regarding weather impacts  to ongoing emergency management operations during this event.³² This capability ensured that  information required to make informed decisions was available as the situation evolved. While  flooding was extensive during Hurricane Harvey due to a stalled weather system which inundated  the region with continuous rainfall, emergency managers and the NWS worked together to  communicate the importance of shelter-in-place measures based on the anticipated amounts of  rainfall. Within the month, Hurricane Maria would again test communications and forecasting  capabilities for an event with a constantly changing forecast track.  

During Hurricane Maria, the National Hurricane Center (NHC) worked tirelessly with affected  NWS offices in the Caribbean (primarily San Juan Puerto Rico office) to ensure consistent  and timely communications for changing weather.³³ A secondary effort supporting numerous  communities, found several of the WFO San Juan staff deployed to assist the local, state,  and federal partners at the Puerto Rico Emergency Management Agency (PREMA) EOC.  Despite having meteorologists embedded in the PREMA EOC however, the federal response  received a great deal of criticism due to the slow response to the disaster. The criticism, while  understandable at the time, was not focused on the timeliness or accuracy of the weather  forecasting, but rather originated from the overstretched resources of FEMA. For Hurricane  Maria, tropical experts at the NHC provide IDSS to emergency managers from nearly the start of  the event, till the end, when Maria finally moved away from the North Carolina coast.³⁴ 

A little more than a year later, in Northern California’s Butte County, the Camp Fire broke out  on November 8, 2018, near the towns of Concow and Magalia. The fire reduced the town of  Paradise to ashes and serves as California’s most devastating fire on record with more than  eighty-five confirmed deaths, and a death toll potentially greater than one-hundred, and nearly  240 square miles burned. The fire, caused by a faulty power line, was exacerbated by prevailing  winds and weather patterns which fanned the flames with moderate dry winds. At the time,  a Red Flag Warning (RFW) had been issued to underscore an increased risk of fire danger due  to very dry fuels, low relative humidity, and gusty winds greater than 35 mph.³⁵ This warning  system ensures that both firefighters and the public at large can be alerted to an increased risk  for dangerous fire related weather. The warning further serves to support predictive services  and decision makers as a forecast warning to ensure that a consistent and standardized weather message is conveyed to the public. As fuels can burn rapidly once ignited, understanding the  significance of a red flag warning can help elevate concerns as to the significance of a critical  weather-related situation once the warning is issued. The Service Assessment for the November  2018 Camp Fire determined that “how to message the threat within the RFW is critical to  those in the field fighting the fires.”³⁶ In the case of the Camp Fire response, the California  Governor’s Office of Emergency Services (Cal OES) requested NWS meteorologists operate from  the EOC from the start of the response, with the Camp Fire IMT team requesting an Incident  Meteorologist (IMET) for utilization at the incident command post (ICP). Administrators deemed  the IMETs aa “best practice” for the event as the ability to have trained incident meteorologists  on-site at the various command posts served to support decision makers in getting real time  forecasts and predictions to assist in their decision-making. The IMET program, it should be  noted, has existed for over ninety years, and has deployed meteorologists to ICPs during that  period to support wildland fire fighters during difficult circumstances. 

Weather Intelligence for Non-Weather Emergencies 

While having meteorologists involved in EOC or ICP operations remotely or on-site during  natural disasters has proven to be successful, non-weather emergencies like earthquakes,  oil spills, HAZMAT response, terrorism, and pandemics might very well also benefit. Weather  information is important for any operation which relies on close coordination, logistics support,  and for events such as support to recent COVID-19 operations where outdoor testing and  treatment was conducted during good weather and bad.  

The COVID-19 pandemic obviously brought about a period of unanticipated challenges here in  the U.S. The pandemic impacted the consequence management activities for a wide range of  operations which could be affected by weather, and in several instances direct weather support  with meteorologists helped to sustain outdoor medical testing and treatment centers and the flow  of vaccines when weather was a factor. Email exchanges involving meteorologists at the NWS in  Pendleton, Oregon revealed that a drive-up COVID-19 clinic was nearly called off due to adverse  winter weather during 2020. However, the facility was able to maintain its operations and account  for weather changes with information provided by NWS to the City of Walla Walla emergency  management office.³⁷ Director of Weather Services Louis Uccellini notes several examples during  the COVID-19 event where NWS worked with local and state emergency managers and health  providers in supporting weather updates for distribution and vaccination site efforts.³⁸ Uccellini  concluded that weather intelligence helps dictate the planning and response for both short-term  and long-term emergency operations, whether the incident is weather-related or not.  

Recommendations 

With the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic of 2019–2022, technological advancements have allowed  EOCs to operate from home offices, thereby challenging the traditional paradigm of in-person  command and control EOC operations. New technologies such as Zoom, Microsoft Teams, and Google Meet have been tested during the COVID-19 pandemic offering emergency response  partners the ability to enhance communications and help “see” one another’s facial expressions  when communicating. While body language and other visual cues can be lost in the absence of  video technology, Baker and Milutinovic have observed: 

Non-verbal cues are just as crucial when communicating as the words we say. Everything  from body language and facial expressions to attentiveness and engagement can indicate  different thoughts and feelings—each of which can only truly be observed through face to-face communication.³⁹ 

Aside from the importance of body language, being in-person allows for “[…] a sense of  community [that] comes with the ability to interact and socialize, and this sets the foundation  for trust, and ultimately better working relationships.”⁴⁰ Building rapport between decision makers and SMEs such as meteorologists and hydrologists is nothing new. However, it is  something that should be reinforced as emergency managers and SMEs are increasingly able  to collaborate via electronic communications. This collaboration, advanced by attending  meetings in person and serving together during emergency operations, helps to reinforce the  bond between meteorologists, emergency management and hydrologists as force multipliers  when working together before, during and after disaster events. The importance of a leader  advocating for serious measurements to be taken when highly impactful weather is expected  goes a long way in supporting community preparedness for incoming weather. On-site  meteorologists, who can provide face-to-face communication and updates regarding weather  not only helps emergency managers to understand the severity of a situation but serves to  improve the relationships necessary to create a unified preparedness message for public safety 

Conclusion 

Weather forecasting and alert technologies have advanced greatly over the last fifty years.  However, meteorologists, hydrologists, and emergency management partners must continue  to remain vigilant in efforts to communicate and integrate weather intelligence into emergency  operations leading up to, during and after disasters. As previously highlighted, weather impacts  every operation, regardless of what caused the initial disaster. Email briefings, conference call  briefings, iNWS, NWSChat, and IDSS are all excellent means by which NWS meteorologists and  hydrologists can provide useful and real-time information supporting emergency managers and  the public. Beyond the use of these applications however, there is no substitute for having a  meteorologist on-site or virtually deployed to support events which may be considered routine,  but may have a chance of becoming more extreme and complex due to changing weather  conditions. Having a meteorologist deployed to support an EOC is a worthwhile investment to  consider, not only during activation period, but for the entirety of an event to assist in the planning  and preparation of field operations. For smaller jurisdictions where resources are thin, virtual  weather support from the National Weather Service may be the best alternative to on-site support  to ensure that these jurisdictions receive timely and accurate forecasting. For larger jurisdictions,  having a team detailed to support its more extensive needs will be a must to ensure that both  meteorological and hydrological services can be provided in support to decision makers and the  public during a disaster where inclement weather is coupled to a large-scale complex event.

Notes 

1. Department of Commerce, National Weather Service Policy Directive 10-24, Operations and Services Impact-Based Decision Support Services, National Weather Service, April 9, 2019. https://www.nws.noaa.gov/directives/sym/pd01024curr.pdf. 
2. National Weather Service, Impact-Based Decision Support Services (IDSS), n.d., https://www.weather.gov/about/idss. 
3. Federal Emergency Management Agency, Emergency Operations Center Skillsets User Guide, September 2018, 2. https:// www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/2020-05/fema_nqs_eoc-skillset-guide_0.pdf. 
4. Russell R. Dynes, “The Functioning of Local Civil Defense in Disasters,” November,1969, https://udspace.udel.edu/ bitstream/handle/19716/1174/WP21.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y. 
5. Department of Commerce, “Improving Weather Forecasts.” National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, May 11, 2016, https://www.noaa.gov/explainers/improving-weather-forecasts. 
6. National Weather Service Western Region, Report on the San Francisco Bay Area Storm, January 3–5, 1982, Summer 1982, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CZIC-qc925-1-u8c3-r37-1982/html/CZIC-qc925-1-u8c3-r37-1982.htm. 
7. Department of Commerce, Operation Foresight: A Report on ESSA’s Performance Before and During the Heavy Floods in the Midwest, March–April 1969, May 1969, https://www.weather.gov/media/publications/assessments/Midwest%20Floods%20 1969.pdf. 
8. Ibid. 
9. Department of Commerce, Report of Palm Sunday Tornadoes of 1965, May, 1965, 2. https://www.weather.gov/media/ publications/assessments/palmsunday65.pdf. 
10. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, “Warn on Forecast,” NOAA National Severe Storms Laboratory, 2022, https://www.nssl.noaa.gov/projects/wof/. 
11. Lans P. Rothfusz,et al.. “FACETs: A Proposed Next-Generation Paradigm for High-Impact Weather Forecasting,” Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society 99, no. 10 (2018): 2025-2043. 
12. Department of Commerce, Final Report of the Disaster Survey Team on the Events of Agnes, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, February 1973, https://www.weather.gov/media/publications/assessments/Hurricane%20 Agnes%201972.pdf. 
13. Ibid. 
14. Department of Commerce, “Northeast Blizzard of ’78: February 5-7, 1978,” National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, September 1978, 4, https://www.weather.gov/media/publications/assessments/Northeast%20 Blizzard%20of%201978.pdf 
15. Department of Commerce, Report on the San Francisco, 23. 
16. Ibid., v. 
17. Department of Commerce, Report on the San Francisco Floods, 23. 
18. National Weather Service Eastern Region, The Great Nor’easter of December 1992, June 1994, 48. http://www. weatherknowledge.com/The_Great_NorEaster_of_Dec_1992.pdf. 

19. Megan Baker and Jenna Milutinovic, “The Importance of Face-To-Face Communication in the Digital Age,” Australian Institute of Business Blog, September 15, 2016, https://www.aib.edu.au/blog/communication/face-to-face communication-in-the-digital-age.

20. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, “Hurricane Isabel September 18-19, 2003,’ 9, https://www.weather. gov/media/publications/assessments/isabel.pdf. 
21. Ibid., 11. 
22. Department of Commerce, Pacific Northwest Storms of December 1–3, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, September 22, 2008, https://www.weather.gov/media/publications/assessments/pac_nw08.pdf. 
23. Ibid. 
24. Heather Hosterman et al.,Using the National Weather Service’s Impact-Based Decision Support Services to Prepare for Extreme Winter Storms,” Journal of Emergency Management 17, no. 6: (November/December 2019): 455–67, https://doi. org/10.5055/jem.2019.0439. 
25. Department of Commerce, The Historic Derecho of June 29, 2012, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, January 2013, https://www.weather.gov/media/publications/assessments/derecho12.pdf. 
26. Department of Commerce, The Record Front Range and Eastern Colorado Floods of September 11–17, June 2014, https:// www.weather.gov/media/publications/assessments/14colorado_floods.pdf. 
27. Ibid. 
28. Department of Commerce, The Historic South Carolina Floods of October 1–5, 2015, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, July 2016, https://www.weather.gov/media/publications/assessments/SCFlooding_072216_Signed_Final. pdf. 
29. Ibid., 54. 
30. Ibid. 
31. Ibid., 60. 
32. Department of Commerce, Historic South Carolina Floods.. 
33. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Hurricane Maria, National Hurricane Center Tropical Cyclone Report No. AL152017, February 2019, 9, https://www.nhc.noaa.gov/data/tcr/AL152017_Maria.pdf. 
34. Ibid., 9. 
35. Department of Commerce, November 2018 Camp Fire. January 2020, https://www.weather.gov/media/publications/ assessments/sa1162SignedReport.pdf. 
36. Ibid.,16. 
37. Marc Austin, email message to author, December 11, 2020. 
38. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, “Challenging Weather Doesn’t Stop for COVID-19: NWS Is Ready and Resilient,” Aware, National Weather Service, March 2020, https://www.weather.gov/media/publications/Aware/20mar aware.pdf. 
39. Baker and Milutinovic, “The Importance.” 
40. Ibid.