- Iran uses a flexible proxy network to project power while avoiding direct conflict, prioritizing operational effectiveness and loyalty over strict ideological alignment.
- Despite pressure that has weakened major groups like Hezbollah and the Houthis, the network is adapting through decentralization and remains resilient rather than in decline.
- Proxy activity is expanding into Europe, with increased reliance on local recruits and criminal networks, creating more complex and harder-to-counter security threats.
The panel “Iran’s Proxy Warfare and Escalation Dynamics,” held at Homeland Security Today’s 2026 Counterterrorism Summit, examined how Iran’s use of proxy actors is affecting regional conflicts and international terrorism. Featuring participants from across the public, private, and academic sectors, including Jay Solomon, Phillip Smyth, Mohammad Al-Basha, K. Campbell, Nawar Shora, and former Iranian diplomat Ebrahim Rothandel, the discussion focused on the structure, ideology, and future of the Iranian Threat Network (ITN). The topic is particularly salient amid intensifying confrontation involving Iran and its partners, alongside proxy-linked activity in Europe. The panel emphasized that Iran’s proxy strategy is adaptive, posing growing challenges for traditional counterterrorism tactics.
A central theme of the discussion was the strategic utility of the Iranian Threat Network. Panelists emphasized that Iran leverages a diverse array of proxy actors to extend its influence while maintaining plausible deniability. This approach, which combines public diplomacy with covert proxy activity, enables Tehran to influence regional dynamics without direct military engagement. The ITN provides strategic depth, allowing Iran to project power across the Middle East and, increasingly, Europe.
At the same time, the panel underscored the limits of ideological cohesion within the network. While the doctrine of Velayat-e Faqih, originating with Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, provides a foundation for some groups, adherence is neither uniform nor required for membership in the ITN or for support from the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. Organizations such as Lebanese Hezbollah and Kata’ib Hezbollah maintain strong ideological alignment with Tehran, whereas others, like the Houthis in Yemen, operate on more transactional or pragmatic bases. Panelists highlighted that operational alignment often outweighs doctrinal consistency, with Iran prioritizing effectiveness and loyalty over strict ideological conformity.
A third major theme concerned the evolution of proxy activity amid current external pressures. Several speakers assessed that significant organizations within the ITN, such as Lebanese Hezbollah and the Houthis, have degraded due to sustained U.S. and Israeli operations. However, this weakening has not destroyed these groups. Rather, the ITN appears to be adapting, with signs of decentralization. Additionally, fault lines within the network were noted, including the Houthis’ delayed entry into the ongoing conflict, indicative of the autonomy maintained by some members of the ITN.
This trend is particularly evident in the rise of less formalized proxy activity in Europe. Panelists cited Harakat Ashab al-Yamin al-Islamia (HAYI) as an example of a loosely connected network that has carried out attacks on Israeli and Jewish targets across multiple European states. Unlike earlier cases in Europe, such as the 2012 Burgas bus bombing, these activities appear to rely more on local recruitment and criminal elements than on centrally directed operations. This change marks a shift in Iran’s power projection, introducing a particularly difficult threat to counter.
The panel underscored that ideological cohesion within the ITN is often overstated. Although Velayat-e Faqih remains influential, particularly among core groups, operational alignment is more important. Iran’s willingness to work with actors who diverge ideologically but align strategically reflects a pragmatic, adaptable network.
A critical emerging trend is the functional expansion of proxy activity into Europe. The integration of local criminal networks into proxy operations introduces a strategy that blends terrorism with organized crime. This convergence complicates domestic counterterrorism and law enforcement.
The panel highlighted the historical context of current proxy dynamics. While HAYI and the use of criminal elements are a current issue, since 1979, Iran has conducted operations in roughly a quarter of the world’s nations. Additionally, Iran has attempted to use criminal elements before, and patterns reflect a spike in proxy activity following assassinations of Iranian figures, such as Qassem Soleimani in 2020.
Another key takeaway is that the ITN, while weakened, is not necessarily in decline. The degradation of major actors has spurred adaptation, with Iran adjusting its methods to preserve its influence. This resilience suggests that counterterrorism efforts focused solely on traditional military tactics may be insufficient in the future.
The panel highlighted the continued relevance and adaptability of Iran’s proxy warfare model. Rather than exhibiting uniform decline, the Iranian Threat Network is evolving in response to external pressures, becoming more decentralized and flexible. This evolution presents significant challenges for counterterrorism, particularly as activity expands into Europe. The discussion reinforces that effective counterterrorism in 2026 and beyond will require a shift from standardized approaches toward more network-specific strategies capable of addressing diverse threats.