Iran Conflict Maritime Update: President Trump Says U.S. Navy to ‘Blockade’ Strait of Hormuz After Talks Failed

Key Takeaways – April 12, 2026

• Four days into the ceasefire, no agreement has been reached, and Hormuz remains restricted and inconsistent.
• 17 vessels transited on April 11, but access remains selective with continued dark activity and declining Gulf vessel presence.
• A VLCC U-turn near Larak Island highlights the gap between ceasefire expectations and actual access conditions.
• Iranian exports remain active, with ~6 million barrels loading at Kharg Island and ~58.75 million barrels shipped since March 1.
• U.S. forces initiated mine clearance operations, alongside signaling potential enforcement and interdiction actions.
• 172 crude tankers are now en route to the U.S. Gulf Coast, reflecting a major shift in global flows.
• Global disruptions continue, including vessel detention near Sweden and severe operational impact from the Antwerp-Bruges oil spill.

Operational Overview

Four days into the ceasefire, maritime conditions in the Strait of Hormuz remain constrained, inconsistent, and dependent on permissions rather than open navigation.

After 21 hours of negotiations, no agreement was reached. At sea, this is reflected in restricted transit, selective vessel movement, and failed passage attempts rather than any normalization. While transit volumes have increased slightly, movement remains operationally unreliable.

At the same time, crude flows toward Asia continue, Iranian export activity remains active, and U.S. forces have begun mine clearance operations to establish a safe passage corridor. U.S. leadership has also signaled a potential shift toward enforcement, including possible interdiction and blockade measures in the Strait of Hormuz following failed negotiations.

The Strait is operating as a controlled and unstable system, where movement is possible but not predictable, and the risk of direct confrontation between state actors is increasing.

Key Takeaways – April 8, 2026

• Although the US and Iran announced a two-week ceasefire overnight the risk profile for the small number of ships transiting Hormuz remains unchanged.
• Transit conditions, toll arrangements (if any), and the legal framework for passage remain undefined
• Whether Iran will maintain control of Hormuz during talks is unclear but all signs point to the Islamic Republic refusing to give up its leverage during the two-week period.

Operational Overview

On April 7, the day before the ceasefire was announced, 11 vessels transited the Strait of Hormuz — four  inbound and seven outbound. All four inbound vessels carried Sanctioned risk. Outbound traffic comprised three tankers and four bulk carriers, all via the Northern Corridor. The profile was broadly reflected in ships tracked in the 12 hours following the ceasefire.

Outlook

8–10 April is the critical test window: if daily transits increase with zero incidents, major operators will begin risk reassessment. 11–14 April is the decision window for blue-chip operators, contingent on ceasefire extension signals, IRGC posture and US Navy escort clarity.

Even under a best-case scenario, weeks are required to move stranded gas and oil cargoes, and months for global trade to approach pre-crisis levels. Iran’s stated conditions — compensation, US military withdrawal, recognition of enrichment rights, lifting of all sanctions — remain unresolved. The IRGC retains physical control of the strait. Full normalization is not imminent.

Attack on Qingdao Star 

The Qingdao Star, a 4,253 TEU Marshall Islands-flagged container vessel chartered by Maersk, was struck by a projectile approximately 25 nautical miles south of Kish Island, Iran, on 7 April — the day before the ceasefire announcement. The UK Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) centre confirmed the incident, reporting that all crew were safe and accounted for, with no injuries and no environmental impact recorded.

The vessel sustained hull damage above the waterline but no fire broke out, and the Qingdao Star was able to continue under its own propulsion to its next port of call for inspection. Iran’s IRGC claimed responsibility, describing the vessel as “an Israeli ship” and stating it was struck with a Qadir cruise missile. The vessel is owned by Chartworld and was previously time-chartered by ZIM, the Israeli container carrier, until October 2023 — the likely basis for the IRGC’s classification.

Read the full update from Windward here.

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Key Takeaways – April 7, 2026

• Hormuz transits on April 6 measured 11 vessels, all taking the Iran-controlled Northern Corridor route via Larak Island.
• Two Pakistani-bound LNG carriers turned back from planned outbound transits
• 1298 cargo ships or tankers transmitted their AIS West of Hormuz

Operational Overview

Bulk carriers in Iranian trades including those with beneficial ownership in Greece and China continue to exit the Strait of Hormuz while Iran ensures regular transits for its oil and gas shipments. Energy commodities exports from other Gulf countries are seen on an ad-hoc basis.

Strait of Hormuz Transits Steady

Eleven vessels transited the Strait of Hormuz on April 6 — four inbound and seven outbound.

Inbound traffic comprised three tankers with one signalling Chinese crew onboard and Hamriyah as its next port of call, although the vessel didn’t sail to this destination. Most inbound tankers are engaged in Iranian oil transportation.

All 7 outbound vessels used the Northern Corridor, with 2 tankers, 2 bulk carriers, and 3 cargo vessels.

Read the full update from Windward here.

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Key Takeaways – April 6, 2026

• Transit through Hormuz has shifted to a dual-corridor system, combining an IRGC-controlled northern route with a new southern pathway along Oman.
• Eleven vessels transited on April 5, with movement split between both corridors and ongoing dark activity.
• The southern corridor became operational between April 2–5, scaling rapidly to coordinated multi-vessel transits.
• Iraqi-linked vessels are now granted exemptions, with prioritized passage already observed in practice.
• Kharg Island loading exceeded 5 million barrels, with exports primarily directed toward China under AIS-dark conditions.
• Missile and drone strikes targeted both transiting and berthed vessels, expanding risk across Gulf waters and port infrastructure.
• 267 AIS-dark events and 596 foreign-flag vessels in the Gulf highlight sustained low visibility and continued regional activity.

Operational Overview

The Strait of Hormuz is no longer operating as a single controlled chokepoint. Between April 2 and 5, transit evolved into a dual-corridor system, combining military control with emerging diplomatic coordination.

A northern route remains centered around IRGC control near Larak Island. In parallel, a southern corridor has emerged along the Omani coastline, enabling vessels to transit outside the original control zone. This shift reflects ongoing Iran-Oman discussions on navigation rules and the introduction of a second operational pathway.

At the same time, Iranian export activity remains active but opaque. Loading operations at Kharg Island continue under AIS-dark conditions, with sustained flows directed primarily toward China. Meanwhile, vessel targeting inside the Gulf has expanded beyond transit corridors to include anchored and berthed vessels, increasing exposure across both maritime and port environments.

The operating environment is now defined by parallel routing structures, selective access, diplomatic coordination, and elevated kinetic risk.

Outlook

The Strait of Hormuz now operates as a dual-corridor system, combining IRGC-managed control with an emerging Omani-aligned route supported by diplomatic coordination.

Iranian exports remain active under AIS-dark conditions, with sustained loading at Kharg Island and continued flows toward Asia. Selective exemptions, including Iraqi crude, indicate that transit permissions are increasingly differentiated and strategically allocated.

At the same time, vessel targeting inside the Gulf shows that risk extends beyond chokepoints to include anchored and port-based assets.

The maritime environment is defined by controlled access, parallel routing structures, opaque energy flows, and expanding security risk across both transit corridors and port operations.

Read the full update from Windward here.

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Key Takeaways – April 2, 2026

• Transits on April 1 climbed for a third consecutive day to 16, from 11 on March 31. More countries are negotiating with Iran to get ships through, suggesting the pace of transits could rise in coming days.
• Three Omani-controlled ships – two tankers and one liquefied natural gas carrier – exited the Strait of Hormuz on April 2 using the normal navigation channel over the re-routed, IRGC-controlled corridor in place since March 14.
• Western sanctioned ships comprised 62% of transits on April 1 as Iran’s inbound shadow tanker fleet prepared for further loadings.

Operational Overview

Three of the four bulk carriers that exited on April 1 were Greece-owned and one China-owned. This signals that EU as well as Asia shipowners are negotiating at both diplomatic and commercial levels to use the permission-based system.

Strait of Hormuz Transits Rise

Sanctioned, Iran-linked tankers dominated inbound transits on April 1. There were nine inbound transits (7 tankers and 2 cargo vessels) tracked via AIS.

Vessels involved in the transport of containerized goods and dry bulk commodities from Iran dominated outbound transits (4 cargo and 2 tankers), according to AIS signals

62% of transits were on sanctioned vessels with falsely flagged tankers flown by 6 ships. Fraudulent registries used included Madagascar, Botswana and Aruba. Three falsely broadcast they were using Comoros.

All 16 ships used the route via Larak Island, a permission-based, selective blockade imposed by Iran around March 14. The route circumvents the normal channel with vessels hugging Iran’s coastline within territorial waters to go through.

Read the full update from Windward here.

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Key Takeaways – April 1, 2026

• Iran is consolidating its control of the permission-based route through the Strait of Hormuz that allows vessels to transit via Larak Island. The route, a selective blockade,  has been operational since March 15. On March 31, 11 AIS-transmitting vessels crossed the Strait, while additional movements likely occurred under partial or fully dark conditions.
• Six AIS-transmitting vessels exited the Gulf, while five AIS-transmitting vessels entered, bringing the total number of confirmed crossings to 11 on March 31.
• A tanker was struck off Ras Laffan, Qatar, by two Iranian missiles, the second attack in as many days, and the 24th reported event since the war began.
• Iran is set to deliver its first oil to India in seven years, taking advantage of a US waiver issued to Iranian cargoes on the water two weeks ago.

Operational Overview

36% of transits seen March 31 were on US-sanctioned vessels, while 27% were Greece-owned bulk carriers shipping agricultural commodities to or from the Islamic Republic. This highlights how the selective blockade of the Strait of Hormuz is benefiting Iran.

Outlook

The Strait of Hormuz remains effectively closed for a fifth week, as Iran entrenches a selective, permission-based transit regime rather than pursuing full closure. Limited increases in crossings suggest a calibrated strategy to maintain market leverage while allowing controlled flows.At the same time, policy distortions, including US waivers, are reshaping trade flows and benefiting sanctioned and dark fleet operators.

Read the full update from Windward here.

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Key Takeaways – March 31, 2026

• Six AIS-transmitting vessels crossed the Strait of Hormuz under Iran’s controlled transit system, with additional dark movements likely.
• Bandar Abbas activity reveals a structured AIS-dark logistics model balancing energy exports, food imports, and China-linked trade.
• Iranian oil on water reached approximately 184 million barrels, with continued AIS-dark export operations from Kharg Island.
• Ust-Luga exports remain severely disrupted, with only one shipment recorded in seven days.
• Russian crude flows are adapting, including a new shipment to Cuba via a sanctioned tanker.
• A drone strike on a laden VLCC near Dubai highlights expanding kinetic risk inside Gulf waters.
• Port disruptions across the Gulf and external hubs reflect continued rerouting pressure and operational instability.

Operational Overview

Transit through the Strait of Hormuz remains controlled rather than open, but throughput is increasing. On March 30, six AIS-transmitting vessels crossed the corridor, while additional movements likely occurred under partial or fully dark conditions.

At the same time, vessel activity at Bandar Abbas provides visibility into how this system operates in practice. A coordinated pattern is emerging: outbound energy exports continue, inbound food supply is prioritized, and China-Iran trade flows remain active, all under AIS-dark conditions.

Beyond Hormuz, pressure on global oil flows is intensifying. Iranian exports continue through opaque logistics networks, Ust-Luga remains disrupted following repeated UAV strikes, and a direct strike on a laden VLCC near Dubai signals expanding exposure across Gulf waters.

The operating environment reflects three concurrent dynamics: controlled access through Hormuz, large-scale dark activity, and growing kinetic risk to infrastructure and anchored vessels.

Read the full update from Windward here.

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Key Takeaways – March 30

• Hormuz remains under controlled, selective transit with standard lanes empty.
• Ust-Luga sustained five UAV attacks in seven days, threatening Russian exports.
• Yanbu is operating as the primary Gulf bypass at ~7 million barrels per day.
• Iranian exports continue, with ~174.2 million barrels in floating storage.
• Russian oil on water stands at ~237.75 million barrels across products.
• Jet fuel supply is tightening, with tanker counts dropping from 78 to 22.
• Combined disruption across Hormuz, Yanbu, and Ust-Luga could remove ~27.15 million barrels per day.

Operational Overview

Global oil and maritime markets are now facing simultaneous pressure across three critical export nodes.

The Strait of Hormuz remains effectively closed under selective IRGC-controlled transit. Ust-Luga has sustained its fifth UAV attack in seven days. Yanbu is operating as the primary alternative outlet for Gulf crude while facing a growing Houthi threat to Red Sea traffic.

This creates a materially different risk environment from earlier stages of the conflict. Rather than a single chokepoint disruption, the market is now exposed to the possibility that the Gulf’s primary outlet, Russia’s Baltic export corridor, and the main Saudi bypass route could all face severe interruption at the same time.

At the same time, Iranian exports remain active, and selective transit through Hormuz continues to scale for approved cargoes, and standard commercial lanes remain inactive.

Taken together, the maritime environment is defined by constrained but functioning selective transit in Hormuz, rising structural dependence on Yanbu, and growing concern that a multi-hub disruption could trigger a global oil shock, severe freight inflation, and wider geopolitical escalation.

Read the full update from Windward here.

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Key Takeaways – March 29

• Transit through the Strait of Hormuz remains active but increasingly restricted, with six confirmed eastbound vessel movements under a tightly controlled Iranian corridor.
• Access is becoming less predictable, with multiple vessels denied passage, including two Chinese-owned ultra-large containerships.
• More than 50 containerships are now stranded west of the Strait, highlighting severe disruption to liner shipping.
• Bulk carriers, LPG tankers, and crude vessels continue to receive selective approval, reinforcing cargo-based prioritization.
• Vessels are being staged and sequenced for transit, with queue buildup indicating controlled throughput rather than recovery.
• A new U.S. MARAD advisory warns that AIS and onboard emissions are being used for targeting, increasing operational risk in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.
• Port activity continues to reflect rerouting pressure, with destination changes and transshipment volatility concentrated in the UAE and Oman.

Operational Overview

Maritime activity in and around the Strait of Hormuz is entering a more restrictive and unpredictable phase. While vessel movement continues through the Iranian-managed corridor near Larak Island, access is no longer consistent or assured. Approval is increasingly conditional, opaque, and subject to shifting criteria.

The clearest signal of this shift is the denial of transit to two Hong Kong-flagged, Chinese-owned ultra-large containerships. These vessels were turned back after attempting to enter the corridor, indicating that even major international operators are not guaranteed access.

This is not an isolated case. Additional vessels, including bulk carriers, livestock carriers, and sanctioned tankers, have been delayed, denied, or left awaiting approval. At the same time, a limited number of bulk, tanker, and LPG vessels continue to move eastbound under the selective-access model.

Congestion west of Hormuz continues to build. More than 50 containerships are now stranded, while additional vessels are staging or repositioning for potential clearance. The corridor is no longer just controlling traffic — it is actively filtering it based on cargo type, ownership profile, and geopolitical alignment.

Beyond the Gulf, the risk environment is evolving. A new U.S. MARAD advisory highlights that AIS and onboard emissions are being used for targeting in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, reinforcing a shift toward reduced visibility and more defensive voyage management.

Read the full update from Windward here.

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Key Takeaways – March 26

• Strait of Hormuz transit remains constrained but is scaling, with five AIS-visible crossings and additional semi-dark movements.
• Transit is increasingly governed through a controlled northern corridor near Larak Island rather than open navigation lanes.
• Iran is formalizing a selective-access system prioritizing outbound energy flows and inbound essential goods.
• Gulf vessel presence remains high, with 664 AIS-transmitting vessels despite restricted transit conditions.
• Salalah is emerging as a structural rerouting hub, supported by sustained destination changes and land-bridge logistics.
• Iranian oil exports remain active, but are increasingly supported by floating storage drawdown.
• China’s LPG sourcing is shifting toward Iran as U.S. tariffs and UAE disruptions constrain alternative supply.
• Port disruptions across Oman and the UAE confirm large-scale rerouting pressure.
• Russian oil flows remain elevated and globally distributed despite infrastructure strain.
• A new Black Sea strike highlights expanding kinetic risk beyond the Gulf.
• The threat environment remains multi-theater, spanning Hormuz, the Black Sea, and Bab el-Mandeb.

Operational Overview

Maritime activity in and around the Strait of Hormuz remains constrained but is now scaling under a more structured and formalized Iranian control model. Transit is no longer frozen, but it is not returning to open commercial conditions. Instead, vessel movement is being filtered through controlled routing patterns and selective access.

On March 25, five AIS-transmitting vessels crossed the Strait, while additional vessels moved semi-dark or without AIS. Standard commercial lanes remained empty, reinforcing that open navigation has not resumed. At the same time, vessel presence across the Gulf remains substantial, indicating that operations continue under constraint rather than collapse.

Iran’s control model is becoming more explicit. Routing patterns, cargo prioritization, and messaging to the UN and IMO all align with a system in which “non-hostile” vessels are permitted transit under coordination. This reflects a shift from navigational freedom to conditional access.

Beyond the Strait, the system is adjusting. Trade flows are being rerouted, supply chains are adapting structurally, and second-order impacts are expanding across energy, commodities, and logistics networks.

Read the full update from Windward here.

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Key Takeaways – March 25

• Strait of Hormuz transit remains highly constrained, with only four AIS-visible crossings and no activity in standard commercial lanes.
• Transit continues through a controlled northern corridor, with vessels staged and sequenced for passage.
• Iran has formalized its selective transit model, allowing “non-hostile” vessels to pass under coordination.
• Iranian crude exports remain steady, but are increasingly supported by declining floating storage rather than new supply.
• Dark activity persists, with 318 events recorded and vessels entering the Gulf without AIS transmission.
• A dual fertilizer supply shock is emerging in East Sub-Saharan Africa due to disrupted Gulf flows and reduced South Asian production.
• Port disruptions are intensifying outside the Gulf, with acute transshipment pressure in Oman.
• Maritime security risk remains elevated, with 20 vessels attacked and sustained military deployment across the region.
• Russian export infrastructure remains under pressure, with Primorsk offline and Ust-Luga only partially recovered.

Operational Overview

Maritime activity in and around the Strait of Hormuz remains constrained but operational under a clearly selective transit framework. While commercial shipping has not resumed through standard lanes, vessel movements continue through controlled routing patterns aligned with Iranian oversight.

On March 24, only four AIS-transmitting vessels crossed the Strait, while standard commercial lanes remained empty as of 02:15 GMT. At the same time, vessel presence across the Gulf remained substantial, indicating that operations have not stopped, but are being filtered and managed.

Iran’s control model is now explicit. Its communication to the UN and IMO that “non-hostile” vessels may transit if coordinated reinforces what is already visible in routing behavior. Transit is no longer governed by open navigation, but by conditional access.

Beyond the Strait, the broader maritime system is adjusting. Energy flows remain active, but underlying structures are shifting, and second-order impacts are emerging across global commodity markets.

Read the full update from Windward here.

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Key Takeaways – March 24

• Maritime activity remains constrained but active, with vessel movements continuing under controlled routing patterns.
• Transit through Hormuz remains limited and permission-based, with vessels following a defined northern corridor.
• Iranian naval mine deployment introduces a new, largely invisible risk layer to commercial shipping.
• Gulf vessel presence has increased, reflecting continued operations despite disruption and elevated threat levels.
• Iranian crude exports remain elevated, with volumes increasing under temporary sanctions relief and flows concentrated toward China.
• Russian oil volumes remain high, though infrastructure strikes are introducing growing forward supply risk.
• Port activity reflects continued rerouting and destination changes, particularly across UAE and Omani hubs.
• Maritime operations are increasingly defined by a combination of controlled access and escalating security risk.

Operational Overview

Maritime activity in and around the Strait of Hormuz remains constrained but increasingly structured, as vessel movements continue under controlled routing patterns and elevated threat conditions. On March 23, limited transit activity was observed, with vessels routing north of Larak Island, reinforcing the emergence of a managed corridor rather than open commercial passage.

At the same time, the threat environment is escalating. U.S. intelligence assessments indicate the presence of Iranian naval mines within the Strait, introducing a persistent and largely invisible risk to maritime operations. While diplomatic signals suggest potential de-escalation, the physical risk to vessels transiting the waterway remains acute.

Across the Gulf, vessel presence increased to 681 AIS-transmitting foreign vessels, reflecting continued operational activity despite disruption. Energy flows remain elevated, with both Iranian and Russian crude volumes sustained under temporary sanctions frameworks, even as infrastructure strikes and supply constraints introduce growing instability.

Taken together, maritime operations are now defined by a dual dynamic: constrained but ongoing commercial activity, operating within an increasingly militarized and risk-intensive environment.

Read the full update from Windward here.

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At a Glance

• Commercial traffic through the Strait of Hormuz remained near collapse throughout the third week, according to the latest update from Windward, with only 16 AIS-visible crossings recorded over a seven -day period and one full day with zero AIS-confirmed crossings in either direction.
• Selective transit behavior became more visible, with authorized cargo vessel crossings, bulk carriers routing through Iranian territorial waters, and evidence of a controlled, permission-based transit model.
• Remote Sensing Intelligence identified eight large vessels operating dark inside the Strait, indicating concentrated AIS suppression among high-capacity maritime assets.
• The Gulf of Oman became a major holding area, with approximately 400 vessels detected outside Hormuz, while total vessel presence across the Gulf reached 686 ships, reflecting accumulation rather than system clearance.
• Iranian export activity continued under constrained conditions, with sustained loading at Kharg Island and a rare crude shipment from Kooh Mobarak enabling exports east of the Strait, while overall Gulf crude and LPG export volumes declined to recent lows.
• Global routing patterns began to rebalance, with increased transits through Bab el-Mandeb and the Suez Canal, while traffic around the Cape of Good Hope remained elevated.
• Port disruption remained significant across Gulf-adjacent logistics hubs, with sharp increases in rollovers and delays at Khalifa, Karachi, and Salalah, alongside early signs of localized easing outside the Gulf by March 22.
• Maritime risk widened beyond the Gulf, with a tanker strike in the Black Sea, unusual Russian tanker activity in the Arctic, and continued anomalous AIS behavior linked to Cuba-bound energy flows.
• Policy responses also expanded, including OFAC General License 134, which allowed previously loaded Russian oil cargoes to complete delivery across a large global tanker fleet, while European enforcement escalated to physical interdictions of a sanctioned vessel.

The Third Week of the Iran War at Sea

Three weeks after the launch of Operation Epic Fury, the maritime conflict in the Gulf has moved beyond immediate disruption into a more structured and adaptive phase. Commercial traffic through the Strait of Hormuz remains near collapse, but the operating picture is no longer defined only by paralysis. Instead, the third week has been marked by controlled movement, dark activity, and selective access, alongside visible adaptation by both state and commercial actors.

The clearest shift is in how access through Hormuz appears to be functioning. Rather than a fully open corridor or a formally declared closure, the Strait increasingly appears to be operating under a selective, permission-based transit model. A small number of cargo vessels were confirmed crossing under exceptional circumstances, bulk carriers were observed routing through Iranian territorial waters, and Iranian officials continued to describe the Strait as open to international shipping while asserting restrictions on specific flags and operators.

At the same time, the wider maritime system continued adjusting around the disruption. Hundreds of vessels accumulated outside the chokepoint in the Gulf of Oman, long-haul Cape diversions remained elevated, and traffic through Bab el-Mandeb and the Suez Canal began to recover unevenly. Iranian exports also continued under constrained conditions, with loading at Kharg Island still active and a rare crude export from Kooh Mobarak showing how Tehran is testing alternative outlets beyond the Strait.

Energy markets are also beginning to show visible strain, with declining export volumes, disrupted refined product flows, and increasing reliance on alternative corridors to sustain global supply.

As a result, the third week of the war at sea has been characterized less by a total shutdown than by an emerging constrained equilibrium: highly restricted movement through Hormuz, controlled exceptions for selected vessels, sustained use of dark maritime behavior, and continued rerouting across the wider global shipping system.

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Key Takeaways – March 18

• Traffic through the Strait of Hormuz remains severely constrained, with transit operating under controlled conditions rather than normal commercial flow, according to the March 18, 2026, update from Windward.
• Eight large vessels were detected operating without AIS in the Strait, indicating concentrated dark activity among high-capacity assets.
• Bulk carriers continue routing through Iranian territorial waters, reinforcing a permission-based transit model.
• Iranian crude exports remain active, with ongoing loading operations and vessel buildup at Kharg Island.
• Port operations show rising volatility, with sharp increases in rollovers and delays across key Gulf and regional hubs.
• Global routing patterns show early signs of stabilization, with increased traffic through Bab el-Mandeb and the Suez Canal.
• Traffic around the Cape of Good Hope remains elevated, confirming continued reliance on long-haul alternative routes.
• Global participation in Gulf operations persists, with international fleets maintaining a presence despite reduced transit volumes.

Operational Overview

Maritime activity across the Strait of Hormuz remains severely constrained, with continued evidence that transit is being tightly controlled rather than fully restored. Commercial movement through the Strait has not normalized, and access appears increasingly selective.

At the same time, visibility within the Strait is deteriorating. Remote Sensing Intelligence has identified a concentration of large vessels operating without AIS transmission, indicating that high-capacity assets are actively suppressing visibility while navigating the chokepoint.

Routing behavior continues to evolve under these conditions. Bulk carriers are exiting the Gulf via Iranian territorial waters, sailing along the coastline rather than standard international navigation channels. This pattern reinforces the emergence of a controlled transit model, where movement is selectively enabled.

Iranian export activity remains active despite disruption. Loading operations at Kharg Island continue, supported by both berthed tankers and a buildup of vessels in anchorage, indicating sustained throughput capacity under constrained conditions.

Beyond the Gulf, maritime traffic patterns indicate early signs of global rebalancing. Increased transit volumes through Bab el-Mandeb and the Suez Canal, alongside continued traffic around the Cape of Good Hope, suggest that shipping is adapting through alternative corridors.

Strait of Hormuz Dark Activity

On March 16, Remote Sensing Intelligence identified eight vessels exceeding 290 meters in length operating within the Strait of Hormuz.

All detected vessels were operating without AIS transmission at the time of observation. While vessel classifications could not be confirmed, their size indicates high-capacity platforms, consistent with VLCCs, VLOCs, Capesize bulk carriers, ultra large container ships, or New Panamax vessels.

The concentration of large, dark vessels within the Strait suggests intentional suppression of visibility among high-value maritime assets operating in a high-risk environment.

Iranian Export Activity at Kharg Island

Loading operations at Kharg Island remain active.

As of March 17, Remote Sensing Intelligence detected two VLCCs and one Aframax tanker berthed at the terminal, with sixteen additional vessels present in anchorage, likely awaiting loading.

The anchorage includes a wide range of vessel sizes, including nine vessels in the 250–333 meter range, indicating the presence of multiple large-capacity ships queued for crude export.

This buildup suggests continued demand and queuing for loading, reinforcing that export capacity remains active despite disruption across the Gulf. Activity appears to be supported by staging and controlled throughput rather than unrestricted transit.

Gulf Operations Snapshot

Maritime activity within the Gulf continues to reflect broad international participation despite constrained transit conditions.

Panama (229 vessels), the Marshall Islands (156 vessels), and Liberia (155 vessels) remain the leading flag states operating in the region, followed by Comoros (99 vessels) and Singapore (90 vessels). Vessel activity is led by bulk carriers (163 vessels), alongside oil product tankers (93 vessels), crude oil tankers (83 vessels), and container vessels (51 vessels), with a smaller presence of LNG carriers (12 vessels).

Company ownership spans major maritime hubs including Japan, Germany, South Korea, Hong Kong, and Singapore, indicating that global operators continue to maintain exposure to Gulf operations despite elevated risk and reduced mobility.

Global Routing Shifts and Alternative Corridors

Maritime traffic across key chokepoints indicates early signs of rerouting stabilization.

Traffic through Bab el-Mandeb increased sharply to 38 crossings on March 16, representing a significant rise compared to the previous day. Activity was led by bulk carriers, container vessels, and crude oil tankers, with flag states including the Marshall Islands, Panama, and China.

Suez Canal traffic also remained elevated, with 39 vessels transiting on March 15. The traffic mix included bulk carriers, crude oil tankers, and container vessels, led by Liberia, Panama, and Sierra Leone-flagged ships.

At the same time, 71 vessels transited the Cape of Good Hope on March 16. Bulk carriers dominated traffic, followed by container vessels and ore carriers, with the Marshall Islands, Liberia, and Singapore as leading flag states.

While the Cape route remains heavily utilized, increased traffic through Bab el-Mandeb and the Suez Canal suggests that vessels are beginning to return to shorter routes. This reflects early-stage normalization of global routing outside the Gulf, even as Hormuz remains constrained.

Port Operations Disruptions

Operational signals indicate rising volatility across both Gulf and external ports.

Inside the Gulf, Khalifa Port recorded 15 transshipment rollovers (+1,400% day-over-day, +2,525% vs 7-day average) and 8 transshipment-delay cases (+700% day-over-day, +833.33% vs 7-day average), reflecting a sharp spike in disruption. Jubail recorded 12 transshipment rollovers, with no change compared to both the previous day and the 7-day average.

Outside the Gulf, Karachi recorded 5 port-of-loading rollovers (−28.57% day-over-day, +288.89% vs 7-day average), alongside 4 transshipment rollovers (+300% day-over-day, +55.56% vs 7-day average) and 2 transshipment-delay cases (no change day-over-day, −54.84% vs 7-day average).

Salalah showed mixed but elevated activity, with 11 late departures (+1,000% day-over-day, +75% vs 7-day average), 4 rollovers (no change day-over-day, +600% vs 7-day average), 17 transshipment rollovers (+54.55% day-over-day, −31.21% vs 7-day average), and 69 transshipment-delay cases (+263.16% day-over-day, +82.95% vs 7-day average).

These patterns indicate significant instability in port operations, with sharp increases in delays and rollovers reflecting ongoing disruption to cargo flow and scheduling.

Outlook

The March 18 operating picture reflects a maritime system functioning under constraint rather than recovery, with the Strait of Hormuz remaining tightly controlled and visibility within the corridor significantly reduced.

At the same time, adaptive behaviors are becoming more defined. Dark vessel activity among large-capacity ships, controlled routing through Iranian territorial waters, and continued export operations at Kharg Island indicate that maritime and energy flows are being sustained through structured, non-transparent mechanisms.

Beyond the Gulf, global shipping patterns show early signs of adjustment. Increased use of Bab el-Mandeb and the Suez Canal, alongside continued reliance on the Cape of Good Hope, suggests that operators are recalibrating route strategies to balance risk, cost, and transit time.

In the near term, maritime activity is likely to remain defined by restricted access to Hormuz, controlled transit conditions, and continued reliance on alternative corridors, with global trade flows adapting to a persistently constrained operating environment.

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Key Takeaways – March 16

• Commercial traffic through the Strait of Hormuz remains near collapse, with only two crossings recorded on March 16, according to the latest update from Windward.
• Bulk carriers are re-routing through Iranian territorial waters, indicating the emergence of selective, permission-based transit.
• Iran has executed a rare crude export from the Kooh Mobarak terminal, bypassing the Strait of Hormuz entirely.
• Maritime security risk remains active in the Gulf, with a confirmed projectile strike on a tanker near Fujairah.
• Dark vessel activity and AIS suppression continue within the Strait, reinforcing ongoing sanctions evasion dynamics.
• Port activity remains unstable, with easing congestion at Salalah and elevated disruption levels in Karachi.
• Bandar Abbas shows a complete absence of commercial and military vessel presence, suggesting a potential drawdown or redistribution.
• Anomalous AIS behavior persists outside the Gulf, including prolonged “Not Under Command” broadcasts linked to Sea Horse, a Russia-associated tanker.
• Maritime security risks continue to expand geographically, with confirmed kinetic activity in the Black Sea.

Operational Overview

Maritime activity across the Strait of Hormuz remains critically constrained as the conflict enters its third week, with transit volumes continuing at near-zero levels. On March 16, only two vessel crossings were recorded, reinforcing the sustained collapse in commercial traffic through one of the world’s most critical energy chokepoints.

At the same time, routing behavior is evolving. Bulk carriers have begun re-routing through Iranian territorial waters to exit the Gulf, sailing along the Iranian coastline rather than standard international navigation channels. This shift indicates the emergence of a controlled transit environment, where movement is selectively enabled rather than fully denied.

Iran is also adapting its export strategy. A crude shipment from the Kooh Mobarak terminal, located east of the Strait of Hormuz, demonstrates a clear effort to bypass the chokepoint entirely and maintain oil flows despite maritime disruption.

Beyond the Gulf, maritime security risks continue to expand geographically. A confirmed tanker strike in the Black Sea underscores the development of a multi-theater threat environment affecting global shipping.

Strait of Hormuz Traffic

Transit activity through the Strait of Hormuz remains extremely limited.

On March 16, Windward recorded two total crossings, consisting of one inbound and one outbound vessel. This represents a 33.33% decrease compared to the previous day and remains below the 7-day average of 2.43 crossings.

All identified vessels were bulk carriers, both flagged to Panama. Overall traffic levels remain approximately 97% below normal, reinforcing the continued near-closure of the waterway to standard commercial shipping.

At the same time, routing behavior is shifting. Between March 15 and March 16, at least five bulk carriers were observed exiting the Gulf via routes within Iranian territorial waters, sailing along the Iranian coastline instead of standard navigation channels.

Iranian Crude Oil Export via Kooh Mobarak Terminal

A significant shift in Iranian export behavior has been identified at the Kooh Mobarak terminal, located east of the Strait of Hormuz.

On March 8, a sanctioned VLCC departed the terminal carrying approximately 1.77 million barrels of Iranian Heavy Crude, bound for Dalian, China. The vessel has remained in a 15+ day AIS blackout following departure.

Remote Sensing Intelligence confirmed the presence of a VLCC-class vessel at the terminal on March 7, consistent with the loading timeline.

This marks the first recorded export from Kooh Mobarak in 2026, following only a single shipment in 2025, indicating historically minimal usage of the terminal.

The terminal’s location enables Iran to bypass the Strait of Hormuz entirely, reducing exposure to transit restrictions and naval threats. The activity suggests a deliberate effort to diversify export routes and sustain crude flows under constrained maritime conditions.

Maritime Security Incident

A maritime security incident was reported 23 nautical miles east of Fujairah, UAE, involving a tanker struck by an unknown projectile while at anchor.

The vessel sustained minor structural damage, with no reported injuries or environmental impact. Authorities are currently investigating the incident.

Windward was unable to definitively identify the vessel due to the presence of a GPS jamming zone in the area, which limited tracking and attribution.

This event reinforces the continued presence of low-intensity, high-frequency threat activity in proximity to key Gulf anchorage areas.

Dark Vessel Activity

SAR imagery collected on March 16 identified an OFAC-sanctioned vessel operating without AIS transmission on the western side of the Strait of Hormuz.

Analysis indicates the vessel was underway and entering the Arabian Gulf, consistent with ballast status data. The vessel last transmitted AIS on March 13 near Khor Fakkan before going dark.

The vessel is associated with sanctioned networks and fraudulent flag registration, highlighting the continued use of AIS suppression and identity obfuscation to enable movement under heightened monitoring conditions.

Port Operations Disruptions

Operational patterns across regional ports indicate continued volatility, with mixed signals between disruption and localized easing.

Inside the Gulf, Umm Qasr recorded two transshipment-delay cases, with no change from the previous day and no deviation from the 7-day average.

Outside the Gulf, Karachi recorded two port-of-loading late departures, up 100% day-on-day, alongside seven rollovers, remaining unchanged from the previous day but up 1,125% compared to the 7-day average.

Salalah recorded eleven transshipment rollovers and nineteen delay cases, both showing sharp declines compared to the previous day and below the 7-day average.

The data suggests a temporary easing at Salalah, while disruption persists in Karachi, reflecting uneven pressure across alternative logistics hubs.

Bandar Abbas Activity

Satellite imagery indicates a complete absence of observable activity at Bandar Abbas as of March 15.

At the commercial dock, five vessels were present on March 2, compared to none on March 15. At the military dock, seventeen vessels were observed on March 2, with no vessels detected on March 15.

This sharp reduction suggests a temporary drawdown or redistribution of both commercial and military maritime presence at one of Iran’s primary port facilities.

Anomalous AIS Behavior

The Russia-linked tanker Sea Horse continues to exhibit anomalous AIS behavior in the Atlantic.

Since February 25, the vessel has remained in the Atlantic while continuously broadcasting a “Not Under Command” status, with no clear progression toward its previously declared destination in Cuba.

The prolonged stationary pattern and inconsistent movement signals suggest potential AIS manipulation or operational disruption, though the exact cause cannot be confirmed.

This behavior aligns with earlier indications of dark tanker activity near Cuban crude terminals, suggesting that opaque maritime logistics networks may still be facilitating energy flows despite reduced visible traffic.

Outlook

The March 17 operating picture reflects a maritime system operating under severe constraint, with the Strait of Hormuz effectively restricted and commercial traffic remaining near-zero.

At the same time, adaptive behaviors are emerging. Selective routing through Iranian territorial waters, alternative export pathways such as Kooh Mobarak, and shifting port activity patterns indicate that both state and commercial actors are adjusting to sustained disruption.

Maritime security risk remains active within the Gulf, with continued incidents near key anchorage areas, alongside ongoing dark vessel activity and AIS suppression.

Beyond the region, the confirmed tanker strike in the Black Sea and anomalous vessel behavior in the Atlantic point to a broader, multi-theater risk environment.

In the near term, maritime activity is likely to remain defined by restricted transit through Hormuz, controlled movement under selective access conditions, and continued redistribution of trade flows across global maritime corridors.