Key Takeaways
- Moscow has warned that the relocation of Central Asian and North Caucasus jihadists from Syria to Afghanistan could strengthen al-Qaeda and ISKP networks, posing a growing security threat to Russia and Central Asia.
- Mounting pressure from Syria’s new authorities, limited prospects for citizenship, fears of deportation, and growing ideological tensions may drive some Central Asian and North Caucasus jihadists to relocate to Afghanistan, where they could reinforce ISKP and al-Qaeda networks.
- An ISKP strengthened by relocated Idlib militants could intensify suicide attacks against the Taliban, Central Asian states, and U.S. interests while further radicalizing Central Asian migrant communities in Europe and the US, potentially facilitating external attack plots.
Moscow Warns of Returning Central Asian Fighters from Syria to Afghanistan
According to a recent report issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Afghanistan is estimated to host between 20,000 and 23,000 militants affiliated with various international terrorist organizations, with more than half assessed to be foreign fighters. The report attributes approximately 3,000 operatives to ISKP, while Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) is estimated at 5,000–7,000 fighters. Al-Qaeda’s presence is assessed at more than 1,500 operatives. The Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP), also known as the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), is believed to field up to 1,200 militants. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) reportedly comprises up to 500 fighters, while the Tajik group Jamaat Ansarullah (JA) is assessed at over 250 members.
The Russian Foreign Ministry emphasizes that ISKP remains active across eastern, northern, and northeastern Afghanistan, and seeks to expand into Central Asia with the objective of undermining secular governments and establishing an Islamic Caliphate. Following this assessment, a pro-Kremlin think tank claimed that up to 8,500–9,000 Uzbek, Tajik, Turkmen, Uyghur, and Caucasian jihadists have relocated from Syria to Afghanistan.
The same sources allege that returning Central Asian militants are being coordinated by Abu Bakr al-Badakhshani, a former al-Qaeda operative from Afghanistan’s Badakhshan province. He reportedly fought in Syria against the Bashar al-Assad government before relocating to Afghanistan, where he is said to maintain close contacts with the governor of northern Panjshir province, Mawlawi Mohammad Agha Hakim, described as a “key Al-Qaeda figure within the Taliban regime”. A Russian researcher claimed that Agha Hakim had established a militant base in Panjshir’s Tunghu Valley, reportedly hosting Uzbek, Tajik, and North Caucasian fighters under al-Qaeda coordination.
Although Moscow has frequently amplified the Afghan terrorist threat to maintain its security influence over post-Soviet Central Asia and strengthen institutions such as the CSTO and SCO, the reported relocation of Uzbek, Tajik, and Chechen militants from Syria amid tightening Syrian security measures appears increasingly plausible. Against the backdrop of Central Asian jihadists relocating from Syria to Afghanistan, the Kremlin is once again amplifying the threat posed by ISKP to heighten regional security fears and portray itself as Central Asia’s indispensable security guarantor.
Al-Sharaa’s Pressure and the Fragmentation of Foreign Jihadist Factions in Syria
Following the fall of Bashar al-Assad and the rise of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) leader Abu Mohammad al-Joulani—now Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa—in December 2024, Central Asian and North Caucasian militant factions initially celebrated what they described as the victory of “sacred jihad” in Damascus, viewing it as a model for future Islamist governance.
However, the new Syrian authorities have adopted a pragmatic approach, tightening control over foreign fighters, prohibiting public threats against Central Asian states, Russia, and China, curbing global Salafi-jihadi narratives, and dissolving foreign battalions. In return, integration into the new Syrian army and pathways to citizenship were offered.
Some Uzbek fighters from Katibat Imam al-Bukhari (KIB) and Katibat Tawhid wal-Jihad (KTJ), Chechen elements of Ajnad al-Kavkaz (AK) and Jaysh al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar (JMA), and approximately 3,000 Uyghur fighters from the TIP have been partially integrated into the 84th Division of the new Syrian army. This process has diluted their organizational identities and constrained their ability to project transnational jihadist activity.
As a result, post-Soviet jihadist groups that fought alongside HTS have become increasingly fragmented and restricted under strict media controls prohibiting group branding, banners, and external Salafi-Jihadi propaganda.
A segment of Central Asian foreign fighters excluded from integration into the Syrian army has expressed growing discontent, accusing KTJ emir Abdul Aziz al-Uzbeki and his military deputy Saifuddin Tojiboy of deviating from the principles of “sacred jihad” and engaging in corruption and nepotism in the distribution of salaries from the Syrian Ministry of Defense.
Syrian authorities have dealt harshly with Uzbek militants who violated new government restrictions. Following a raid on a Druze community in Daraa and the promotion of his Muhajir Tactical group, Abu Dujana al-Turkistani (formerly Ayub Hawk), along with his deputy Islomjon al-Uzbeki and Kyrgyz militant Koshoy Khan, was imprisoned from August 2025 to April 2026. More than 10 post-Soviet militants are currently detained in Syria on charges of illegally occupying homes belonging to former Assad-era officials and Druze, Alawite, and Christian residents in northern Syria—properties now being returned to their original owners by the new authorities.
One of the most serious incidents occurred on 5 May 2026 in Idlib, when more than 24 Uzbek militants were arrested following an armed standoff in Kafriya and al-Foua. The confrontation was reportedly triggered by a raid on the residence of Abu Ali al-Tajiki, an Uzbek militant suspected of involvement in highway robberies, who was killed in the ensuing firefight. More than 50 Uzbek fighters reportedly surrounded a Criminal Security headquarters in Idlib, demanding the release of detained militants, prompting Syrian forces to deploy heavy military equipment. The standoff was eventually defused following mediation by Uzbek elders led by KTJ emir Abdul Aziz al-Uzbeki, who reportedly reaffirmed his loyalty to the Syrian state.
While tensions between post-Soviet jihadists and the Syrian government remain unresolved and only temporarily contained, a dissident segment of Uzbek militants claimed in a statement that “a trilateral meeting was held on May 9 between Uzbek fighters affiliated with the Syrian Army, a Syrian defense official, and independent Uzbek Muhajireen, organized by Abdul Aziz al-Uzbeki, a brigade commander linked to the MoD”.
In a statement, opposing Uzbek militants complained of repression by al-Sharaa’s government, citing widespread accusations of links to the Islamic State. According to the statement, during the meeting the spokesperson of the Syrian MoD—identified by the militants as “Abu Abdou Tauma”—warned that Uzbek fighters operating outside the MoD structure would be treated as Islamic State militants and detained. The statement further alleged that Abdul Aziz al-Uzbeki reinforced this position by declaring that Uzbek militants opposing government forces would face arrest.
According to dissenting Uzbek militants, refusal to integrate into the new Syrian army has led to detentions, with detainees allegedly subjected to torture during interrogations to extract confessions of IS affiliation or information on other Uzbek fighters. They claim that the “persecution of hundreds of Uzbek Muhajireen for not being affiliated with the MoD is illegal, unjust, and dangerous, as they refused to allow their women and children to live under conditions of terror and intimidation.”
In conclusion, dissident Uzbek jihadists recalled having fought alongside HTS during its most difficult periods, describing themselves as long-standing comrades in jihad, and demanded that any allegations of wrongdoing be substantiated under Sharia, rather than reflecting pressure from Russia and the US, which have urged al-Sharaa to crack down on foreign jihadist elements.
ISKP Exploits Emerging Divisions Among Uzbek Jihadists
In the editorial ‘Between the Follower and the Followed’ published in Issue 547 of al-Naba, ISIS called on former foreign fighters in Syria to join its ranks, seeking to exploit recent tensions between dissident Uzbek militants and the Syrian government. ISIS warned that al-Sharaa’s administration would ultimately move against foreign fighters under pressure from external actors, including Israel and the United States. The group instead urged them to ‘repent’ and defect to ISIS, which it portrayed as a transnational Islamic Caliphate unconstrained by national borders” (al-Naba, no. 547, May 14, 2026).
Uzbek, Tajik, and Russian ISKP supporters have mocked the deteriorating position of dissident Uzbek jihadists in Syria. Arabic-language pro-IS accounts argued that foreign fighters now face consequences for failing to join the group earlier, with one user, Al-Battar al-Janubi, writing that they are “reaping what they sowed.” Another account, Amjad al-Hashimi, cited earlier warnings attributed to Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, the late ISIS spokesman, suggesting that al-Jolani would eventually “consume them.” Some ISKP supporters have further framed the developments as a “last opportunity” for Uzbek fighters, urging them to join the group.
Online debates across Telegram and Facebook further intensified over reports of violence against Uzbek jihadists by Syrian forces. A pro-ISKP supporter using the Facebook alias “Majora Markazi” accused pro-HTS Uzbek jihadists of abandoning Islamic principles, recalling their earlier denunciations of “Islamic Khilafah fighters as proponents of kharijism and takfirism.” He further claimed that Uzbek Muhajireen had become targets of “al-Jolani the munafiq,” portraying the situation as evidence of the need to embrace the “true path of Allah.” Indeed, ISKP’s Voice of Khurasan magazine portrayed al-Jolani as a munafiq and accused his administration of betraying Islamic principles through its embrace of nationalism, political pragmatism, and cooperation with what the publication described as “Zio-Crusader kuffar and mushrikin.” The magazine framed these policies as evidence of the Syrian leadership’s departure from “true jihad” and the broader transnational Salafi-jihadi project.
Amid rising tensions, some Uzbek militants expressed fears that Syrian authorities could transfer them to Türkiye’s National Intelligence Organization (MIT) for possible deportation to Central Asia. Such concerns appear plausible given Türkiye’s intensified counterterrorism campaign against ISIS financial networks across Türkiye, Syria, and Iraq in December 2025, which reportedly led to the detention of 357 suspects linked to Islamic State financial transfers. Central Asian jihadists in Syria and Iraq have long relied on Türkiye as a key transit hub, while the presence of their families there may have exposed their financial remittances to MIT scrutiny.
Conclusion: Security Implications of Relocated Militants
Intensifying military pressure on Central Asian and North Caucasus jihadists, the absence of prospects for Syrian citizenship, and fears of deportation to their countries of origin—where they face likely repression and long prison terms—combined with ideological tensions with the emerging Syrian state, may drive some fighters to return to Afghanistan, where many originally began their militant trajectories.
Russian foreign and security services assess that Chechen, Uzbek, and Tajik jihadists are already relocating to Afghanistan, where some joined al-Qaeda and ISKP networks. Open-source analysis of Uzbek- and Tajik-language jihadist posts on Facebook and Telegram indicates that several hardline Salafists formerly active in Idlib have been present in Afghanistan since 2025. In Syria, they advanced al-Qaeda’s ideological narrative, while their relocation has been marked by continued online activity in Uzbek and Tajik using Cyrillic script—an uncommon practice within Afghanistan’s jihadist milieu. This suggests that foreign fighter returnees have reached Afghanistan, albeit in smaller numbers than claimed by Russian sources.
Overall, sustained pressure by Syrian security forces, combined with the fragmentation of KIB, KTJ, AK, and JMA, is reshaping the trajectory of post-Soviet jihadist networks with implications for Syria, Türkiye, Russia, Central Asia, and Western security interests.
First, battle-hardened Chechen, Uyghur, Uzbek, and Tajik jihadists who fought alongside HTS during the Syrian civil war and contributed to the fall of the Assad regime are increasingly expressing ideological dissatisfaction over the failure to establish sharia rule, a factor fueling the current tensions. Nevertheless, most Central Asian and Caucasus militants are likely to integrate into Syria’s new military structures and settle permanently in the country through family and community ties. Having largely abandoned ambitions of global jihad or its export from Syria, they are unlikely to pose a significant terrorist threat beyond Israel.
Second, the hardline faction of foreign jihadists that has already experienced friction with Syria’s security forces and criticized the refusal to enforce sharia norms, even in the limited scope previously seen in Idlib, is unlikely to expect accommodation from al-Sharaa’s administration. This cohort—primarily Uzbek, Tajik, and Chechen militants linked to KTJ, KIB, and AK that remain committed to al-Qaeda’s ideology—may increasingly relocate to Afghanistan. Many retain longstanding ties to the Haqqani Network, as well as operational links to the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) and IMU, while continuing to demonstrate loyalty to the Taliban. From Afghanistan, some could rejoin Jamaat Ansarullah or al-Qaeda in Badakhshan, potentially intensifying the terrorist threat to Tajikistan amid the anticipated succession from President Emomali Rahmon to his son Rustam. If successfully reconstituted, these networks could emerge as a growing security threat to Central Asia and Russia.
Third, the most destabilizing scenario involves hardline Uzbek and Tajik Salafi-jihadists, rejected in Syria, targeted by Türkiye’s MIT, and denied reintegration by the Taliban, drifting toward ISKP due to its ideological appeal, including its emphasis on global jihad and promises of sharia governance, as well as its intensified recruitment amid pressure from Syrian security forces. An ISKP reinforced by relocated Idlib militants could increase the frequency of suicide attacks against the Taliban, Central Asian states, and U.S. interests in the region. With accumulated battlefield experience in Syria and Afghanistan, the group could also further radicalize Central Asian migrant communities in Europe and the US, potentially facilitating external attack plotting.
