spot_img
62.5 F
Washington D.C.
Tuesday, September 28, 2021

State of Narrative Warfare: Learning from Afghanistan in the War for Influence

We need to lead with a comprehensive strategic narrative that speaks to the identity of its audience.

Not many predicted that on the 20-year anniversary of 9/11 we would be mourning the fall of Afghanistan. And now we are thinking about “lessons learned.” But we have not learned, and don’t even know enough to ask, about what warfare strategy the tactic (the tower hits) served.

Narrative Warfare attacks the identity layers and the sense-making apparatus of the target audience. A comprehensive Narrative Strategy has both offensive and defensive components and enlists tactics like the weaponization of adversarial narratives such that the target audience is being attacked from the inside. That is how we were hit on 9/11. Our identity layers as Americans were hit hard and we needed a way to understand such a horrific attack. The way we understood it was to contextualize it in our understanding (our meaning map: our narrative) of modern warfare as primarily kinetic. And away we went with our hardware.

The foundation of any gray zone effort ought to be a comprehensive Narrative Strategy designed for multi-layered influence. Let’s not confuse Narrative Strategies with StratComm because Narrative Warfare and the weaponized narratives that support it don’t necessarily “communicate” anything. All they need to do is trigger what is already there or trigger and then manipulate if necessary.

What is already there that weaponized narratives trigger? Identity. Why trigger identity? Because nothing is as motivating as an identity attack.

“The most effective weapons in warfare have always been the ones that target the cognitive space because they are the most enduring.”

Why use narrative to conduct an identity attack? Because it is through narrative that we construct ourselves. Our foundational cultural narratives tell us who we are supposed to be in the context in which we were born and then we each take it from there by living stories that reflect our narrative environment and our place in it. The telling of our stories does not merely reflect our identities; it co-creates the teller in the process of the telling.

Deeper, while the stories we tell about ourselves are conscious, the narrative foundation of those stories is less than conscious; it operates at the level of assumption. That is where weaponized narratives attack –- at the level of less-than-conscious assumption. Weaponized narrative represents a deep threat to national and international cooperation — a threat that our advanced kinetic capacity cannot address. When narratives are weaponized, they can undermine stability by shaking the faith in governance and the rule of law.

All conflict has a narrative basis and requires a narrative strategy to reach the foundational narrative layers of our adversaries if we are to go on the offense. Those foundational levels are usually less than conscious unless the TA has been trained. Because they are less than conscious, weaponized narrative attacks go undetected. A comprehensive long-term offensive narrative strategy will render our adversary’s narratives obsolete, and our defense components will render our own narrative impenetrable.

We have mis-identified parts for the whole; just as terrorism is only one aspect of psychological warfare, so, too, psychological warfare is only one aspect of Narrative Warfare. Narrative Identity Theory is the basis of Narrative Warfare. Psychological, Information, Influence, and Stability Operations are all aspects of Narrative Warfare. They fall under its domain.

The most effective weapons in warfare have always been the ones that target the cognitive space because they are the most enduring.

Kautilya in India in the 4th century B.C. refers to the psychologically based tactics and strategies of those before him, suggesting that the strategies may have been employed as early as 650 B.C. Hits in the cognitive space were prescribed by Sun Tzu, practiced by Genghis Khan’s armies, employed by Xerxes, by Hannibal more than 200 years before the birth of Christ. But hits in the cognitive space do more than produce a win before the bullets fly. It is a mistake to assume that narrative is only a non-kinetic strategy that belongs in the soft power toolbox. Narrative underlies any conflict, even the most kinetically oriented.

Many, including myself, have argued that a terrorist tactic should not be confused with an “act of war” as terrorists are not recognized nation states and cannot legitimately declare war against a sovereign nation. We were wrong. We were focused on a limited modern conception of war. Our fight didn’t end when we got Osama bin Laden, and it won’t end as we have left Afghanistan. We are in the thick of it right now and we had better wrap our heads around what sort of warfare is being waged against us so that we can begin to form a defense and an offense.

Mujahideen graduate from a Taliban military camp in this June 2021 photo. (Taliban photo)

Success in influence will look different and the optics will be less spectacular than any sort of end-point victory that the American public expects. In fact, effective influence doesn’t show itself. What we may see are influence tactics but we don’t see effective influence. If we did, it wouldn’t be effective.

We can achieve our strategic goals by enlisting narratives that shape environments and affect behaviors. We need to lead with a comprehensive strategic narrative that speaks to the identity of its audience.

Our adversaries understand this concept, have embraced it, and have incorporated strategic narratives across their operations. AQAP, ISIS, the Taliban al-Qaeda, and groups on the homeland, effectively disseminate their brand and reinforce their ideologies through broad information operations to control the strategic narrative.

Ten years ago we did what we went to Afghanistan to do: we rooted out bin Laden. That goal was comprehensible to, and supported by, American public sentiment. But that goal was based on a more complex strategic need: to cripple al-Qaeda’s capabilities, stabilize the region, and keep mass casualty attacks from threatening the homeland. And those goals rested on something we are not doing well: influence.

Announcing that we lost Afghanistan is a mistake that rests on the faulty assumption that there is an end point to influence. We may have lost that particular battle in that particular place but the war for influence remains ongoing and we are not even defending ourselves much less dominating. We have the capacity; we just need a certain type of intelligence, and clarity, on what to use and where to aim.

Ajit Maan
Ajit Maan, Ph.D. writes the Narrative & National Security column for Homeland Security Today featuring her original work and work by guest experts in narrative strategy focused on identifying active narratives, who is behind them, and what strategies they are deploying to manipulate and muddy facts to the detriment of America. She is founder and CEO of the award-winning think-and-do-tank, Narrative Strategies LLC, affiliate faculty of the Center for Narrative Conflict Resolution at George Mason University, Professor, Global Security, Future of War, and member of the Brain Trust of the Weaponized Narrative Initiative at Arizona State University. She is also author of seven books including Internarrative Identity: Placing the Self, Counter-Terrorism: Narrative Strategies, Narrative Warfare, and the forthcoming Plato’s Fear. Maan's breakthrough theory of internarrative identity came in 1997; she published a book by the same name in 1999 which was released in its second edition in 2010 (with the addition of the subtitle Placing the Self). Internarrative identity deals with one’s sense of identity as expressed in personal narrative, connecting the formation of identity with one’s life experiences. Maan’s theories are influenced by Paul Ricoeur’s writings in narrative identity theory, and she cites several of his works in her book (Maan, Internarrative Identity: Placing the Self 90). The connection between the interpretation of personal narrative in relation to the larger social group seems to be a key factor in the work of both Maan and Ricoeur. She states that “Following Ricoeur, I’ve argued that who one is and what one will do will be determined by the story one sees oneself as a part of. Going further than Ricoeur, I have suggested that a genuinely imaginative theory of narrative identity would be inclusive of alternatively structured narratives” (Maan, Internarrative Identity: Placing the Self 71-72). This seems to indicate that Maan believes in the role of identity in behavior, but she also recognizes that one can be constrained by society to accept a self-narrative that fits within existing cultural norms. Maan is also influenced by Jacques Derrida as well as Michel Foucault, as referenced in her article “Post-Colonial Practices and Narrative Nomads: Thinking Sikhism Beyond Metaphysics” (227). After establishing herself through her work on internarrative identity, Maan has now turned her attention to the analysis of narrative as a means of understanding (and combating) terrorist recruitment tactics. Her 2014 book, Counter-Terrorism: Narrative Strategies, examines the scripts perpetuated by a wide range of terrorist organizations while also making important interdisciplinary connections between studies in the humanities and current world events (a workbook companion to the text was published in 2018). She collaborated with the late Brigadier General Amar Cheema on the edited volume titled Soft Power on Hard Problems: Strategic Influence in Irregular Warfare, published in 2016. Maan's 2018 book, titled Narrative Warfare, is a collection of articles examining the topic of weaponized narrative; her 2020 book, Plato's Fear, further examines the role of narrative and power. Her work was also the focus of Representations of Internarrative Identity, a 2014 scholarly monograph dedicated to the exploration of internarrative identity through diverse fields of study and from international perspectives. In addition to her contributions to academia, Maan has also been active in sharing her knowledge with a wider audience. In September of 2015, Maan began work on Narrative Strategies, an online blog dedicated to the application of strategic narrative to international affairs. That project formed the basis for a consultancy group of the same name, uniting military and academic experts in the cause of eradicating violent extremism around the world. ​ ​

Related Articles

STAY CONNECTED

- Advertisement -
National Fallen

Latest Articles